Digital Library of the Commons

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 21

The Power and Limitations of Proportional Cutbacks in Common-Pool Resources
(1998) Gardner, Roy; Herr, Andrew; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M.
"This paper examines the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks as an allocation rule for improving the performance of common pool resources (CPRs). Two field cases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, where there are high value types and low value types. This asymmetry induces a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linear-quadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency and distributional consequences of proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived."
Self-Governance and Forest Resources
(1999) Ostrom, Elinor
"Forest resources share attributes with many other resource systems that make difficult their governance and management in a sustainable, efficient and equitable manner. Destruction or degradation of forest resources is most likely to occur in open-access forests where those involved, or external authorities, have not established effective governance. Conventional theories applied to forest resources presumed that forest users themselves were incapable of organising to overcome the temptations to overharvest. Extensive empirical research, however, has challenged this theory and illustrated the many ways that forest users themselves have devised rules that regulate harvesting patterns so as to ensure the sustainability of forest resources over time. "There is now a large body of literature analysing common-pool resources such as many fisheries, irrigation systems and rangelands. A growing consensus exists in this literature concerning the attributes of common-pool resources and of resource users that enhance the probability that self-organisation will occur. Many of these attributes seem also to help predict when forest users will self-organise. Forest users are more likely to devise their own rules when they use a forest that is starting to deteriorate but has not substantially disappeared, when some forest products provide early warning concerning forest conditions, when forest products are predictably available, and when the forest is sufficiently small that users can develop accurate knowledge of conditions. Self-organisation is more likely to occur when forest resources are highly salient to users, when users have a common understanding of the problems they face, when users have a low discount rate, when users trust one another, when users have autonomy to make some of their own rules, and when users have prior organisational experience. These attributes of forests and of the user community affect the benefits and costs of organising to protect and enhance forest resources. When users create organisations consistent with a set of design principles, they are likely to be able to sustain their own institutional arrangements over a long period of time. "This growing consensus about the attributes of users and resources has been applied in the design of policies intended to enhance the participation of local users in the governance and management of common-pool resources, including many forests. Supporting further research - especially studies of forests and their users over time is an important foundation for even more effective public policies in the future."
The Need for Civic Education: A Collective Action Perspective
(1998) Ostrom, Elinor
"Why should we teach the theory of collective action as a critical element in courses on American government and political science more generally? My answer to this question is that the theory of collective action is a core explanatory theory related to almost every 'political problem' addressed by citizens, elected officials, political action groups, courts, legislatures, and families. At any time that individuals may gain from the costly actions of others, without themselves contributing time and effort, they face collective action dilemmas for which there are coping methods."
Rules and Games: Institutions and Common Pool Resources (DRAFT)
(1991) Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy; Walker, James M.
"The central thesis of this book is that individuals jointly using a CPR face incentives leading to harm for themselves and others. The degree of harm depends on the rules they use and the environment in which they make decisions. We formalize this relationship using the framework of institutional analysis and noncooperative game theory. The relationship between rules and games is of fundamental importance to all of the social sciences and particularly when social science is used in policy-making. We intend to explore the general relationship between rules and games and do so by focusing on a broad family of games of considerable substantive importance—the games that appropriators play when they decide upon investment and harvesting activities related to CPRs. We begin with a formal definition for a CPR and a CPR dilemma."
Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis
(1991) Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor
"The term 'common-property resource' is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry."
Framework for Modeling the Linkages between Ecosystems and Human Systems
(1996) Cleveland, Cutler; Costanza, Robert; Eggertsson, Thráinn; Fortmann, Louise; Low, Bobbi S.; McKean, Margaret A.; Ostrom, Elinor; Wilson, James; Young, Oran R.
"We hypothesize that sustainability requires human systems that are concordant at appropriate scales with the ecosystems to which they are related, given the limits of human information processing. Many current governance and management systems are at a scale which is either too large or too small for the ecosystems to which they are related, leading to unsustainable policies for these systems. Problems often occur when human systems developed and sustainable at one scale or for one ecosystem or for one part of an ecosystem are transferred without adequate modification to other scales and ecosystems or to the whole system. In this paper we develop an analytical framework for treating human systems, ecosystems, and their interactions simultaneously. We developed and initial dynamic, multiscale, spatial model that illustrates some of the core concepts of the framework. We are in the process of developing multiscale conceptual and mathematical models and empirical data bases, including a range of ecosystem and human system characteristics, aimed at testing our hypothesis and providing guidance for designing sustainable human systems within sustainable ecosystems."
Commons
(1997) Ostrom, Elinor
"The 'tragedy of the commons' has been a famous metaphor for problems related to common-pool resources ever since Garrett Hardin (1968) wrote his evocative article in Science. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made resources that share two attributes: (I) substantial difficulty (but not impossibility) of devising ways to exclude individuals from benefiting from these resources and (2) the subtractability of benefits consumed by one individual from those available to others."
The Governance and Management of Irrigation Systems: An Institutional Perspective
(1993) Yan-Tang, Shui; Ostrom, Elinor
"During the past three decades, massive resources have been invested by donor agencies and developing countries in technologically sophisticated, large-scale irrigation projects. Even though the planning processes for these projects rely on modern benefit-cost analysis, many projects that looked outstanding on paper have not fared well 'on the ground.' Costs have usually been higher than expected, and benefits have been lower. Cost recovery has often not proved feasible."
International Forestry Resources and Institutions Research Program (IFRI:)Research Strategy
(1995) Ostrom, Elinor; Wertime, Mary Beth
"The International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program is a long-term effort to establish an international network of Collaborating Research Centers (CRCs) who will: * continuously monitor and report on forest conditions, plant biodiversity, and rates of deforestation in a sample of forests in their country or region; * continuously monitor and report on the activities and outcomes achieved by community organizations; local, regional, and national governments; businesses; NGOs; and donor-managed projects in their country or region; * analyze how socioeconomic, demographic, political, and legal factors affect the sustainability of ecological systems; * prepare policy reports of immediate relevance for forest users, government officials, NGOs, donors, and policy analysts; * build substantial in-country capacity to conduct rigorous and policy-relevant research relying on interdisciplinary teams already trained in advanced social and biological scientific methods; and * prepare training materials that synthesize findings for use by officials, NGOs, forest users, and students. "This Research Strategy provides a broad overview of the goals of the IFRI research program and its methods of operation. More detailed information about the structure and content of the IFRI database, theoretical foundations, and findings from initial studies is available from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University."
Common Property Regimes in the Forest: Just a Relic from the Past?
(1995) McKean, Margaret A.; Ostrom, Elinor
"Common property regimes, used by communities to manage forests and other resources for long-term benefits, were once widespread around the globe. Some may have disappeared naturally as communities opted for other arrangements, particularly in the face of technological and economic change, but in most instances common property regimes seem to have been legislated out of existence. This happened in two basic ways: where common property regimes - however elaborate and long-lasting - had never been codified, they may simply have been left out of a country's first attempt to formalize and codify property rights to the resources in question (for example, in Indonesia, Brazil and most countries of sub-Saharan Africa). Where common property regimes had legal recognition, land reforms sometimes transferred all such rights to individuals (as in the case of enclosure in the United Kingdom) or to the government itself, or to a combination of the two (as in India and Japan)."

Filters

Settings

Sort By

Results per page

Search Results