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Title: FROM EXCLUSION TO OWNERSHIP: THE CONTINUING TRANSFORMATION OF THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITIES IN RELATION TO TWO ADJACENT NATURE RESERVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S "WILD COAST"

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Introduction

Like South Africa itself, the country's coastline comprises more developed and less developed stretches. Portions of the Western Cape and Natal coast approximate Southern California or the French Riviera; other stretches, on the West Coast, in the southern Cape and and the eastern Cape, and to the north of Durban are less developed, but the resorts and settlements have modern infrastructure. Next to the Zululand Coast, the "Wild Coast" of the former Transkei is the least developed of the entire coastline. Accessed mainly by dirt roads of up to 100km long which are so poorly maintained as to be virtually impassable by conventional vehicles when it rains (as it does regularly here), the area also lacks electricity and telephones. Other services, such as shops and garages, tend to be associated with the trading stores which are geared to the needs of the subsistence-agrarian indigenous population. In spite of these deterrents, the hitherto unspoiled beauty of the area has long attracted the more robust local holidaymakers and, increasingly, international tourists to the few resort hotels and holiday-cottages.

Near the centre of the Wild Coast the Mbashe River in its scenic gorge divides nearly 6 000 hectares of pristine forests, grasslands, estuaries and coastline into twin nature reserves: that of Dwesa on the western side and Cwebe on the eastern side. Only a quarter of one percent of South Africa consists of indigenous forest, so these fine examples of South Coast Forest are especially valuable. This has long been recognised by the State, and the forests have been protected in one form or another since the turn

of the century. Now the twin nature reserves are about to pass from the ownership of the South African state to that of the surrounding communities -- Xhosa-speakers subsisting, for the most part, on a combination of animal husbandry, cultivation, remittances and welfare.

This paper, based on research still in progress, analyses the transition of the reserves from areas of protection and exclusion to a new role as the greatest material assets of the surrounding communities in the contexts of the making of the old South Africa and the transition to the new.

The populating of the Dwesa-Cwebe area

The stretch of coast which the Mbashe river bisects is associated with the earliest recorded history of the Xhosa nation. The first Xhosa paramount chief who can be dated with any degree of confidence, Ngconde, ruled from his Great Place near the Mbashe River from the mid-seventeenth century onwards (Peires 1976). In the next century, under Chief Phalo, the amaXhosa moved westwards, leaving the territory to the east of the Mbashe, including the Cwebe forest, a no-man's land.

The ama-Bomvana, originally from Natal, needed a safe haven, and so their chief, Gambushe, bought the non-man's land for ten cattle from Hintsa chief of the Gcalecka, the heirs of Phalo and, ultimately, Nconde, who had the rights to the land but no use for it as they inhabited the area to the west of the Mbashe. In the course of time the area to the west of the Mbashe river, including the Dwesa forest, came to be regarded as Gcaleckaland while the area to the east, including the present-day Cwebe reserve, came to be associated with the Bomvana (Gergh & Visagie 1985:61).

This neat division of the study area was later complicated by the arrival of the so-called Fingo (a.k.a. Mfengu), refugees from the Natal chiefdoms crushed by Shaka who fled westwards through the Transkei only to be subjugated by the Gcalecka Xhosa. When, during the war of 1834-5 the Gcalecka were routed by the British, these Fingoes were rescued by the missionary, John Ayliff and settled in the Cape Colony (Stapleton 1996:233-4).

As the Fingoes tended to side with the British in subsequent struggles with the Xhosa and identify with western culture, the colonial regime rewarded them with privileged access to land, particularly where such land was of little value to whites or in areas of contestation between chiefdoms (Switzer 1992: 60-75). As the struggle between the Xhosa and the British on the frontier intensified in the first half of the nineteenth century, increasingly desperate Xhosa-speakers passed themselves off as Fingoes to enjoy these privileges. By the 1850s there was a "population explosion" of those regarded as Fingoes in the Colony. But relief was at hand: The Great Cattle Killing of 1857, which caused the deaths of up to 50 000 people and the displacement of 150 000 was a disaster for the Xhosa, but it created opportunities for the colonists and the hard-pressed Fingoes (Peires 1989; Switzer 1993:72).

The Gcalecka, being the closest survivors of the catastrophe to the Colony, were the most vulnerable; British troops drove them across the Mbashe into Bomvanaland in preparation for colonisation of the former Gcaleckaland. For their part:

[c]olonial government-appointed Fingo headmen of low status saw the move to Transkei as an excellent opportunity to acquire more land, cattle and power. Fingo headmen and their henchmen then embarked on a vicious campaign of land-grabbing with Captain Veldman

Bikitsha, a veteran of many campaigns against the Xhosa chiefdoms and a government-appointed chief, acquiring the largest share (Stapleton 1966:245-6).

Best estimates are that around 20 000 Fingoes were relocated in this way, repopulating, among other inland areas of the western Transkei, the land on the west bank of the Mbashe River around the Dwesa forest.

The struggle for a measure of independence and autonomy

Over the next half century there was some scope for recovery and consolidation among the communities of Dwesa-Cwebe. The Bomvana, remained affluent and secure across the Mbashe, well able to play host to the fugitive Gcalecka for a time, because their chief, Mpahla, had refused to participate in the Cattle-Killing. For their part, the Fingo on the other side of the river responded to having privileged access to land and "favoured nation" standing with the missionaries and colonial authorities, by embracing Victorian Christian ideology with its emphasis on agriculture over pastoralism and individualism over collectivism, and literacy, numeracy, the plough and introduced cultivars (Bundy 1979). Although the Fingoes' agricultural revolution was never as marked on the remote Transkei coast as it was in the colony, their inclination towards Christianity and Western education and life-style served to differentiate them culturally from their Gcalecka and Bomvana neighbours even if there was little difference in standard of living.

After the turn of the century subsistence for all groups on either side of the Mbashe became more problematical, and has continued in that vein ever since. In the aftermath of the annexation of the Transkei in the 1890s, measures to disempower the traditional leaders and extend the authority of the colonialists brought dislocation to the societies which most depended on traditional leadership: the Bomvana and the Gcalecka. At the same time, two waves of cattle disease, in 1897 and 1910, decimated the herds of the Bomvana and plunged them into poverty and dependency (Jansen 1973:13-14). Nor were the agrarian, western-orientated Fingo immune from hardship at this time: racial land legislation, which was to become such a central measure of white hegemony, had already begun to limit the scope of the progressive Fingo farmers of the Eastern Cape. Soon these measures would reduce all rural blacks to a below-subsistence level designed to encourage the recruitment of preferably young males for labour on white farms, mines and public works.

The unfeasibility of armed resistance by blacks had long been apparent on the frontier, even if it failed to deter the desperate; but with annexation its futility was apparent to all. From henceforth the most sophisticated leaders would negotiate for what little political space they could gain, but the rural masses of the Eastern Cape, traditionalists such as the Gcalecka and Bomvana, on the one hand, and the westernised Fingo, on the other, could only articulate their resistance at the level of ideology (cf. Mayer 1980, McAllister 1980). Until the 1970s when it began to decline the Bomvana and Gcalecka, among others, would embrace the so-called Red ideology in terms of which they sought solace and articulated resistance by emphasizing their native culture and traditions, whereas the Fingo and other progressives would characterising themselves -- and being labelled by the others -- as School people: those who embraced Western culture.

The long slide into poverty and dependency

From the 1930s onwards labour migration involving all groupings of Xhosa-speakers increased markedly, and after 1940 subsistence agricultural production began to decline in the general area of the Wild Coast (Andrew 1992).

The old mode of production, which had been highly effective in the past, emphasized large homesteads headed by polygynists with dependent sons and their wives and children which were well-suited to hand cultivation and fencless animal husbandry. As arable land became increasingly scarce, young men were motivated to establish independent homesteads early in order to claim their share. Such individualism even in the teeth of paternal opposition had become possible with the spread of (migrant) wage labour. But even when capitalized, the single-field monogamous household, which was now all that was possible could not compare with the old large households of many fields and wives. The increasing absence of men engaging in migrant labour exacerbated an already less tenable situation. Adjustments were made: sorghum gave way to the more manageable plantings of maize intercropped with beans and pumpkins; households became more dependent on technology (oxen and ploughs or tractors) and cooperation with other households at critical points in the agricultural cycle. In spite of these measures arable and stock-farming became less sustainable while gardens which were easier to work, manure and fence than fields with limited labour resources came to assume a central role in subsistence (McAllister 1992:205-7).

Official efforts to mitigate these dire consequences of the land legislation (the land acts of 1913 and 1936) were hamstrung by the reluctance of their colonial- and apartheid-era political masters to abandon racial ideology.

Betterment Planning, or Rehabilitation, was a case in point. Adopted in the late 1920s but not implemented until after the Second World War, Betterment Planning entailed the division of the land into discrete residential, arable and residential areas; the relocation of people from their dispersed homestead sites into villages; the fencing of residential areas and grazing camps; and perhaps the introduction of contour ploughing, rotational grazing, reservoirs, boreholes, irrigation schemes, agricultural extension services, livestock improvements, erosion projects, and so on.

"Betterment" was widely implemented in the Eastern Cape, but frequently with an insufficient grant of land or fencing and none of the "extras". Yet even when fully implemented Betterment Planning was inimical to local survival strategies (for it had come to that). Residential relocation was destructive of the pre-existing cooperative networks on which the new smaller households have been seen to be so dependent. The re-organisation of space weakened local autonomy and control which was already tenuous; it also, by default, increased the power of the State and its placemen, a trend hitherto associated with underdevelopment. Far from gaining land in the process, "bettered" communities frequently lost out on grazing and, even more vitally, gardens with their central subsistence role now that field cultivation had declined.

This iniquitous system was inflicted on the communities of Dwesa and Cwebe, along with other coastal communities, particularly in the 1960s (see also De Wet 1987; McAllister 1989; O'Connell 1981; Sansom 1974). A feature of particular relevance in the case of communities near protected areas is that the land-use flexibility and proximity to a *range* of natural resources which was a key feature of the old scattered settlements was curtailed. Forced settlement thus accelerated ecological damage through overgrazing, erosion, and natural resource depletion. Beinart & Coates are thus correct when they cite the arrival of "betterment" in the

area as a factor in the 1960 revolt in Pondoland, a couple of hundred kilometres west of Cwebe-Dwesa (1995:102). Attempts to reserve the coastal forests were opposed by ama-Mpondo, but the main casualties were chiefs and headman who had sided with the State in the matter of "betterment". It took a helicopter-assisted armoured division to restore order (ibid.)

Given the condition of the infrastructure along the Wild Coast (either lacking altogether or in bad repair) it is probable that no one at Dwesa and Cwebe heard of the Pondoland revolt, and that it therefore had no influence on what happened at Cwebe-Dwesa thirty-four years later. Alternatively, when a similar configuration of forest closure and betterment occurred in the area, it is possible that some older resident remembered something he had heard long before... But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

Whether as a consequence of betterment or other factors material conditions on the Wild Coast as in the rest of the Transkei continued to deteriorate. The passage of the Transkei to nominal independence in terms of "Grand Apartheid" policy in 1976, did not bring the hoped-for international recognition and investment, and the efforts of the South African and Transkeian governments to encourage industrialization within the Transkei thereafter bore scant fruit -- less than 20 000 jobs in manufacturing at their peak in 1985, reducing by a quarter by 1990 (Southall 1992:17). More disastrously, migrant labour contracted from 125 900 to 104 000 in the course of the 1980s, as the mines sought more docile and vulnerable recruits from neighbouring countries (ibid.). The only consolation was that the civil service was mushrooming, in the manner of the bantustans, and social pensions were tending to keep pace with inflation.

From the point of view of most people in the far-flung communities at Dwesa and Cwebe, lacking secondary education or contacts, the new opportunities in the civil service were largely irrelevant, though social pensions were becoming increasingly important as old-style oscillating migrant labour became a rarer option. Younger rural men, and increasingly women as well, now opted for open-ended out-migration, either to the Transkeian towns and cities in the increasingly vain hope of employment, or to the urban areas of South Africa where Influx Control was uninforced by the late 1980s and, after 1990, abandoned altogether. This new migration may have taken pressure off the rural households, but it did not generate remittances like the old form: couples and singles, some with children, most of them work-seekers, did not have the capacity of employed, hostel-dwelling single men to remit and save.

Diminished cash-income from migrants made it more difficult to capitalise agriculture -- cultivation outside of irrigable gardens anyway became unviable during the longest and hardest drought of the century, c1982-1994. At the same time cattle -- the only security the majority living under communal tenure had to fall back on -- were decimated. Rural households found themselves between the hammer of a loss of income from remittances and the anvil of a decline in subsistence. In many cases the only source of income the household had was the pensions of its disabled and its elderly, and only then if they were registered as social pensioners¹.

¹ Social pensions continued to be paid more or less regularly, every second month, in the former Transkei. In recent years, pensions have increased in real terms faster than workers' wages. Households containing one pensioner can survive; those with two or more are almost affluent by local standards.

A recent survey in the Dwesa-Cwebe area found that while 80 percent of the adult population is unemployed only 13 percent of them are on welfare; 605 out of the 2 270 households surveyed had income from neither of these two sources (Village Planner 1997:1). When our household survey has been completed and analysed it will be possible to document the poverty of most households at Dwesa and Cwebe more fully, but it is already clear that the pattern of deepening need and the flight to the cities has continued through and since the dissolution of the Transkei bantustan and its incorporation into the new province of Eastern Cape.

Natural resource use at Cwebe and Dwesa

In the rural eastern Cape the Xhosa and even the Fingoes have always made as much use of the natural environment as circumstances and common-sense allow (cf Palmer 1997). Their large stock, at least, being regarded as capital-on-the hoof, has generally not been consumed outside of a ritual context; which provides an incentive for seeking protein from the environment, via hunting, fishing and collecting. Nor have they troubled to cultivate that which is generally available from the environment, such as timber, thatching grass, wild spinach (*imifino*) and medicinal barks and herbs. As with indigenous populations everywhere in the colonised territories, this strategy of complementary natural resource use made excellent sense before colonisation, but became less sustainable afterwards as, in particular hunting, has been constrained by the colonisers and, in many cases, successive regimes have continued in the same vein.

At Dwesa and Cwebe, an unusually rich environment has offered:

- infrastructure for the subsistence economy in the form of poles and laths for the construction of houses and kraals and the fencing of gardens;
- dietary supplements in the form of game, *imifino* (wild spinach), fish and shellfish (mussels, limpets, etc.);
- medicines, from the bark of trees and plants found only in the forests;
- emergency grazing, in times of drought;
- shelter for fugitives or dissidents, whether these were Bomvana harrassed by the Thembu, Gcalecka fleeing from the British, or Umkhonto weSizwe training cadres for the struggle².

The major forests at Dwesa and Cwebe -- together covering 5 700 hectares -- as well as the small "pocket" forests found in valleys all over the area were always protected to the extent that they were not differentiated from other forms of communal land and access required the sanction of the Chief or Headman. Besides, serious depredation of well-grown indigenous forest required a level of technology -- the steel axe, the saw -- which was only attained latterly. The same applied to fish, though the

² Umkhonto weSizwe was the military wing of the ANC; it translates as Spear of the Nation. During the years that it was banned in Transkei, as in the Republic, cadres were trained clandestinely in and around the Dwesa-Cwebe forests.

species of the rocks and shallows -- crayfish, octopus, mussels and limpets -- could be exploited without recourse to advanced technology. The picture of natural resource use at Cwebe-Dwesa is not yet complete but it appears that so long as only the communities closest to the forests and shore were involved, employing limited technology, their depredations were entirely sustainable. The incentive for over-exploitation, over-riding even traditional notions of sensible resource use, obviously increases as alternatives become limited or ruled out altogether. Households without income cannot consider other than timber and laths for fencing, game and shellfish as sources of protein, and so on. The long slide into poverty of the communities at Dwesa-Cwebe has greatly increased their potential threat to the environment.

The advent and extension of protectionism at Cwebe and Dwesa

The colonial thrust into Transkei broke the power of traditional authority and thus the traditional environmental controls. It also offered an opportunity for travelling groups of sawyers to ransack the indigenous forests of the Transkei. It was in the face of this onslaught that the forests at Dwesa and Cwebe were declared state forests and became protected areas -- part of the only one quarter of one percent of South Africa that is under indigenous forest (Beinart & Coates 1995:34). The fact that the legislation contained servitudes granting collecting and even grazing rights to the neighbouring communities suggested that the early administrators of the forests realised that the neighbouring communities posed little threat (Vermaak & Peckham 1996). They appear to have been less tolerant of the communities that existed within the boundaries of the protected areas, in spite of the fact that half the World's protected areas have people living inside them (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996). These were subject to intermittent forced removals in the first half of this century. When preparing for the transfer of the reserves from Forestry to Conservation in 1975, which preceded their hand-over to Transkei on independence, the most proximal neighbouring communities were removed on the pretext of "betterment" (Village Planner 1998:2).

Ostensibly, the circumstances -- involving a combination of protectionism and betterment -- are similar to those described for Pondoland, above. But there are two crucial differences: (i) the declaration of the protected area and the introduction of betterment are decades apart; and (ii) protection was instigated, at first benignly, before the impoverishment of the communities.

The actions just described were not quite sufficient to provoke a violent protest -- not yet, anyway.

Under the Transkei Government's Department of Nature Conservation the twin reserves were brought more into conformity with other Southern African protected areas. These seldom emphasize "scenic wonders" (as is the case in the United States with its Yosemite, Niagara and Grand Canyon parks). In South Africa protected areas began as a response to the failure of hunting restrictions in the nineteenth century: they were refuges for endangered big game in vacant expanses of bushveld, and generally continue in that vein, though with an increased emphasis on biodiversity (Beinart & Coates 1995: 75). In the course of time the chance of viewing the "big five" and other large quadrupeds came to be expected of Southern African protected areas, and any reserve with ambitions had to conform. After 1976, accordingly, the forests and grasslands of Dwesa and Cwebe were filled with game, including white rhino, wildebeeste, a variety of antelopes and crocodile; the fences were reinforced and the reserves were placed off-limits as far as the surrounding communities were concerned. To the "injury" of forced removals was added the "insult" of exclusion from resources the communities depended on and considered to be theirs. But still the time for action had not yet arrived.

So long as the ideology of protectionism reigned among South Africa's and Transkei's nature conservators, and rural communities were disempowered through disenfranchisement or bantustan authoritarian rule, there was not much that the neighbouring communities of the Dwesa and Cwebe reserves could do about their situation. The unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990 was their signal for the intensification of their struggle for land restitution and restored access to the reserves by means of lobbying and negotiations with the authorities. But the momentous period of the transition to democracy and the reincorporation of the Bantustans into a single South Africa was not a good time for addressing such problems: the enabling structure (a conservation authority for the new province of the Eastern Cape) and the enabling legislation for land restitution were not yet in place. So it was that two further landmark events in the transition to democracy -- the elections and presidential inauguration of April-May 1994 -- were to pass without any official response to the representations of the community leaders. The time for direct action was nigh.

The popular invasions of the reserves and their consequences

The strategy selected for expressing the frustrations of the frontline communities and drawing attention to their cause was a combination of land invasion and "demonstrative seizure of resources", as one commentator described it (Village Planner 1997:2). Hundreds, if not thousands, of villagers streamed through the gates of the reserves in several waves (coinciding with spring tides) in the closing months of 1994 and helped themselves to forest products and marine resources. The conservation officials on hand were powerless to stop the destruction, and at one point the army was called in to assist. Prime-time television viewers were treated to close-ups of throngs of women in traditional dress stripping mussels off the rocks with agricultural implements and removing them by the bucket-full. This was highly unusual behaviour, quite unlike the local approach to the environment before 1975, when the servitudes were still in place. The message seemed to be: "If we are to continue to be denied access to these natural resources on which we, in our deepening poverty, increasingly depend, then we would rather destroy them than let others have them".

In a desperate attempt to address the volatile situation at a meeting in the area, the then M E C³ of Environment Affairs in the Eastern Cape, Tertius Delport, immediately complied with local demands to restore access to the forests for consumptive use even though scientists were already estimating that the environment would take at least ten years to recover from the damage inflicted, even if left alone (Dye & Lasiak 1994). But he also gave official sanction to the fledgling Eastern Cape Nature Conservation's emergency report which recommended the setting up of village-based Conservation Committees (CCs) to assist in the regulation of access to the reserves and to negotiate joint management with the ECNC. The general acceptance of this intervention by the communities encouraged some of the conservationists to seek the assistance of scientists and other interested parties to take matters further, proposing a Bioregional Development Forum and a call for research proposals -- only they forgot to invite community representatives to their deliberations.

Whether it was the crass failure to consult locally, or the months lost in obtaining funding, it proved

³ Member of the Executive Committee. MECs are the equivalent of ministers at the provincial level.

difficult to sustain local interest in the issue of access to the reserves and joint management. But the only project to eventually attract funding, the Dwebe Project, initially operating out of ECNC offices but independently funded, persevered with its participatory facilitation via mobile and stationary workshops⁴. The deeper reason for the Dwebe Projects travails, more obvious now than then, was that issues of access had become less interesting to the communities over the months since the invasions even if, from the point of view of conservationists, sustainable management of the resources of the reserves remained the priority. It was no longer *access* but *restitution* that motivated the CC members.

Given the history of land alienation in the area, there was much local interest in the ANC's election promises of land reform. When it became government policy and was passed into law as The Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 identifying land alienated since 1913 on racial grounds, it looked as if the communities of Dwesa-Cwebe might have a case. A land NGO, the Transkei Land Service Organisation (TRALSO) and its consultant, The Village Planner confirmed this impression and from thenceforth worked closely with the communities until the claim succeeded.

The passage to land restitution

Working towards ownership via a land claim made more sense than dealing with access because assertion of the former would anyway improve the terms of the latter. An early proof of the workability of this approach came when the ECNC, distracted by the task of amalgamating three departments into one with no senior management yet appointed, was readily made to concede that the management of the reserves should be a joint effort and neighbouring villagers should benefit from the proceeds of the reserves in an agreement signed on 4 December 1995. The next step, however, was to establish a Joint Management Committee, an unprecedented step for which preparation and a constitution were required. The Dwebe Project, with its track record in facilitation, made a major contribution here. But it it was to continue under the new conditions, it would have to evolve.

As a first step the Dwebe Project distanced itself further from the ECNC by transferring to the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University and making the facilitation of joint management but a part of a more general project aimed at confronting the dearth of baseline research in the area.

Funded by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) the expanded project was entitled *Indigenous knowledge, conservation reform, natural resource management and rural development in the Dwesa and Cwebe Nature Reserves and neighbouring village settlements*. New research topics of the first phase included the historical-anthropological background, GIS mapping, a survey of water sources and the ethno-botanical research (cf. Palmer et al 1997). The second phase, in closer collaboration with the HSRC and with an expanded research team, would continue the focus on GIS mapping, but now the focus was to be an intensive socioeconomic and environmental survey of the two "frontline" villages -- Cwebe, the village closest to Cwebe reserve, and Ntubeni, the village closest to Dwesa reserve. An ancillary focus would be on the households' exposure to past and present tourism as well as interviews with holiday cottage-owners and guests at the only hotel, with a view to

⁴ The mobile workshops consisted of excursions to other provinces to give CC members an opportunity to observe other conservation and eco-tourism projects in action.

predicting the impact of imminent tourism development in the area.

While we were engaged with the first phase of our project, a protracted period of negotiation ensued in which the main role-players, the neighbouring communities, the ECNC, the Department of Land Affairs and the Regional Land Claims Commission dealt with the land claims and established working mechanisms for joint management and benefit sharing.

The main facilitators of this process were the Transkei Land Service Organisation (TRALSO), the Village Planner and the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER). Progress was slow largely because the Dwesa-Cwebe issue was way ahead of national and provincial policy formation. Senior government officials accordingly lacked the political will to take binding decisions. Then, in August 1997, the Minister of Land Affairs - Derek Hanekom - visited the communities of Dwesa and Cwebe and assured them that he supported their claims to restitution and that the State would transfer property rights either through the Restitution Act or the State Disposal Act, subject to the agreement of cabinet colleagues, the creation of necessary legal entities and clear guarantees for future conservation.

Since then planning proceeded rapidly. With the assistance of the Department of Land Affairs, communities have organised themselves into Communal Property Associations (CPAs). This element of tenure reform means that they will now officially own the land on which they are currently residing. This is an improvement in their land security as previously the land was held in tribal trust and they could be moved about at the whim of government officials, as was often the case with Betterment. The reserve land is to be transferred to a land holding Trust on which each of the CPAs will be represented. The land-use will remain as conservation and the new land owners will be empowered to lease out the conservation management function to a competent conservation body. This will generate much-needed revenue to be put to use for the development of these economically depressed areas. Another potential revenue earner is eco-tourism. This is being promoted as a sustainable development strategy along with forestry and agriculture projects by the Department of Trade and Industry. This initiative, called the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative, seeks to attract private investors into the area and encourages them to form partnership arrangements with local communities to ensure that eco-tourism revenue remains within the area. That is why the resolution of the land claim at Dwesa-Cwebe was accelerated by ministerial intervention; any confusion on that issue would have deterred investors.

Conclusion

The resolution of the Dwesa-Cwebe land claim is imminent. The CPAs have been formed and the trust has a name, the Community Development Trust, though it is still to be formed. It will probably all be settled before the second phase of our project has been written up. Delayed by funding-difficulties, we are half-way through the second phase. Perhaps the results will be of use to the new partnerships of national and regional government, national and local investors and the communities-as-owners as they confront the enormous task of bringing development to this coastal area which -- we are discovering in the course of our household interviews -- is still as poverty stricken as it has been at any time in the last 60 years.

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