

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, POLICY ANALYSTS AND PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION*

by

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At the Bloomington conference in 1981 a group of colleagues in both Europe and North America undertook to clarify for one another the theoretical concepts and methodological tools that they were using to conduct inquiries at the interorganizational and intergovernmental level of analysis in the public sector. The key concepts being utilized were networks, implementation structures and public-service industries. The concept of network supplies an important heuristic for mapping the configuration of relationships that is likely to be involved in patterns of interaction in the advanced industrial societies of Western Europe and North America. Much of the discussion, however, focused upon the conceptual orientation and methodologies being used to study implementation structures and public-service industries.

As sometimes happens in the exploration of new concepts and methodologies the conferees were not able to clarify how the two different approaches were related to one another. Much of discussion proceeded as though the two approaches were competitive. Yet there were important disjunctions. The essential complementarity did not get clarified because of the failure to specify the essential relationships between

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policy studies and service-delivery studies.

This failure has been a stimulus to further reflection on my part. I have sought to understand different modes of political inquiry and the importance of establishing appropriate linkages among these modes of analysis if we are to develop adequate programs of inquiry into the study of political phenomena generally. Basic distinctions are difficult to establish because so much of political experience depends upon making comparisons across a multitude of conceptual sets that people draw upon in relating themselves to one another and that scholars in turn use to study the action tendencies that are derived from the use of those conceptual sets.

Political phenomena rely minimally upon overtly observable phenomena. Types of buildings provide clues about the activities that are likely to occur in those locations. Uniforms or patterns of dress provide other clues about action tendencies that can be expected. But the conceptions that people have in relating themselves to one another are of more importance in understanding what is giving order to human activities and relationships. Organizations are artifacts that contain their own artisans and an understanding of the nature of these artifacts depends upon the conceptions and explanations of the artisans who use these artifacts to relate themselves to one another. What Bielefeld University, for example, is depends upon the conceptions and explanations offered by those who identify themselves as being a part of Bielefeld University. The scholars who seek to understand the cognitively-pregnant phenomena of human organization must, in turn, fashion their own cognitive tools where the referent is often difficult to specify. There is little wonder that problems arise in specifying cognitions of cognitions when human beings cannot directly read one another's minds.

An explicit and self-conscious effort to study the phenomenon of interorganizational and intergovernmental relationships when viewed from the perspective of studying cognitively-pregnant experiences is something of a heroic effort in itself. The overwhelming preoccupation in the study

of political phenomenon has usually focused upon the study of relationships inherent in a particular organization or unit of government. It is relatively easy to put boundaries upon patterns of relationships, to reify the concept of an organization and to imagine it to be a discrete thing. Where the focus shifts to the structure of interorganizational relationships and how one defines and conceptualizes those particular structures is itself a difficult task in human cognition.

In this paper I shall focus upon some basic cognitive distinctions that scholars make when they engage in the study of political phenomena. The distinctions I want to make pertain to what I shall refer to as policy analysis, institutional analysis and operational analysis. First, I wish to show how these different modes of analysis are related to one another and show some of the difficulties that are likely to occur when studies are conducted without an awareness of the essential complementarity of these different modes of analysis. I shall turn first to policy analysis, to operational analysis and then to institutional analysis. Finally, I shall indicate how the focus upon implementation structures and upon public-service industries to study patterns of interorganizational relationships are essentially complementary to one another. The tasks confronting us, then, is to develop a conscious awareness of the importance of making proper linkages in scholarship drawing upon these different ways of conceptualizing patterns of interorganizational relationships.

Public Policy Analysis

In the contemporary social sciences and in political science particularly a mode of analysis characterized as public policy analysis has been a major preoccupation of many scholars and professional policy analysts. In a most general sense, policy analysis is as old as efforts of legislators or others to explain the implications that would

follow from a proposed course of legislative action. While this ancient perspective still has considerable relevance, the contemporary modes of policy analysis have taken somewhat different stances in relation to place of legislation in policy analysis.

One mode of analysis takes the legislative specification of goal or purpose as given and proceeds to conceptualize a means-ends analysis as being the appropriate mode of inquiry for conceptualizing the nature of a program that would entail the appropriate operation to realize the specified goal. This is an effort to construe or explain the relationships of an administrative program to the execution of public policy.

Another mode of analysis again takes the specification of legislative goal as defining the task to be accomplished and focuses upon the implementation of public policy. Implementation is considered successful when the legislative goal is realized and relatively unsuccessful as implementation efforts depart from the realization of legislative goals. Taking the legislative goal as controlling is sometimes referred to as a "top-down" approach. A variation in implementation studies are those that focus upon the configuration of different organizations that are implicated by any policy decision and examine the pattern of interorganizational arrangements that are involved in working out the implementation of a legislative enactment. This latter variation is the context for specifying implementation structures in "analysing policy production" (B.H. to V. & L.O., 12.3.83).

There are critical problems that arise in these modes of analysis. One is the place assumed by the specification of the "goal" or "goals" in the legislative enactment. This aspect of a legislative action includes the specification of basic considerations of value. The goal is the value to be sought. Further, the mode of analysis proceeds on a presumption that a legislature is the legitimate instrumentality to make such decisions and the legislative decision is not itself to be subject to critical assessment and examination.

Little or no consideration is given to the circumstance that political discourse at a legislative level, especially as one has recourse to only one legislature for a large nation-state, has strong tendencies to rely upon simple formulations that have the import of slogans: "war on poverty", "social justice", "pure water", "clean air", "good health". There may, then, be reasons why goals formulated in legislation are not properly specified or are misspecified.

The emphasis placed upon a means-ends calculus as applying to policy analysis suggests that the transformations in the means-end process yield some specifiable state. Problems at this point abound in determining whether the resulting state is a physical state such as "pure water" or "good health" would clearly imply, or a state of social relationships as a term like "social justice" might imply.

A means-ends calculus would need to specify the causal conditions that would yield something that is properly specified as "pure water". Can such conditions be specified so that the production of "pure water" is yielded as an end-state? If such a process were technically feasible, what would it cost and what would be its effects? Presumably distilled water comes reasonably close to providing a technical criterion for pure water. Is this the goal being specified? What would be the costs of yielding such an end-state? What would be its effects? Can such a process be organized so that it would apply to a nation as a whole? If not what are the conditions of variability that would require variable production processes in the way that particular enterprises or combinations of enterprises might be organized to produce comparable end-states?

In the allusions to means-ends analysis, the traditional modes of public-policy analysis rarely proceed with rigor in specifying a technically-feasible engineering solution, but instead use a means-ends language as a crude heuristic to presume that an administrative process can be organized to yield the desired effect. The specification of end-states

is abandoned for a crude and unspecified criterion of choice that is assumed to function in a set of rule ordered relationships. The problem is shifted from being an engineering problem to a regulatory problem where the assumption is made that administrative authorities are competent to enforce whatever regulations are adopted.

The rationale for implementation studies arises primarily from the circumstance that the thrust of the policy problem is not primarily one of engineering but one of regulation. The instrumental quality of a means-ends calculation then shifts to one of administration. Bureaucracies as ideal-types are often assumed to be rational means for attaining the goals sought in policy decisions. Perfectly obedient public servants held accountable by a well integrated hierarchy of command are viewed as the appropriate means for the translation of legislative specification of goals into effects. The discrepancy between goal specification and performance is the issue addressed in implementation studies.

This shift in the nature of the problem with an assumption about the appropriateness of a means-ends calculation usually ignores the fundamental differences that are involved in physically producing "pure water" from regulating patterns of human conduct by reference to rules and rule enforcement. This latter problem requires reference to human institutions as rule ordered relationships and a range of difficulties that are entailed in those relationships that are of a radically different order of magnitude than those that have to do with the properties of H₂O.

One of numerous difficulties is the issue of enforcement and the costs that apply to enforcement procedures. Most societies have elaborate procedures with exacting standards of judgment that apply to the imposition of criminal penalties. The imposition of sanctions for the violation of rules of law normally involves criminal jurisprudence.

The procedures in criminal jurisprudence in the United States, for example, require that special criteria be met which are in the legal competence of only specialized authorities. These authorities exist apart from the normal administrative channels that have to do with the implementation of public policy. Before an indictment can be issued in criminal proceedings, it is necessary to engage in "preliminary" proceedings that are designed to determine whether "probable cause" exists for prosecution. These proceedings uniformly require recourse to a grand jury, a Prosecuting Attorney or an Attorney General as independent law officers to establish the appropriate grounds for an indictment. Conviction of a criminal offense requires evidence that must meet demanding conditions of proof including that of unanimous agreement by a trial jury. The condition of unanimous agreement is designed to establish proof "beyond reasonable doubt". Enforcement costs associated with criminal proceedings, thus, entail high costs both for the enforcers and for those subject to enforcement efforts. Given these costs one would not expect to find high levels of enforcement for those policies that entail high costs for "target groups" and proportionately small or negligible benefits for anyone else.

Implementation studies which view the relevant structure of relationships as involving multiple organizational arrangements have abandoned the assumption that a theory of bureaucracy provides the appropriate instrumentality for translating authoritatively specified goals into effects. But the problem is still viewed as one of "policy production" without having specified the problems of entrepreneuring the desired effects. Is, beginning to understand some of the difficulties involved we need to specify more precisely the nature of policy decisions and their relationships to other decisions that are brought into focus by reference to the operational and the institutional modes of analysis.

Clarity is added if we recognize that the legislation is confined to words. Resolutions and statutes are nothing but words. A policy decision then is a set of instructions.

If well formulated that set of instructions may specify the attainment of some objective or goal with accompanying instructions that assigns certain powers with commensurable obligations to some who are to exercise entrepreneurial responsibilities in the realization of those objectives in relation to correlative obligations and entitlement on the part of the community of people who will presumably benefit from efforts being undertaken. We should never forget that policies are no more than a set of instructions and that the legislative process entails no more than producing sets of instructions.

Operational Analysis: Service Delivery Systems

To see the effect of a set of instructions upon end-states as tangible events requires a shift in the focus of inquiry. One needs to be concerned with states of the world including states of human social relationships and human development if the intended effect, as in education, bears critically upon the development of individual potentials. The focus is upon the effects which are yielded and upon the conduct of those enterprises which bear most closely upon yielding those effects. A focus upon service delivery rather than policy implementation provides a closer approximation to the tangible effects that occur.

Problems also abound in the study of service delivery and what constitutes appropriate indicators of outputs when inquiry focuses upon performance in the public sector at an operational level. The defining characteristics of many public goods and services are such that those goods and services are not easy to unitize or package into equivalent units. Measurements are difficult to attain. While difficulties abound, those difficulties need not foreclose the use of human ingenuity to conceptualize proxy measures

which can be used as indicators of performance. Issues then arise in critically evaluating the limits and usefulness of different types of indicators.

For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States has for a long time used an index of major crimes to report on law enforcement efforts. Ostensibly such an index would appear to be a good indicator of performance in the delivery of police services. However, serious difficulties arise which make this measure into a highly unreliable indicator. First, the data are derived from crimes as classified and reported by thousands of different police agencies. Either lax reporting or lax law enforcement is likely to create low measure on the crime index. Efforts to improve law-enforcement efforts are likely to yield an increased score on the crime index. The measure creates false impressions about relationships of effort expended to results attained. These problems lead professional law-enforcement officers to have little or no confidence in the FBI crime index as a measure of performance.

The insufficiency of the FBI crime index need not foreclose efforts to devise more appropriate indicators of the presence of crime and of police performance. Measures of criminal victimization may be important indicators. The reliability of different methods for estimating criminal victimization by a sample survey or a census of relevant population is a proper subject of inquiry. So is the analysis of calls for service, speed of response, degree of follow-up and referral, and evaluation of the quality of the service rendered. A variety of different indicators of performance can be used; and the use of a multi-mode approach might be expected to compensate for the bias of any single indicator.

The close relationship of fire protection to the value of property protected by fire insurance introduces a close proximity between effort and measurable effect in assessing the performance of fire protection agencies. Similar circumstances apply to the collection and disposal of trash and a variety of similar services. Measuring the output of an educational system poses greater difficulties analogous to those involved in police protection services.

The need to extend the horizons of public policy studies to take account of the effects yielded by studies of service delivery systems should be apparent if there is to be an assessment of the effect of public policies upon states of affairs in human communities and the environmental circumstances in which human beings relate to one another and to their world. All of those different relationships may be difficult to take into account or impossible to contain within the confines of a single study. Yet it is important to appreciate the limits inherent in any one study and to be sensitive to establishing proper linkages that enable scholars to draw properly qualified conclusions from the limits that apply to particular studies. One type of essential linkages are those that appropriately relate policy studies to studies of service delivery systems.

Institutional Analysis

Policy analysis by focusing upon the prescriptive messages adopted by legislative bodies is necessarily related to other realms of inquiry that might be characterized as institutional analysis. Here, various types of rule-ordered relationships, as such, are subject to inquiry. Particular structures of rule-ordered relationships in legislative bodies, administrative agencies, judicial instrumentalities and the relationships among different decision-making units in a system of government can all be subject to inquiry.

For example, reference to a hierarchy of superior-subordinate command structure to coordinate relationships both within and among governmental agencies can be subject to inquiry where inferences can be drawn about the implications which follow from such structures of relationships. On the one hand, the coordination of relationships through an integrated chain of command has been used to imagine a rational legal order that maintains a uniform rule of law throughout a public domain including that of a large nation

imagine radically different implications. When individuals are assumed to act strategically to advance their career potentials rather than being perfectly obedient public servants, the inference is that information will be systematically distorted to discount failures and to emphasize successes. Such filtering of information can reach a point where expectations depart radically from performance. This propensity can be expected to assume more extreme magnitudes in the public sector where outputs or outcomes are not easily observable and measurable. If the desired result does not apply uniformly over the domain of a nation-state, then the attainment of the desired variability might better be realized by multiple organizations.

Many similar questions can be raised about the effect of legislative structures upon the policy decisions that are reached. For example, the legislative process including legislative debate may be so organized that only those arguments considered to have a significant bearing upon the future prospects of the major political parties will have an opportunity to be heard. Legislative bodies such as the British House of Commons do not even permit all members to be present at any one time. Recognition to speak may not be available to individual members of the House of Commons. What any speaker has to say may be well delimited by party leadership in advance of presentation. Members of Parliament normally vote as instructed by party whips. The probability that legislative deliberation will serve to clarify the different implications that are likely to follow from legislative decisions is reduced when the legislative process is so organized to foreclose more open inquiry. The probability of "unanticipated consequences" is increased. Variable conditions of legislative organization can be expected to affect the way that policies and policy objectives are specified.

The conditions of legislative organization need to be viewed as reflecting variable institutional arrangements. To understand how these conditions are taken into account requires one to take a constitutional perspective where one might consider the effects that variable conditions ,would

have in specifying the terms and conditions of legislative organization and of the relationship of legislatures to other decision structures within a system of government. A constitutional perspective would in addition require one to consider whether other principles of organization and criteria of choice need to be taken into account in considering legislative exercise of authority.

One of the more important design criteria that might apply to a system of government, including the exercise of legislative authority, is whether the terms and conditions specified in a constitution are enforceable as positive law. Jurisprudence would then be informed by constitutional law and the precepts of justice that give meaning to the language of law. In such circumstances the exercise of governmental prerogatives would themselves be subject to general rules of law. That would limit the range of discretion.

The conditions that apply the maintenance of an enforceable system of constitutional law have radical implications. All exercises of authority would be subject to limits and no exercise of authority would be unlimited. This condition stands in antithesis to the doctrine of unlimited sovereignty on the part of those who exercise leadership positions in a government. A legislative specification of goal would in such conditions be an insufficient basis for determining its legitimacy and for making the inference that such a specification of goal is deserving of unqualified implementation.

The same issue can be addressed from an slightly different perspective. Do we have reason to believe that specification of a winning coalition in a legislature meets the necessary and sufficient condition for establishing a just policy that takes proper account of the larger community of interest or only serves the interests of those comprising the winning coalition. Where the latter possibility exists the specification of rules of constitutional law that constrain the legislative exercise of discretion so as to reduce improper exercises of discretion would be justified.

From a constitutional perspective, one might then contemplate the conditions that might properly apply to legislative specifications of goals. Grounds might then exist for determining when a legislative specification of goal had not been properly specified. An issue might then exist in constitutional law about the criteria that apply to a proper specification of legislative standards. Such criteria would have substantial implications for conceptualizing standards that are relevant to the analysis of implementation efforts.

The problem can be illustrated by reference to an essay by Sabatier and Mazmanian which makes a general assessment of implementation studies. Sabatier and Mazmanian advance the thesis that "many of the case studies that form the bulk of the implementation literature become so immersed in the details of program implementation that they lose sight of the macro-level legal and political variables that structure the entire process" (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981: 3). These "macro-level legal and political variables" that structure the entire legislative and implementation process derive their meaning from their constitutional context.

In the course of their assessment of the implementation literature, Sabatier and Mazmanian formulate a list of items that is offered as a checklist for legislative staffs and other framers of legislation to take into account in drafting legislation so as to facilitate implementation. This list is reproduced as Table I. This table can be construed as advice pertaining to the standards that are relevant to the exercise of legislature authority as derived from implementation studies.

Item 4 advises that- "the number of veto points within and among implementing institutions" be minimized and that "sufficient sanctions and inducements" be provided "to enable supportive officials to overcome resistance among their colleagues and among target groups" (25). "Supportive officials" are those who support and advocate the legislation. "Target groups" are those who are subject to enforcement efforts. Efforts to invoke procedures giving opportunities to advance

T A B L E I

Toward this end, we propose the following checklist that legislative staff and other statutory framers can use in estimating the probability that a statute will achieve its mandated objectives. In so doing, we simplify the situation somewhat by making the following assumptions concerning the tractability of the problem—the most important being (1) that the statute seeks a rather substantial change in target group behavior and (2) that there is a reasonably valid theory relating changes in such behavior to the "solution" of the problem being addressed; in other words, the principal difficulty facing statutory framers is obtaining compliance from target groups.

1. Are the statutory objectives precise and, if multiple, clearly ranked in importance? Moreover, if the statute is assigned to an existing agency, does it indicate the relative priority of these new objectives in the totality of the agency's programs?
2. Does the statute actually incorporate a valid causal theory?
3. Does the statute provide sufficient financial resources to the implementing institutions to enable them to conduct the necessary technical analyses, to apply the general objectives to thousands of specific cases, and to monitor target group compliance?
4. Does the statute minimize the number of veto points within and among implementing institutions and does it provide sufficient sanctions and inducements to enable supportive officials to overcome resistance among their colleagues and among target groups? If dealing with a regulatory function, does it provide for tax breaks or other forms of compensation to members of target groups who are particularly hard-hit by adjudicatory decisions?
5. Are the decision rules contained in the statute consistent with statutory objectives? For example, do they place the burden of proof on target groups? Do they give as much authority as possible within implementing institutions to those officials most likely to support statutory objectives? Do they make the granting of permits or licenses contingent on specific findings consistent with statutory objectives?
6. Does the statute assign the responsibility for implementation to institutions (agencies) that are strongly supportive of its objectives and likely to grant the program high priority? Specifically, is it possible to create a new agency to administer the program or else to assign it to a prestigious existing agency that supports the objectives and is looking for a new program?
7. Does the statute maximize the opportunities for supporters external to the implementing agencies to participate actively in the implementation process? Specifically, does it provide standing for supporters to actively intervene in agency proceedings and to appeal agency decisions to the courts? Does the statute provide for evaluation studies by prestigious independent organizations to monitor the extent to which agency decisions and the impacts of those decisions are consistent with statutory objectives? Finally, is it possible to somehow centralize legislative oversight in the hands of supportive legislators?
8. What is the probability that changes in socioeconomic conditions or in technology during the foreseeable future are likely to undermine political support for statutory objectives? If the achievement of those objectives is contingent on technological innovation, what steps does the statute take to foster such progress?
9. What can be done to counter the short issue-attention span of the mass media and the general public? In particular, is it possible to convince some of the more important media to hire specialist reporters to cover the general issue addressed by the statute?
10. What steps can be taken to activate any latent supportive constituencies

T A B L E I (Continued)

and to assure that supportive groups have the necessary staff and other resources to monitor and to actively participate in the implementation process?

11. What can be done to assure that legislative and executive sovereigns who support the statute will actively monitor and intervene in the implementation process? In particular, is anyone available to serve as a "fixer" and does he have the staff and other resources to do so effectively? Moreover, what can be done to assure that subsequent legislation in policy areas relevant to the statute does not undermine statutory objectives and that attempts to revise the statute do not emasculate it?
12. Can anything be done to appoint implementing officials who are not only committed to the achievement of statutory objectives but also have above-average managerial and political skills?

The answers to these questions should provide a reasonable estimate of the probability that the policy decisions of implementing agencies will be consistent with statutory objectives and that target groups will actually comply with those decisions until the objectives are attained.

Source: Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1981: 25-27.

arguments about the probable effect of legislation and rules adopted under legislation would presumably be reduced or eliminated. Item 5 calls for supporting provisions including that of placing the burden of proof upon those subject to enforcement efforts. Items 7, 10 and 11 urge that legislation be drafted to strengthen the capability of supporters to act on behalf of the program, engage in legislative oversight, and participate in implementation processes. Special standing is to be given to supporters of the legislation, presumably at the cost of equivalent opportunities for those who have reason to oppose the legislation.

The purport of these recommendations have substantial significance for issues of a constitutional nature. Placing the burden of proof upon those subject to enforcement efforts stands at variance with long-established constitutional principles of due process of law. Extending special standing and resources to supporters of legislation would have a strong biasing effect upon the consideration of arguments and evidence in assessing the impact of implementation efforts. Winning coalitions are encouraged to formulate legislation in a way that mobilizes constituency support to facilitate both the short-term, and long-term dominance of those interests. Presumptions of equal justice in a procedural due process of law is abandoned to a presumption that winning legislative coalitions meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for properly specifying legitimate goals for mobilizing sanctions and taking collective actions in a society.

Whether such a presumption is correct or not can only be resolved by inquiries directed at institutional variables that are potentially relevant to constitutional choice. An extended tradition of inquiry about the effect of alternative voting arrangements both in selecting legislators and in making legislative decisions has developed over the last two decades. The overwhelming conclusion of this research is that no single voting rule whether applied to general elections or legislative decisions provides, by itself, an adequate mechanism for translating individual preferences into social

decisions in a fair, reliable and stable manner. This tradition of inquiry also demonstrates that skillful manipulation of the agenda within a set of rules can lead to a majority decision for a policy that is less preferred by a majority than other available alternatives. It is possible for minorities strategically to manipulate agendas so that minority preferences prevail over majority preferences. William Riker's recent book on Liberalism Against Populism reviews the conclusions drawn from these inquiries. From these inquiries there appears to be little justification for presuming that winning coalitions in legislatures will establish just policies that take proper account of the larger community of interest. Other structural and procedural constraints pertaining to due deliberation and due process of law are necessary conditions to facilitate the just exercise of authority in a society.

Linkages Among Modes of Analysis

Public policy analysis, thus, needs to be conducted with a recognition that policy considerations need to take account of studies done in the mode of institutional analysis where the effort is made to ascertain the effect of variable institutional arrangements upon processes of policy making. These analyses need to take account of design criteria relevant to an assessment of the implementation process itself.

Since all human beings are prone to error and are subject to limited and biased perception it would be an error not to subject legislative deliberation and implementation processes to the error-correcting procedures of critical inquiry in the exercise of human judgment. An awareness of the problems that arise in the organization of political processes and the way that different institutional arrangement may have differential effects in coping with such problems is of importance in understanding the policy process and the problems that are likely to arise in policy implementation.

While policies can be reviewed as a set of instructions that apply to the assignment of responsibilities for transforming states of affairs in the world of events we also need to recognize that processes of legislation, implementation and adjudication may also occur within sets of constitutional instructions that establish the relevant conditions and criteria of choice that apply to political processes more generally. It is an error to assume that implementation somehow acquires an imperative quality that dominates all other considerations in human societies.

The effects of these different sets of instructions must in turn be established by the way that they affect patterns of human interaction to yield tangible effects in reordering the world of events, relationships in human societies and the development of individual human potentials. The effects of both institutional arrangements and policy decisions can be assessed only as attention can appropriately be focused upon outputs and outcomes. Thus policy studies must be conceived as having a basic relationship to the study of service delivery systems and their effect upon events in the world.

The great difficulty that is presented is that any one study must be confined in a way that can address only a few questions at a time. It is not feasible for any one study to take account of all variables relevant to institutional, policy, and operational modes of analysis at any one time. Instead it is necessary that scholars design particular studies so that they are cognizant of relevant conditions addressed in different modes of inquiry that are essential in specifying the logic of the relevant decision situation. To do this we need to give much more serious attention to the linkages between institutional, policy, and operational modes of analysis and how they can be constructively related to one another.

It is possible to design inquiries about service delivery systems where pertinent institutional variables can be treated as independent variables to determine the differences, if any, in the effects that are yielded by variable institutional arrangements. Policy formulations that include reference to implementation structures that embody particular types of institutional arrangements can be treated as elements in a hypothetical set. Evidence derived from implementation studies could be tested for its consistency or inconsistency with findings derived from an examination of the relevant institutional variables for their effect upon service delivery.

Legislative specification of policy objectives and the terms and conditions pertaining to the attainment of those objectives can be construed at a theoretical level so that criteria pertinent to legislative decisions and the implications that follow from particular structures of electoral and legislative arrangements can be assessed for potential relevance. The empirical relevance of constitutional specifications regarding institutions of government, thus, depend upon establishing proper linkages between those considerations and the outputs and outcomes yielded by service delivery systems. Tangible evidence at the level of outputs and outcomes must be traced back through the conduct of enterprises in service delivery systems, through policy instructions to the terms and conditions that apply to the setting of those policy instructions, and their application, enforcement and revision. In this way we might hope to determine how structures affect performance.

An improvement in the quality of knowledge about the instrumental effect that different types of institutional arrangements have upon the outputs and outcomes yielded by service delivery systems should provide better grounds for exercising constitutional decisions relevant to the guidance and control of governing institutions. When the governed can establish and enforce appropriate constraints and criteria upon the conduct of those who govern, human societies would have the appropriate basis for maintaining patterns of reci-

standards of conduct. where such arrangements are subject to critical inquiry, human societies might gradually acquire increasing capabilities for self-government.

Implications for the Study of Interorganizational
Arrangements

The difficulties experienced at the Bloomington Conference in identifying the relationship of implementation structures as formulated by Hjern, Hull and Porter at the International Institute of Management to public-service industries as formulated by the community of scholars associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis should now be apparent. The focus upon multiorganizational implementation structures is centrally directed to issues of policy analysis and "to analyzing policy production in a systematic manner in this corporatist world of fuzzy political responsibilities" as Hjern has put it (Letter to V.&E. 0. 12.3.82). The public-service industry studies were conceived and conducted as inquiries concerned with service-delivery systems. The two approaches are complements to one another. Both types of studies need to be placed in the context of a more general system of inquiry that has reference to institutional, policy, and operational modes of analysis.

The IIM studies are concerned with man-power training programs in Sweden and Germany. A multiplicity of agencies with different structures are involved in the complementation of policies pertaining to the development of manpower training programs. If the confines of the policy study were to be extended to service delivery arrangements, the focus of inquiry would then shift to an effort to assess the structure and performance of labor markets in an effort to determine what effect differently structured manpower training programs have upon the performance of labor markets. Presumably such market arrangements would include both private and public

services as well as fully legitimate markets. The conceptualization of the relevant industry structure would presumably have reference to both private and public instrumentalities and voluntary associations contributing to the supply of labor services in relation to potential users of such services.

Studies in the delivery of police services might also be complemented by studies of policy implementation where an effort would be made to determine how a general policy to be applied to all police agencies would be considered within the context of forces organized on an interorganizational basis to determine how relationships should be reconstituted to facilitate the attainment of the policy objective. It is imaginable that unanticipated problems might arise at this level of inquiry requiring a reconsideration of policies. The assessment of these calculations would have a critical relevance for determining the effect of a policy decision upon service delivery and the effects yielded for communities of people. It is imaginable that a policy decision might adversely affect performance when measured by one criterion and improve performance when measured by another criterion. Those involved in a public-service industry may well form themselves into an implementation structure in considering the effects of a policy upon their joint operations. But this does not imply that an industry structure is the same as an implementation structure. If patterns of entitlement are established in law where citizens can make enforceable demands upon service delivery agencies we might expect quite different patterns of compliance than where enforcement prerogatives are confined to a central regulatory agency and the Department of Justice. Again, institutional variables enter into the calculation of probable effects.

Different modes of analysis and different conceptual terms are appropriately used to complement one another in undertaking parallel modes of inquiry. Clarifying the different modes of analysis, their patterns of complementarity to one another and their ties to a more general framework of analysis are important steps in the development of interorgan-

izational studies that draw concurrently upon institutional, policy and operational modes of analysis.

It is also important to recognize that different intellectual disciplines have diverse resources that can be mobilized for these different modes of analysis. Students of philosophy and jurisprudence have strong interests bear upon critical issues in institutional analysis. Political scientists and sociologists have been centrally concerned with policy analysis. Economists have had more strongly focused interests in operational analysis. Yet inquiry is not narrowly compartmentalized. Studies broadly concerned with guidance, control and performance evaluation in the public sector need to draw upon diverse capabilities across a variety of different scholarly disciplines. Effective collaboration depends upon a clarification of the essential complementarity of different approaches and the mobilization of critical capabilities to be derived from different points of view.