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CAN DEVELOPMENT BE ADMINISTERED?

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Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, September 1-5, 1975. Panel on Comparative and Development Administration: Findings, Theories, and Prospects. Wednesday, September 3, 1975.

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ABSTRACT

This paper raises some issues concerning the basic assumptions of Marxist-Leninist and American liberal democratic views on the process of "development." In particular it asks whether the assumption that development can be administered is tenable. In approaching this question, the paper examines (1) the conception of development held by Marxist-Leninists and certain liberal democratic theorists, including those associated with the Comparative Administration Group; (2) the means proposed to achieve "development" in each case; and then (3) suggests apparent contradictions in each of these formulations. The contradictions lead to the conclusion that in some important ways "development administration" is antagonistic to development.

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The bureaucrat has the world as a mere object of his action.

Karl Marx

Manipulated man is the carefully worked out product of equally carefully developed administration of objects. . . . Only the formula forgot to add objects including mankind.

Hans Freyer

CAN DEVELOPMENT BE ADMINISTERED?

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The intent of this paper is to raise some issues concerning the basic assumptions of Marxist-Leninist and American liberal democratic views on the process of "development." In particular it seeks to raise the question of whether the assumption that development can be administered, is tenable. In approaching this question the paper examines: (1) the conception of development held by Marxist-Leninists and certain liberal democratic theorists, including those associated with the Comparative Administration Group (CAG); (2) the means proposed to achieve "development" in each case; and then (3) suggests apparent contradictions in each of these formulations. These contradictions lead to the conclusion that in some important ways "development administration" is antagonistic to development.

The Idea of Development and Development Administration

In the years after World War II the idea of "development" replaced progress and Utopia as a synonym for the good life. Despite a change in nomenclature, however, human beings were no closer to agreement concerning the process and character of development than they have been in defining progress or Utopia in the past.¹ Even the more generally shared values associated with development—adequate nutritional levels, health care, shelter, and life expectancy—are challenged, at

least in the short run, by those who claim that feeding and providing health care for the world proletariat merely creates further problems for humankind.

Further, the efforts to define and then bring about development have been complicated by the confrontation between proponents of seemingly incompatible ideological prescriptions offering alternative visions of the good life. On the one hand, Marxist-Leninists offer a teleological process that culminates, theoretically, in a society in which poverty, exploitation, alienation, and the nation state apparatus itself disappear. Human beings "become accustomed to the observance of the elementary rules of social life that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all school books; they will become accustomed to observing them without force, without compulsion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for compulsion which is called the state."²

Variations in the Marxist-Leninist model of development incorporate national idiosyncrasies and theoretical refinements but share the basic objectives spelled out by Marx and Lenin: an end to class society through the development of productive forces; raising of political consciousness; an end to the social division of labor; and, ultimately, to the withering away of the state. For while the state exists there is no freedom; when there is freedom there will be no state.³

To achieve these objectives, however, requires an indeterminate period of transition during which the means of production become the common property of all and the socialists "demand the strictest control by society and by the state, of the quantity of labor and the quantity of consumption."⁴ in short, development toward the higher stages of communism must be administered—that is ordered through decrees, administrative regulations, and implementation. Human behavior must be controlled by reference to hierarchically-imposed rules of conduct enforced by "society and the state."

In contrast to the Marxist-Leninist vision of the good life, Western liberal democracy and social democracy offer the material progress and pluralism of the variants of modified capitalist economies (i.e., regulated markets and some government policies for redistribution,—including social security, public health services, public education, unemployment insurance, and so on). While rejecting the Marxist assumption that private ownership in the means of production is necessarily incompatible with development, the contemporary liberal vision of the good life also recognizes a need for an expanded role of administrative

institutions to regulate "market imperfections" in countries seeking to achieve economic and political development.

- In the United States, in particular, a concern to find a non-Marxist definition of development gave rise to collaboration between those making and implementing foreign policy, private foundations, and academic specialists in economics, political science, and public administration. From this concern emerged in 1960-the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) which focused attention upon "administrative development" and "development administration." In the words of Fred Riggs,

The CAG consisted largely of scholars who had served on technical cooperation missions in many parts of the third world, under conditions which showed the accepted administrative doctrines of American practice to be severely limited in their applicability to different cultural situations.. It was natural, consequently, that the members of the CAG would be keenly interested in the revision of these doctrines on the basis of an improved understanding of the forces affecting administrative behavior in these countries.⁵

Over the next decade the CAG elaborated a conceptualization of administrative development and development administration that has been reviewed, critiqued, and attacked on a variety of grounds.⁶ In fairness, it must be noted that the individual scholars associated with the CAG did not represent a unified intellectual or organizational whole. Thus no effort to synthesize "the" CAG literature can avoid neglecting the differences of approach and emphases within the Comparative Administration Group. Recognizing this problem, it is still possible to identify the major themes of "administrative development" and "development administration" that were set out by certain members of the CAG and further elaborated by other American scholars who came to share the basic theoretical and doctrinal assumptions of "administrative development" and "development administration."

According to Fred Riggs, the focus of the development administration literature was the methods used by large scale organizations, notably governments, to implement policies and plans to meet their developmental objectives and the strengthening of administrative capabilities.⁷ Since inadequate administrative capabilities inhibited development administration, "administrative development" was a necessary condition for effective "development administration." Most of the scholars within the CAG assumed that intentional instrumental action by officials of the nation state, i.e., administrators, could indeed induce development and, even more, that the

degree to which societies, through political and administrative action could change their own environments was a measure of the extent to which development had occurred. Thus development meant the expansion of a government's capabilities "to reshape its physical, human, and cultural environment."⁸

All this further assumed that administrative development and development administration were compatible with United States foreign policy! that since development would lessen the chance of "communist takeovers" the United States national interest demanded development in the third world. Thus John T. Dorsey, Jr. described United States efforts to promote "political development" in South Vietnam and David S. Brown pointed to the accomplishments of American technical assistance in public administration ("administrative development") as represented in "the placing of public administration advisers in more than fifty countries, the undertaking of several hundred projects in administrative improvement, and the training of several thousand officials in the United States. . . ." ⁹

These orientations led, as we will see, to a United States foreign policy and an academic literature (including members of the CAG) that supported highly authoritarian and military regimes as the "only" or "best" administrators of development in the third world. Despite the explicit commitment of most members of the CAG to Western liberal democracy, the generally shared conception of administrative development and development administration led logically to the conclusions of Milton Esman: "Much of the change desired today must be induced, and therefore managed."¹⁰ In short, development must be administered.

While the CAG largely ignored basic questions posed by the Marxist-Leninist model of development, including the deliberate administered reshaping of human values in order to make a particular vision of the good life widely shared and desired, the assumption that development can and must be administered was no different than the assumptions of the Marxist-Leninists.¹² Thus Esman's contention that "far reaching and purposeful social change usually requires the sustained initiative of relatively small energetic and cohesive groups," comes quite close to Lenin's call in "What Is to Be Done?" for a revolutionary elite to act as the vanguard of the proletariat in bringing about socialist development.¹³ As Alfred Diamant neatly summed up: "A great many students of the politics of the new states have identified the primary need of these states to be acquiring the capacity to marshal men and resources for the development tasks by any means at their disposal . . . we have obviously identified a process of marshalling resources by an elite."

As Diamant accurately foresaw "administrative development" and "development administration" came more and more to mean expanded state control and manipulation of human beings. Indeed development administration meant "mobilizing human resources" (that is, human beings) and the expanded capability of the state to "reshape its physical, human, and cultural environment."

These barely disguised euphemisms obtained implicit authoritarian (if not totalitarian) assumptions which were no more consistent with the liberal democratic values of most of those participating in the CAG than with the communism of Lenin in State and Revolution. Yet, in practice, administrative development and development administration have meant progressive increased state and bureaucratic control over individual human beings.

If such tendencies, called by Henry Jacoby the "bureaucratization of the world,"¹⁵ are over the long run antithetical to "development" as conceptualized both by Marxist-Leninists and by liberal democrats, then the idea of "development administration" entails a fundamental antagonism between "administration" and "development" that not even the magic of dialectical reasoning can resolve.

The shared assumption--that development can be administered and that, in fact, development requires tight administration of society by a politico-administrative elite, ultimately poses quite different paradoxes for Marxist-Leninists and those who, like most of those scholars associated with the CAG, identified with liberal democratic values. But both the Marxist-Leninist and pluralist conceptions of development administration assume that: (1) development means both material progress and the expansion of human freedom, the elimination or reduction of inequality and provision for psychological well-being; (2) that development administration requires, first, administrative development; (3) that development requires development administration; (4) that these assumptions are compatible, in practice, with one another--given the differing conceptions of "development" implied in each model. For Marxist-Leninists this, would mean that material progress, abundance, an end to exploitation, alienation, and class society are compatible with "socialist development administration-" For liberal democrats these assumptions would mean that development administration as defined by the CAG in the 1960s was compatible with material progress, more equitable distribution of wealth, income, and life-chance opportunities, and the principles associated with liberal democracy.

The Administration of Development:

The Paradox of Marxism-Leninism

Those who accept progress without any reservations are usually people who are driving others, and the very life around them, toward their own convictions., Tyranny begins with ultimate truths about society and man.

Milovan Djilas

For Marxists development is an inexorable, if dialectical, progression towards communism. Communism means

. . - the positive abolition of private property as being man's self alienation, and since this is a genuine appropriation of man's essence by man, Communism is the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being. . . . It is the solution to the riddle of history. . . .16

While Marx never spelled out precisely the detailed nature of a communist society or the process of creating such a society, he did suggest that the emancipation of the working classes must be the work of the working class itself. But Marx's interpretation of the Paris Commune of 1871 provided little of practical relevance to the deliberate, ordered, administered destruction of capitalist society and creation of socialism—which would ultimately lead to communism.

It was left to Lenin to elaborate the principles for the organizational and administrative foundations of socialist development as a directed and administered process. Lenin revised Marx's views concerning emancipation of the working classes and substituted the idea of a small, secretive intellectual elite as the vanguard of the proletarian revolution.¹⁷ Lenin argued that for the dictatorship of the proletariat to come into existence, there must be a core of professional revolutionaries leading the way—that is "administering development."¹⁸

According to both Marx and Lenin, the creation of the "higher stages of communism" depended upon the development of technology, industrialization, and what has come to be called modernization. Communism could only exist when human beings possessed the knowledge and technical wherewithal requisite to creation of material abundance. A communist society would require no exact calculation by society of the quantity of products distributed to each of its members: each would take freely "according to his needs." Thus administration in the conventional sense is incompatible with the higher stages of

communism. In the meantime, however, the task of the political and administrative elite—the vanguard—is to mobilize resources and human beings so as to modernize the economy, eliminate the causes of poverty and misery, and stimulate the development of "consciousness" necessary for the ultimate withering away of the state and "passage" to the higher stages of communism—"the solution to the riddle of history."

Thus for Marxist-Leninists the conventional answer to the question "can development be administered?" is yes. The administration of development demands: • (1) destroying private property in the means of production and capitalist institutions of the state, (2) establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat directed by a revolutionary elite, (3) mobilizing resources and human beings for the development of the "productive forces" while imposing "the strictest control by society and the state of the quantity of labor and the quantity of consumption."¹⁹

According to Lenin this will lead, at some unspecified time in the future, to a level of development of productive forces, human political consciousness, and widespread managerial and technical competence which will permit the withering away of the state, of the complete abolition of all bureaucracy, and all commanding from above.²⁰ This is critical, for "while the state exists there is no freedom? when there is freedom there will be no state."²¹

In practice, therefore, Marxist-Leninists can only answer affirmatively to the question "can development be administered?" if: "(1) socialism as described by Lenin does create the material conditions necessary for abundance; (2) human beings do gradually become accustomed to following the "elementary rules of social life" that have been known for centuries without force, without compulsion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for compulsion called the state;²² (3) the functions of public service are converted into "such simple operations of control and accounting as are within the reach of the vast majority of the population, and ultimately, of every single individual, so that the social division of labor that gives rise to the state can be eliminated; and (4) the state, at some time in the future, withers away.

Achievements and Constraints

In assessing the performance of Marxist-Leninist inspired "development administration" we must leave aside, for now, the last requirement mentioned above as Lenin

emphasizes the "protracted nature of this process [of withering away] and its dependence upon the rapidity of development of the higher phase of communism; leaving quite open the question of lengths of time, or the concrete forms [sic] of withering away."²³ We can ask, however, whether the national variants of the Marxist-Leninist model have (1) led to development of the "productive forces," (2) raised the level of human "political consciousness," (3) moved in the direction of eliminating the social division of labor, (4) moved in the direction of creating material abundance? These are, using Marxist-Leninist criteria, necessary conditions for "development." We need also to ask what the costs of socialist "development administration" tend to be for the human beings whose "development" is being administered.

There are numerous indicators of economic growth and "development of productive forces." The Marxist-Leninist model, as adapted by Stalin and the leaders of Eastern Europe and, later, the third world, focused especially upon industrialization and, in particular, heavy industry. Recognizing this emphasis, and remembering also that state intervention to stimulate industry also occurred to some extent in Eastern Europe prior to World War II, we can assess the performance of Marxist-Leninist "development administration" using a range of conventional economic criteria: rates of growth in total and per capita product: output capacity: efficiency; by changes in the relative shares of manufactures, public utilities, and agriculture in total product; by changes in the growth, and skills of the population and so on. In the present context such "analysis" is necessarily impressionistic, though it relies upon a vast literature describing the development of the economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.²⁴ None of the criteria chosen inherently reflect any "class bias"; each, and all together, are explicit objectives, by Marxist criteria, on the path to communism, i.e., a society of material abundance.

Development of the Level of Productive Forces

In some respects Marxist-Leninist "development administration" has produced quite impressive results in mobilizing resources and human beings for industrialization and modernization. Industrial growth rates, taking into account the difficulty of measurement due to price distortions and problems of underlying definitions, were quite vigorous in most of Eastern Europe after 1947, with the least industrialized countries (Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia) experiencing the largest rates of growth, ranging from 9-13 percent a year.²⁵ In these same countries the proportion of population employed in agriculture was greatly reduced, while the share

of population employed in industry (1950-1963) doubled (Rumania, Yugoslavia) or tripled (Bulgaria). Similar though less dramatic changes took place in the USSR; Poland, Hungary, and even in the more industrialized nations of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic-- Industrial growth was accompanied by general increases in per capita product. Overall and especially industrial capacity of the economies in these nations was clearly increased as a direct result of administered development, including centralized decision-making and enforcement of policies in regard to investment priorities, labor allocations, prices and so on.²⁶

"This "development of productive forces" was achieved, however, at tremendous cost in resources and labor--costs which could have been substantially reduced by relying less upon administration and more upon human beings making choices within the context of market-like institutions. The massive waste, inefficiency, and economic losses associated with socialist development administration "were largely the consequences of faulty systems of information, target setting and incentives which tended to produce a self justifying process with secondary waste effects. "²⁷ In the late 1960s it was reported that the material intensity of production in the Socialist countries was about one-third higher than in the West.²⁸

In the 1960s widespread recognition of the inefficiency of centrally administered economies led to "economic reforms"--- a euphemism for "de-administering" to a greater or lesser extent, decision-making concerning allocation of resources and price levels. This trend was even more pronounced in the agricultural sector where socialist development administration had been very much less successful. Indeed, in agriculture and certain service industries, with variation from one country to another, the effort to administer development has been quietly given up. Gripp reports the 'extension of the private sector of the economy in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even the German Democratic Republic in areas like restaurants, taxis, repair shops, travel, and advertising agencies, dressmakers, tailor shops, and so on.²⁹ In the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s private farms, and individual garden plots occupied less than 2 percent of farm land and accounted, officially, for about 20 percent of agricultural output--and as much as 70 percent of eggs; 60 percent of potatoes; 40 percent of vegetables, meat, and milk. ' These proportions were generally higher in the rest of Eastern Europe.³⁰

Not only was administered development relatively inefficient, despite its effectiveness in creating industries and expanding output, but it did not keep pace with the

technological development of the nonsocialist world. This means that a critical basis for the creation of a communist society, "production" of the technology which would make abundance possible, was not being "administered" effectively: increases in the purchases of Western licenses and patents were impressive testimony to the relative incapacity of administered development to keep pace.³¹

Thus while socialist development administration was able to mobilize resources and induce economic expansion, including industrialization, the costs of this pattern of administered development were quite high. Further development required reforms—away from an-administered economy, toward satisfaction of repressed consumer demand (and elimination of "socialist inflation"). As the socialist economies became (and become) more complex, the quantity and variety of decisions to be made regarding allocations of resources make nonadministrative, market-like decision processes more efficient, indeed essential, if development of productive forces are not to be retarded or prevented. The issue here, to clarify, is not limited to who owns the means of production, but rather to the existence of institutions which force private bureaucracies (firms) and public bureaucracies to take into account the costs of inputs and the character and intensity of consumer preferences in the allocation of resources. The entrepreneurial skills and initiative necessary for effective and efficient economic expansion could not generally be generated within the institutional context of the administrative state; thus not only market-like decision processes but entrepreneurial enterprise managers (in contrast to bureaucratic officials operating according to impersonal rules and regulations) are needed to further economic development:

It is relatively easy to forbid people to think and to make it impossible for them to show their ideas and abilities, but creative thinking and business acumen cannot be commanded. Hence we must realize that we need a new type of business leader, we must appoint to the leading positions those who are of the required type and we must devote all our attention to the establishment of the most favorable conditions for the development of capable managers and give them the opportunity to show their nettle.³²

This comment by an industrial manager in Poland indicates the crux of the problem:

I am not a manager. A manager in the West is a businessman. If he is a bad businessman, he is fired. It is not my task to raise the income of my enterprise. I do not get my salary for this. I am paid for implementing the plan in accordance with the

indices received, and I am evaluated according to the indices. The man who implements directives is good.³³

Beyond certain levels of economic growth, mere mobilization of resources and administration through bureaucratic agencies is clearly inefficient and defective in the socialist economies. Socialist development administration in the late 1960s sought to employ nonadministrative allocation of resources and incentives to further develop the "level of productive forces." Likewise, administrators proved generally poor as enterprise managers except in regard to traditional bureaucratic practices of affecting to comply with those commands from superiors that are monitored or used as evaluation criteria for purposes of promotion. In short, development of the level of productive forces can be administered—but only at the cost of inefficiency, lack of innovation, and a general tendency to fail to meet consumer demand.³⁴

Socialist Development Administration and Political Consciousness

It was Lenin's contention that only when human beings voluntarily worked according to their ability so that all could consume according to need would communism be possible. This means that pervasive political socialization would, over a period of time, lead human beings to act "correctly," voluntarily, without need for material incentives or threats of coercion.

In practice of course socialist development administration has required massive coercion despite efforts to reeducate the old generations and educate the new generations to the ways of socialist consciousness. In the 1970s a return to material incentives as the primary motivation of human behavior, combined with coercion and threats of coercion even in nations led by the most "romantic communists," indicate a generalized failure, at least to the present, to create a "new socialist man." The Cuban case is illustrative but not unique; by 1973 Fidel Castro also had accepted the Soviet Orthodoxy—consciousness could develop no more rapidly than the economic structure: "In certain cases we tried to make more headway than we were prepared for . . . if you try to go farther than you can, you are forced to retreat. . . . There are many examples to show us we are not yet prepared to live in communism. . . .³⁵

Scarcity, rationing, black markets, and the obvious inefficiencies and corruption of socialist development administration do not stimulate "socialist consciousness" but merely "socialist cynicism." If the level of consciousness

cannot develop more quickly than the material base, as Marxist orthodoxy would have it, and the material base is impeded in its development by the constraints of socialist "development administration," then only de-administering certain aspects of economic activity will lead to the increased economic efficiency and prosperity required for alteration in political consciousness. The dilemma this poses for socialist development administration is well illustrated in the "moral incentives" versus "material incentives" debate in the Cuban experience. In 1968 Fidel Castro declared:

At the very core of Marx's thought [is the idea that] socialist society and communist society must be based on a complete mastery of technology, on a complete development of the productive forces, so that man will be able to create enough material goods to satisfy everyone's needs. . . . •

[And above all] we should not use money or wealth to create consciousness. We must use consciousness to create wealth.³⁶

'In an apparent concession to pragmatism Fidel announced in 1974 that income levels of technicians and managers would be increased as a "recompense, for their skills" and cars would be imported to be sold to technicians "in order to increase their productivity."³⁷

But if increased prosperity and material goods cannot produce "consciousness," and consciousness cannot be relied upon to increase productivity, there results a critical obstacle to socialist development and attainment of the higher stages of communism.

Socialist Development Administration and the Social Division of Labor

A principal weakness in Lenin's original formulation of the characteristics of communist society was his naive approach to the increasing specialization inherent in economic development and technological change. Yet if Marx, and Lenin were correct that the social division of labor is the basis for a specialized apparatus of coercion—the state—which must wither away for communism to be achieved, then to the extent that socialist development administration intensified specialization it makes the achievement of communism ever less possible. In practice, therefore, a revision of Lenin has become necessary which asserts that Communist construction gives rise to such an upsurge of creative activity that the constant growth of the guiding role of the proletarian party is one of the most important social laws.³⁸ Management and

technical occupations have come to be ever more specialized and associated with the material and psychological incentives "necessary" to compensate them for their difficult responsibilities." Thus socialist development administration fails to eliminate the social division of labor and, indeed, creates incentives as well as the need for further specialization which, in effect, creates "new classes." Socialist development administration, thus, has not led toward a classless society although it has created new classes while destroying old ones.³⁹ But if planned (administrative) socialism does not lead along the path to communism, how should we justify the "strict controls"; the coercion and inefficiency associated with this model of development administration? On this dimension as well as the creation of political consciousness socialist development administration seems not to lead to development.

Socialist Development Administration and the Creation of Material Abundance

Nowhere has socialist development administration produced anything like material abundance for the majority of a nation's population. In part this lack of consumer welfare stems from deliberate under-investment in consumer-oriented industries in accord with socialist emphasis upon heavy industry and producers goods. But unplanned decreases in consumer welfare also have accompanied socialist development administration. For example, government policy reduced real wages in Hungary by 20 percent between 1949-1952 although an increase by 50 percent had been planned. In the late 1960s Czechoslovakia's standard of living was lower than in Austria or Belgium, with which it was on a level twenty years earlier.⁴⁰ The share of consumer goods in the total Soviet industrial production fell from 60.5 percent in 1928 to 30.8 percent in 1940 and 25.5 percent in 1963. In Yugoslavia this proportion dropped from 70 percent prior to World War II to 37 percent by 1956 and 31 percent by 1965.

The general neglect of consumers and the major current consumer-related problems in the Soviet economy (1973)-were well described by Gertrude E. Schroeder: (1) pervasive shortages of desired goods and services and of housing, (2) the poor quality of goods and services in general, and (3) continuing repressed inflation.⁴¹ While the Soviet, Eastern European, and Cuban experiences with socialist development administration have largely met subsistence needs of the vast majority of the population (an important achievement), beyond this level consumer demands have been ignored or unmet due to the inefficiency of the command-administration model of economic management.

Published accounts [of shortages] are legion. Would-be-buyers cannot find bath and face towels. . . . For over two years there has been an acute shortage of screws for assembling furniture. For three years meat grinders were not to be found even in large cities. An "ebb and flow" is characteristic—first, acute shortages of an item, followed by bulging inventories—for irons, rolling pins and hangers. . . .

Squally prolific are complaints concerning the poor quality of goods and services. And the poor quality of new housing is notorious.⁴²²

Schroeder concludes that the institutional arrangements of the socialist model of development administration as represented in the Soviet Union "are uniquely unsuited to managing the production and distribution of consumer goods and services for a populace whose basic subsistence needs have been more than met."⁴³ Beyond certain basic levels, thus, "development" (material welfare and abundance) has not been effectively administered. And while it is tempting to suggest that concern for trinkets, bath towels, and quality housing is a luxury for most peoples of the third world, it is also necessary to recognize that Marxist-Leninist criteria do not define development simply with respect to "subsistence." If "development" means abundance—and both Marx and Lenin were clear on this point—then socialist development administration has not "produced" development.

To date, then, using the criteria set out initially, we can say that socialist development administration has speeded up industrialization, and eliminated or reduced certain inequalities in wealth, income, and life-chance opportunities typical of societies with market economies, but that it has not notably altered human political consciousness in the manner hoped for by Lenin? it has not eliminated the social division of labor? it has not created societies characterized by material abundance. Can socialist development administration—"strict controls, iron discipline"—bring about development as defined by Marx and Lenin? There is no empirical evidence that suggest this is the case—beyond an ability to mobilize resources, through coercion, for induced industrialization and provision of a range of public services (e.g., health care, libraries, museums, education) previously unavailable to much of the population.

If this is the limit of achievement of socialist development administration, and further development requires, as the overwhelming burden of evidence suggests, de-administration of economic and social activity, then we can only conclude that there is a fundamental antagonism between administration and development towards the higher stages of communism. It remains to be shown how dialectical reasoning or dialectical

materialism will resolve (synthesize?) this fundamental antagonism between the inefficiency, and oppressiveness of the administered society and the complete "return of man to himself" in a Communist society--"the solution to the riddle of history."

The Administration of Development; The Paradox of
CAG-AID and Liberal Democracy.

For most members of the CAG development administration involved no (explicit) teleological vision, but rather "organized efforts to carry out programs or projects thought by those involved to serve developmental objectives."⁴⁴ The better human societies were able to carry out "developmental objectives" through development administration, the more "developed" were the societies: ". . . the essential idea of development lies in this increased ability of human societies [as collectivities] to shape their physical, human, and cultural environment."⁴⁵ Thus "development administration refers not only to a government's efforts to carry out programs designed to reshape its physical, human and cultural environment, but also to the struggle to enlarge a government's capacity to engage in such programs."⁴⁶

This sort of formulation by an intellectual who in other writings made clear his own democratic values led to both theoretical and practical dilemmas--as Riggs himself had earlier recognized.⁴⁷ For despite disclaimers by some, limited government and constitutional rule, or what John Montgomery referred to as "political democracy" did provide an underlying political morality for most of the members of the CAG although they were not so forthright about it as "Montgomery: "Western contributions may be as important for their moral and teleological components as for their capital and technical infrastructure."⁴⁸

If development administration required increasing government control over resources and human beings, how could development in the third world be made compatible with liberal democracy or "Western political morality?" Riggs attempted to wrestle with this problem in euphemistic (and neologistic) terms, suggesting that a strong "constitutive system" might exercise substantial power and impose effective control over the bureaucracy.⁴⁹

But the fragile distinction between politics and administration, or "constitutive system" and "bureaucracy" did nothing to reconcile the underlying incompatibility between a government ever more capable of "shaping" the physical, human, and cultural environment, and the fundamental values of individual liberty and limits upon state authority and

power—the cornerstone of liberal democracy. It became evident, then, as Carl Friedrich pointed out in the same volume that the dilemmas of "development" were both quite like those of modern government in general and also another way of referring to a set of issues with which classical political philosophy had wrestled since "the beginning."⁵⁰

Just as the Marxist-Leninist theorists sought to administer the "development of productive forces" in order to create a society of abundance, so the CAG and other social scientists interested in "development" and "development administration" were concerned with economic growth.⁵¹ This concern was founded upon the basic assumptions that:

(1) economic growth (increasing per capita product or income) would reduce poverty and provide a larger array of goods and services to third world peoples; (2) economic growth with rising average incomes would, ultimately, be compatible with, and even provide support for, liberal democracy, "economic autonomy," and a situation in which "more of the representative individual's time and income become discretionary . . ."⁵² and (3) that these processes of "development" (economic growth and liberal democracy) would "contain communism."

The CAG, both through the members' own participation in United States' international programs to induce "development" and by elaborating an academic ideology of development provided an intellectual grounding for American foreign policy in the 1960s. With the failure of liberal democratic regimes to "develop," it gradually became clear that United States policy and the CAG would have to make ever more explicit the relationship between growth, liberal democracy; anti-Marxism, and a strategy giving first priority to political stability—which would, when achieved, be the foundation for economic growth and democracy. For this to occur, however, an intermediate if parallel problem of "administrative development" had to be resolved. Administrative development had to precede effective development administration; any concern for constraints on bureaucratic authority had to be subordinated to the need to create effective administrative instruments.

To a number of scholars, including this writer, the emphasis on control of bureaucracy in the context of most of the developing countries is a misplaced priority, one that might seriously retard their rate of progress. We ought to be much more concerned with increasing the capacity of the bureaucracy to perform, and this we see as a function of greatly enhanced professional capability and operational autonomy rather than further controls.⁵³

The implications of Esman's analysis for American foreign policy and for development administration only gradually

became evident over the course of the 1960s. But the course of future "development" was foreshadowed in a set of papers published in 1962 concerning the role of the military in "underdeveloped" countries. In this volume Lucian Pye noted that in large measure the story of the third world "is one of countless efforts to create organizations by which resources can be effectively mobilized for achieving new objectives," (i.e., administrative development) and that "the acculturative process in the army tends to be focused on acquiring skills that are of particular value for economic development." Pye concluded that "the military stand out because in a disrupted society they represent the only effectively organized element capable of . . . formulating public policy."⁵⁴

Pye also argued that we should not be biased by our Western values and see the military, necessarily, as a "foe of liberal values."⁵⁵ While Pye emphasized the need to pay attention to the "growth of responsible and representative politicians," he concluded that "the military in the underdeveloped countries can make a major contribution to strengthening essentially administrative functions."⁵⁶

The answer to the CAG's (and United States policy-makers') quest for an administrative elite to carry out development administration: the military. . . . This despite the warning of certain other academic specialists in "development" that "where the goal-setting and goal-implementing bureaucracy is military rather than civil, the prospects for democratic political development are . . . dismal. . . ." ⁵⁷ Thus a "revisionist view" of military-regimes came to dominate much American and third world thinking about development administration; the military represented a "stabilizing force," a "modernizing force," and a reservoir of the administrative- and technological skills needed for "development administration."⁵⁸

By the 1970s administrative development and development administration had become euphemisms for autocratic, frequently military, rule that, admittedly, sometimes induced industrialization, modernization, and even economic growth. But this occurred at a great cost in the welfare of the rural and urban poor and a substantial erosion* if not deletion of the political freedoms associated with liberal democracy. The substance of Esman's recommendations, to be less concerned with control of the "development administrators" and more concerned with the capabilities of these elites to carry out "developmental objectives," were heeded by United States' policy-makers.

Brazil, Iran, and South Korea became the "showcases" of development administration. These nations achieved very high economic growth rates, rapid industrialization, and modernization—accompanied by expansion of the capabilities of the

state apparatus to "reshape" the human environment, especially through terror, institutionalized torture, and repression of the opposition in a style (if not on a magnitude) to leave Stalin no room for envy. Economic growth, instead of bringing increased welfare and democratization, intensified inequalities, made the poorest even poorer, and concentrated power in the hands of the administrative elites that "administrative development" and "development administration" sought to establish.⁵⁹

In 1972, drawing upon the theoretical literature of "development" and "development administration," a Department of State adviser with the army's John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance lamented that in supporting "stability operations" American doctrine "does not stress how to discriminate between subversion and dissent," and went on to recommend that "Our best bet may well be to encourage reformist attitudes among the military that reflect a constructive approach to the destabilizing nature of development. . . . Our encouragement of responsible reformist military forces would be realistic and accord with the tide of history."⁶⁰

Achievements and Constraints

Like the administrators of socialist development administration, authoritarian civilian regimes and, more frequently, military regimes that have come to dominate almost all the "beneficiary nations" of the United States-AID-CAG programs of administrative development and development administration, have been able to stimulate industrial growth, although in a much less consistent manner than in the socialist nations. The progressively more authoritarian rule of these regimes also is similar to the coercion of induced modernization in Eastern Europe and China. In general, also, the rural labor force, and to a lesser extent, the urban workers have paid the costs of capital accumulation, while military and civilian administrative elites and industrialists concentrate the benefits of economic growth. But while socialist development administration at least provides more equal access to public services (health care, education, and so on) and the basic nutritional needs of human beings, the development administration inspired by the United States-AID-CAG doctrines reinforced or increased income disparities, inequality of access to life-chance opportunities, and actually made the poorest even poorer in absolute terms.

If the inefficiency of the socialist development model leads to repressed consumer demand and uneconomic utilization of resources and labor, the GAG model of development and modernization has led to extreme unemployment problems and

increased impoverishment of the worst off among the working classes of the third world. If we return to Dudley Seers criteria of development cited earlier (eliminating or reducing poverty, unemployment, and inequality) we are forced to conclude that the United States-AID-CAG inspired development administration has often led to "antidevelopment," supporting the thesis of many "dependency theorists" that "underdevelopment" is caused by particular patterns of capitalist "development."⁶¹ By the criteria widely shared within the CAG itself the focus upon administrative development and development administration has nowhere led to liberal democracy nor even to liberalization. Instead, it has led everywhere to progressively more authoritarian (and generally no more "efficient") regimes.

It would appear from the evidence so far accumulated that the CAG-positied linkage between administrative development and development administration has nowhere produced more than physical facilities (dams, roads, bridges, hospitals) accompanied by restrictions upon human liberty and freedom. It has increased the capabilities of nation-states to "reshape" the physical, human, and cultural environment—but most of the human beings whose environment, or bodies, in the case of regimes with systematic torture of political prisoners, are reshaped in these "free world" nations have very little discretion over the way in which the state does its "reshaping." Administrative development has led to further control of state institutions over human beings? to further coercion of human beings; but not to development in any meaningful human sense. Beyond certain superficial material achievements "development administration" a la CAG has merely demonstrated on a lesser scale than in the Soviet Union, Germany, or Eastern Europe that factories, public works, and labor camps can be administered—but not the "good life."

The Costs of "Development Administration"

As indicated above both Marxist-Leninist and modified capitalist approaches to development entail large scale mobilization of resources by the administrative apparatus of the state. Both involve the imposition of projects and programs, "for their own good," upon large numbers of human beings who fail to share elite visions of "development." While there can be no question that, when backed by sufficient force, state enterprises and administrative agencies can induce industrialization, build roads and dams, transform land tenure patterns, establish professional bureaucracies, and soon, the human costs of these efforts have been enormous, even when they have been "successful." Efficiency aside, it remains for future generations to assess the global ecological costs imposed by "modernization" through development administration.

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe socialist development has been accompanied by pervasive regime terror. Administering development in accord with elite images has required operation, at least intermittently, of a terrorist state in which the geographical, occupational, and social mobility of individual human beings is subject to rigorous control by bureaucrats. It has required massive coercion against peasants, merchants, businessmen, and intellectuals. And, without the persistent threat of Soviet intervention (and an occasional object lesson as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia) it is clear that socialist developmental regimes could not maintain themselves against domestic demands for political and economic reforms. That is to say, administering development on the Eastern European socialist model has required only somewhat less than the creation of labor camp economies whose warden is the Soviet Union. While there is no question that the state has increased its capability to "reshape its physical, human, and cultural environment" the results nowhere even approximate the Marxist-Leninist vision of the good life.

The record of the United States-AID-CAG model of development administration is in most respects no better and, in some respects, much worse. Without even the "saving grace" of easily accessible medical care, educational opportunity, and a floor on malnutrition or starvation, capitalist development administration and modernization have bred more misery, making the poorest even poorer and the hungriest even hungrier, while political opposition and liberal democratic values have been made "inoperative." This was hardly the "development" imagined or preferred by most members of the CAG or even the liberal Democrats who made American foreign policy so much a matter of "civic action," counterinsurgency, and "stability operations." Yet more and more the United States sponsored "Alliance for Progress" became a commitment by the United States to perform the same sort of "police service" for repressive regimes in the, "free world" that the Soviet Union "offered" to Eastern Europe.

Ultimately, thus, the evidence suggests that development beyond construction of public works, provision of certain public services, forced industrialization, establishment of "order," and imposition of certain elite values through coercion supplemented by ideological persuasion is not amenable to administration in any conventional sense. Administration is a necessary component of development, but the "administered society" is antagonistic to development. Above all, bureaucratic administration means hierarchically ordered instrumental control of the behavior of human beings. Both by Marxist criteria and liberal democratic criteria, beyond a specifiable level of administrative routine, development requires a "withering away" of the state, or, as the

case may be, limitation of the authority of the state apparatus to control human behavior. For Marxists, "where there is a state there is no freedom"—and development means the expansion of human freedom— For liberal democrats, development means extensive limitation upon state regulation of human behavior—while the concept of "development administration" elaborated by members of the CAG recognized no such limits, indeed came to belittle them.

This is clearly not the place to propose alternative strategies for attaining the good life. However, the discussion in this paper at least calls into question the results we can expect from "development administration." Though administration is a necessary condition for development, development cannot be administered. For development to occur not only must subsistence needs be met, but the initiative of individual human beings must be encouraged. Human beings must be able to rethink and redefine their own values and the conditions of their daily lives. Human choice must be expanded. This cannot take place to great extent when government administrators continually increase their capabilities to "reshape" the physical, human, and cultural environment—at their discretion. This is not development of anything except what Henry Jacoby has called "the bureaucratization of the world."⁶²

NOTES

1. In a special issue on "Development Indicators" of the Journal of Development Studies (April 1972) eleven authors compile well over one hundred measures of "development" ranging from the eighteen core indicators of socioeconomic development of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) to a review of forty-one "development indicators" presented by Adelman and Morris in 1967. In the same issue, Dudley Seers ("What Are We Trying to Measure?") remarks that development is almost a synonym for improvement; he goes on to define development, at a minimum, as reducing poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Seers normative focus on distribution and life chance opportunities is a refreshing break, with the too common focus upon "objective" indicators such as gross national product, energy consumption, newspapers per capita, and so on. Still, as Seers points out, development remains improvement in relation to certain ethical criteria not necessarily agreed upon by policy-makers, social scientists, or the human beings whose lives "development" ought to improve.

It is also useful to note that even the seemingly benign indicators chosen by Seers are problematical. Would we say that German concentration camps performed well on two dimensions of development: eliminating unemployment through forced labor and "equalization" by reducing almost all stratification, beyond the SS elite, to a common level of inhumanity? This suggestion is obscene, but it points out the difficulty of specifying abstract criteria of development independent of a knowledge of the values, living conditions, and dreams of the human beings whom elite policy-makers and academics hope to mobilize for "developmental objectives."

2. V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution (International Publishers, 1971), p. 74.
3. Ibid., p. 79.
4. Ibid., p. 80.
5. Fred W. Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration, "Introduction" (Duke University Press, 1971), p. 5.
6. See for example Abdo Baaklini, "Comparative Administration, the Persistence of an Ideology," Journal of Comparative Administration (May 1973); J. G. Gunnell, "Development, Social Change, and Time," in D. Waldo, ed., Temporal Dimensions of Development Administration (Duke University

- Press, 1970), pp. 47-89; W. F. Ilchman, "Comparative Public Administration and 'Conventional Wisdom,'" Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics (1971)? F. Marini, ed., Toward a New Public Administration (Chandler, 1971); J. J. Heaphey "Comparative Public Administration; Comments on Current Characteristics," Public Administration Review (May/June 1968); B. B. Schaffer, "The Deadlock in Development Administration," in Colin Leys, ed., Politics and Change in Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 177-211; Joseph LaPalombara, "Political Science and the Engineering of National Development," in Monte Palmer and Larry Stern, eds., Political Development in Changing Societies (Heath Lexington, 1971), pp. 27-65; William J. Siffin, "Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries: An American's View," International Development Research Center (Indiana University, 1974).
7. Riggs, "Introduction," 1971, p. 6.
 8. Fred W. Riggs, "The Context of Development Administration," in Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration (Duke University Press, 1971), pp. 74-75.
 9. John T. Dorsey, "The Bureaucracy and Political Development in Vietnam," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 318-59? David S. Brown, "Strategies and Tactics of Public Administration Assistance: 1945-1963," in J. D. Montgomery and W. S. Siffin, Approaches to Development (McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 219.
 10. Milton J. Esman, "CAG and the Study of Public Administration," in Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration (Duke University Press, 1971), p. 71.
 11. An important exception to this was Gideon Sjoberg, "Ideology and Social Organization in Rapidly Developing Societies," in Fred Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration (1971), pp. 274-301.
 12. Of course the Marxist-Leninist emphasis upon a strong centralized party and party auxiliaries (trade union leaders, intellectuals, women, youth leaders, and so on) differs somewhat from the CAG emphasis on administrative elites. In the American literature on political development it was Samuel Huntington (not a member of the CAG) who emphasized the role of party in centralizing state power, expanding regime capabilities, and promoting political stability. See Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 146-47, and chapter 7.

13. Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin, eds., Approaches to Development Politics, Administration and Change (McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 72.
14. Alfred Diamant, "The Temporal Dimension in Models of Administration and Organization," in Dwight Waldo, ed., Temporal Dimensions of Development Administration (Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 131-32.
15. See Henry Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the World (University of California Press, 1973), especially pt. 4, "Bureaucracy: The Problem of an Administered World."
16. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, as cited in Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class (Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1969), p. 141.
17. Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin (Simon and Schuster, 1964), pp. 19-33, suggests that Lenin's political and ideological orientations owed more to Sergey G. Nechayev's, "The Revolutionary Catechism," than to Marx or Engels.
18. Thus there maybe a number of non-Leninist Marxist alternatives to "development" questions. The discussion here is deliberately limited to the implications of Marxism-Lenism.
19. Lenin, State, p. 80.
20. Ibid., p. 61.
21. Ibid., p. 79.
22. Ibid., p. 74.
23. Ibid., p. 79.
24. For example, see Alec Nove, The Soviet Economy (Praeger, 1961, 1965); Ljubo Sirc, Economic Revolution in Eastern Europe (Praeger, 1969); Nicolas Spulber, The State and Economic Development in Eastern Europe (Random House, 1966); Socialist Management and Planning; (Indiana University Press, 1971); Michael Gamarnikow, Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe (Wayne State University Press, 1968); J. Wilczynski, Socialist Economic Development and Reforms (Praeger, 1972).
25. See Spulber, chapter 9.

26. See Wilczynski, chapters 1 and 11.
27. Ibid., pp. 33-35.
28. Ibid., p. 37.
29. See Richard C. Gripp, The Political System of Communism (Dodd, Mead & Co., 1973), pp. 96-97.
30. Wilczynski, p. 203.
31. Ibid., p. 305.
32. Cited in Gamarnikow, p. 116.
33. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 117.
34. It is tempting for some to dismiss concerns with consumer demand with barbed remarks about "bourgeois trinkets," the evils of "consumer society," etc. In point of fact, however, it is nice to have a bath towel, toilet paper, wood screw, coat hanger, or meat grinder when one is "needed." Socialist policy-makers do not deny that this is the case, and the economic reforms of the late 1960s explicitly recognized the desirability of increasing supply and quality of consumer goods.
35. Cited in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970's (University of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 28.
36. Cited in Richard Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 139-40.
37. Mesa-Lago, p. 43.
38. Spulber, p. 76.
39. Djilas, *passim*.
40. Sirc. pp. 32-33.
41. Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Consumer Problems and Prospects," *Problems of Communism* (March-April 1973), p. 11.
42. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
43. Ibid., p. 22.
44. Riggs, "The Context" p. 73.

45. Ibid., p. 74.
46. Ibid., p. 75.
47. Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 120-67.
48. John D. Montgomery, "A Royal Invitation: Variations on Three Classic Themes," in Montgomery and Siffin, eds., Approaches . . ., pp. 292, 294.
49. Fred W. Riggs, "The Structures of Government and Administrative Reform," in Ralph Braibanti, ed., Political and Administrative Development (Duke University Press, 1969), p. 244.
50. Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Development and the Objectives of Modern Government," in Braibanti, ed. (1969), pp. 107-35.
51. See Joseph J. Spengler, "Allocation and Development, Economic and Political," in Braibanti, ed. (1969), p. 588.
52. Ibid., pp. 611-12.
53. Esman, "GAG and . . . ," p. 62.
54. Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 82.
55. Ibid., p. 86.
56. Ibid., p. 89.
57. Joseph LaPalombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," in LaPalombara, ed. (1963), p. 33.
58. See John P. Lovell, "Military Dominated Regimes and Political Development: A Critique of Some Revisionist Views," in Palmer and Stern, eds. (1971), pp. 159-79; Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970): 1131-48.
59. See, for example, Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (Yale University Press, 1973)? Marvin Zonis,

The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton University Press, 1971).

60. Raymond J. Barrett, "The Development Process and Stability Operations," Military Review (November 1972), p. 68.
61. , See, for example, the collection of essays in James D. Cockcroft et al., Dependence and Underdevelopment (Anchor, 1972).
62. Jacoby, The Bureaucratization . . . (1974).