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9.28.90

WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY
AND POLICY ANALYSIS
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→ THE PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROJECT: (*Philippines*)
technocratic strategies and unintended consequences

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December, 1981

Revised, October, 1983

I. Introduction

The Provincial Development Assistance Project of the Philippines (PDAP) in many ways exemplifies the frustrations and successes of bilateral development programming. Created in 1968 as a joint USAID-GOP project to begin direct development assistance to rural and agricultural areas, it was not atypical of the "institution building," technocratic approach to administration and government then in vogue. What was unusual, however, was its emphasis on subnational government. It defined itself as:

as agency of the Philippine Government devoted to upgrading the capability of local governments to plan, coordinate, and implement their development projects by developing and field-testing systems, techniques, and procedures that best improve the management of local governments.

PDAP was basically a technical assistance program which sought to upgrade the capacity of provincial government by developing, systematizing and disseminating sophisticated, technocratic, management, planning and decision-making systems. For a period of time PDAP was also an "operational" or implementing agency which supervised provincial implementation of several infrastructure programs and performed miscellaneous support tasks intended to help maintain that infrastructure.

At its inception and throughout its lifetime, though, PDAP was at heart a technical assistance program which attempted to transfer to Philippine provincial government what appeared to USAID personnel to be the latest American administrative technology. Beginning during its early years (1968-1972), PDAP focused on developing specific managerial, planning, project analysis, budgeting and research routines for the provinces. Its work was substantial, and it produced such models as the Socio-Economic Profile, Joint Work Plan, Capital Improvement Program, Equipment Pool Plan, Quality Control Plan, two generations of Road Network Development Plans, Performance Budget, Provincial Comprehensive Plan, the Real Property

Tax Administration System and others. These plans and systems were developed largely by American contract personnel who worked with Fillipino personnel employed by PDAP in "manualizing" the system for provincial dissemination.

Once manuals had been developed, PDAP would inform participating provinces of new planning and/or administrative requirements, organize and schedule training sessions at various regional locations, and begin a series of visits to provincial capitals to assist in and assess the implementation of the systems. These activities, a variety of sources reported, continued throughout PDAP's lifetime, though they declined substantially after 1976. Field visits to assess compliance were supplemented by extensive requirements for provinces to submit copies of various documents to PDAP's central office in Manila.

Thus development, manualization, diffusion, technical assistance and assessment of compliance in technocratic administrative systems were major activities of PDAP throughout its lifetime. However, PDAP had other responsibilities as well.

The "carrots" which persuaded provinces to submit to the PDAP management systems "stick," were four "Special Projects." The Special Projects provided provinces reimbursement for costs expended in several approved, generally infrastructural, development programs. These projects, "Rural Roads," "Barangay Waters," "Rural Service Centers," and "Real Property Tax Administration," were set up so provincial governments could identify, design and implement improvements consistent with PDAP/USAID parameters, and receive reimbursement on a fixed cost basis. PDAP's Manila office was responsible for assessing compliance with these requirements and approving reimbursement. Between 1972-1978 PDAP was called upon to supervise the "Flood Rehabilitation Program" in eleven central Luzon provinces and the "Special Infrastructure Program" initially in the Visayas and Mindanao, and later on in eight central Luzon provinces. These programs built bridges, roads and a few structures, and PDAP took responsibilities for designing, contract-

ing, supervising and funding these projects. During 1978, these two projects were completed and the four Special Projects were removed from PDAP's control and established as independent USAID-Government of The Philippines assistance projects. While the Special Projects are still administered in the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development and continue to use planning systems, decision making routines and budgetary parameters developed by PDAP, they are completely independent of it .

PDAP's final responsibility was in supporting development of provincial Equipment Pools. The Equipment Pools were regarded as a necessary maintenance component of both infrastructural and institutional development in the provinces. PDAP developed a manual, Equipment Pool Operations, trained equipment pool supervisors and provincial mechanics, and made loans through USAID's Local Development Project to construct equipment pool facilities. Finally, PDAP assisted the transfer of excess United States Government heavy road equipment (primarily obsolete military vehicles) to the equipment pools from 1973 to the termination of the Local Development Project.

In summary, PDAP was at heart a technocratically oriented project which developed, manualized and disseminated a variety of administrative systems to selected provincial governments. It supervised their compliance with these and other requirements (staffing levels and roles), and disbursed funds to reimburse provincial expenses in approved infrastructure areas. For a period of time, it also supervised a direct infrastructure program which grew from needs caused by the disastrous floods of 1971. At the time of this research, PDAP had been removed by USAID and the GOP from all infrastructure and reimbursement responsibilities, and was performing only minor training and technical assistance activities.

By 1980 (PDAP had been temporarily extended for two more years in 1978) there was substantial evidence that PDAP had had a dramatic impact on Philippine

provincial government. Interestingly, however, much of this impact appears to have grown from unintended consequences of the project, rather than from its consciously implemented strategic program. In retrospect it seems it was its political dynamic at the provincial level rather than its technocratic design that was the key to change. As a case of induced change, PDAP makes particularly interesting comparative analysis, as it lived through three rather different sets of roles and functions the through three virtually different identities.

I I . PDAP: Three Identities

1968-72, and Administration by Committee: The Search for Appropriate Procedures

To analyze PDAP as a change inducing project, it is useful to examine its three "identities." At its inception in 1968, PDAP was the Philippine Agency organized to manage Philippine inputs and responsibilities in the Systematic Program for Rural Economic Assistance and Development (Operation SPREAD). SPREAD was initiated by the Philippine Government's National Economic Council (NEC) and the United States Agency For International Development. Mounted in 1968 in two provinces (Tarlac and Laguna), Operation SPREAD was intended to support agricultural production. PDAP's objective in this project was to strengthen the capacity of provincial institutions to stimulate and lead local agricultural and rural development.

During the first four years of its existence, PDAP was managed by committee. An Advisory Committee on Policy and Coordination attended to policy issues and overall coordination. The Chairman of the NEC acted as PDAP's ex officio director, and day-to-day management was provided by an Executive Officer who came from the University of The Philippines' Local Government Center.

Personnel were assigned to PDAP from various national government agencies and from the University of the Philippines Local Government Center. Specialists were drawn from: the NEC, Civil Service Commission, Bureau of Public Highways, Agricultural Credit Administration, Agricultural Productivity Commission, Local Finance Division of the Department of Finance, Local Government Center, and the Presidential Arm for Community Development. These specialists comprised the Technical Staff of PDAP and participated on an ad hoc basis. They were not paid from PDAP funds. De Guzman, et al., report that,

PDAP depended upon the work of these specialists. The specialists conducted research, reviewed provincial plans and projects, provided technical assistance to provinces and submitted proposals to the Advisory Committee on Policy Coordination for project consideration. They also determined the capacities of provinces in developing and implementing workable provincial development programs.

It is difficult to determine now how the absence of a full-time staff affected the development of the PDAP program, and, in particular, those experimental activities which required close monitoring and evaluation to determine what, in fact, worked. It is possible, however, that a technical staff participating on a part-time and transient basis, whose primary responsibility was to their own agency, would not formulate a very effective challenge to accepted, conventional national-level management and planning systems, and therefore weaken experimental activities.

In any case, it was during this period that many of the key management and planning tools currently utilized by PDAP provinces were developed. These included the Five Year Capital Improvement Plan (CIP), the Annual Provincial Action Budget, the Provincial Equipment Pool Development Plan, and the Provincial Equipment Pool Operations Manual.

Two important additional developments for provincial government occurred during this period. First, provincial equipment pools were established. Second, and more important for strengthening administrative capacity, PDAP provinces were required to comply with conditions pertaining to the establishment of a provincial development organization. PDAP provinces were required to establish provincial development staffs (PDS) "to serve as the governor's principal arm for the exercise of his developmental functions." The PDSs were also to be responsible for "coordinating" the formulation of socio-economic plans and for program monitoring and evaluation. The establishment of a technical, professional unit, headed by a Provincial Development Coordinator, to act as the governor's planning staff constituted an innovation

in and a departure from conventional practices of provincial administration. By mid-1971, nine provinces had entered the PDAP program. Five more joined in the fall of 1972.

1972-1976 and Central Consolidation: Central Control over the Provinces

In November 1972, PDAP was transferred to the Development Management Staff of the Office of the President. The transfer was made, according to the PDAP Director, Colonel Vigilar, "in recognition of PDAP's increasingly important role in the strengthening of local government." Observing that the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD), now a ministry, was established at more or less the same time, Vigilar visualized the entire system: PDAP is "responsible for developing pilot systems for improving the operations of local government" and DLGCD is "the agency responsible for directing and coordinating the extension of improved development program management to every level and agency of local government." Anticipating that at some appropriate stage PDAP would be transferred to DLGCD to act as its experimental unit, replication or "application on a nationwide basis" would occur "under the auspices of DLGCD." (pp. 5-6)

While the transfer was effected in 1976, the division of labor between PDAP and DLGCD never materialized. In fact, it appears that during the time it operated within the Executive Office, whatever research and development work that occurred in its first years had ceased, and was replaced by enforcing stringent controls over the provinces. These took form as rules and regulations on planning, budgeting, project design, project selection, priority setting, etc., many of which were set out in a large number of planning manuals. In 1975, the Executive Director pointed to the manuals, instructions, and guidelines, in conjunction with practical training courses, as constituting "two tightly-combined features, indispensable (to) PDAP's

repeatedly successful program replications."

The manuals, and the instructions which PDAP provinces were required to comply with included: Equipment Pool Development Plan Format, Road Network Development Plan Format, Equipment Pool Operating Manual, Provincial Capital Improvement Program Format, Provincial Budget Preparation Manual, Cash Flow Analysis Procedure, and Administrative Procedures for Implementing Infrastructure Programs. Although insisting upon the need for further testing of the procedures, Vigilar nevertheless felt that he could claim that the "manual and training are positively affecting provincial routines."

In 1972, upon the transfer of PDAP to the Executive Office, a significant organizational change occurred within PDAP itself. Management by committee was abandoned, and in its place a strong executive appeared in Colonel Vigilar as Executive Director. The technical staff, formerly seconded from national agencies on an ad hoc basis, was replaced by a full-time PDAP staff. Ten persons were detailed to PDAP from line ministries, and additional technical staff was hired on a contract basis. No permanent positions were created, however. These facts, coupled to Vigilar's later statements, suggested that there was no intention then to make PDAP a permanent agency.

The planning procedures and manuals developed in the early years of PDAP were thus put into final form and instituted in all PDAP provinces during Vigilar's tenure as director. Although Vigilar maintained that the PDAP approach to planning consisted of "rigidity in form and flexibility in substance," there is little evidence of the "flexibility in substance." Instead, "rigidity in form" is quite apparent. For example: unless provinces complied with equipment pool and planning requirements, they were not eligible for certification with respect to infrastructure projects (the PDAP "carrot"). One of the mountain provinces advised PDAP they could not come up with three

hectares of flat land required by Equipment Pool regulations because of its mountainous terrain. It was, therefore, excluded from the entire PDAP program at that time, even though its mountainous terrain precluded use of "Equipment Pool" machinery in any case. As well as terminating what experimentation had occurred between 1968-1972, defining and formalizing a series of planning-budgeting-implementation systems, and establishing a full-time staff, PDAP became an operational agency under Vigilar. For the first time, in 1972, PDAP engaged in the direct administration of infrastructure projects, beginning with the Flood Rehabilitation Program in the Central Luzon provinces. PDAP's infrastructure-oriented efforts escalated sharply: in 1973 PDAP embarked on the Special Infrastructure Program (SIP) in eight provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao, and later extended SIP to seven Luzon provinces that had completed their Flood Rehabilitation projects.

Commodity assistance (vehicles) together with the Fixed Amount Reimbursement scheme (FAR) were part of these activities, and constituted a powerful incentive for provinces to enter, to remain in the PDAP program, and to comply with its requirements. First, provincial budgets were increased by an average of some 10 percent, some receiving increases of as much as 20 percent. Second, infrastructural projects provided tangible results, and were therefore politically appealing to provincial governments. Indeed, interviews with provincial officials make it clear that many of them equated the "PDAP concept" with commodity assistance and fixed amount reimbursements. Finally the accounting procedures built into the FAR scheme tended to minimize leakage of funds and centralize their control in the governor's office.

Despite the PDAP Central Staff's insistent claim that it never ceased to be a developmental-experimental organization and that its programs are to be properly considered as part of a sustained effort to improve managerial

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and planning techniques, during the administration of Colonel Vigilar its tasks became primarily operational. Infrastructural projects constituted the major PDAP activity, and work on "manualization" was directly geared toward infrastructural development and enforcement of existing provincial requirements.

There were in this period, two events which were to have considerable impact on provincial government in The Philippines, and both were a direct outcome of activities first instituted by PDAP. In 1974, a ministry circular was issued by DLGCD which directed all provinces to establish Provincial Development Staffs. In the same year, Presidential Directive 744 extended the performance budget pioneered by PDAP to all provinces. By 1976, twenty-eight provinces were participating in PDAP.

1976-80 and Organizational Disarray: Relaxation of Central Control in the Provinces.

In 1976, PDAP was transferred to MLGCD as a special office under a Deputy Minister. Along with its new status, a number of additional changes occurred; they deserve mention because they direct attention to the importance of institutional and programatic arrangements in sustaining or weakening the viability of an organization. In PDAP's case, the 1976 reorganization contributed directly to organizational impotence and exacerbated internal conflict. Whether or not by design, it effectively destroyed the grounds on which PDAP had come to justify its continued existence. The specific changes are summarized below.

The transfer to MLGCD was perhaps the least significant of all the changes. To be sure, PDAP lost some of the prestige that had been conferred on it when it was placed under the Executive Office, and this contributed to a lowering of staff morale. But the resignation of Colonel Vigilar as Executive Director of PDAP was of greater moment, insofar as it signalled

the end of a strong and effective leadership. Capable leadership is but one of many factors that contribute to the success of an organization. But when an organization is weak and young, has limited resources, and has developed few linkages to clientele or constituent groups, a strong and charismatic leader may be practically a requirement for its survival. In the case of PDAP, such leadership was lacking at a time when the agency went through a near total redefinition of its responsibilities and functions. For in 1976 the Philippine Government decided to administer the four Special Projects as separate, autonomous organizations, removed from the jurisdiction of PDAP. This meant that in 1978, after RRP I, PDAP no longer had any direct responsibility for the implementation of infrastructure projects. The significance of this is obvious. For during 1972-76, PDAP had changed direction and became an operational agency, with primary emphasis on infrastructure programs. Experimentation, research and development in local administration had ceased, and PDAP had neither the momentum nor a constituency to reenter this area. Removal of the responsibility for operational activities eliminated its task domain and, therefore, placed its continued existence in doubt. This existence was all the more problematic because it had no regular (i.e., legal) status in the Philippine Government.

Vigilar himself seems to have realized this. In his assessment of PDAP in 1976, he presented it as an experiment that worked. As he saw it the next priority was to extend it, to replicate it, nationally. Nor, as indicated above, did he think that this responsibility would be assumed by PDAP, PDAP, he stated,

will phase out of operations in 1978, but that does not mean the end of this type of assistance. There are many programs right now being prepared to continue where PDAP left off.

Evidently, the programs to which Vigilar was referring are the Special Projects.

The changes that took place in PDAP between 1976 and 1978 resulted in a severely weakened agency which was either stripped of, or had abandoned much of its previous jurisdiction. All this, in turn, had far-reaching consequences for PDAP-provincial relations. During recent years, control exercised by the PDAP center over the periphery rapidly declined, to the point where provincial personnel now openly observe that while they comply with PDAP's nominal requirements, they treat them as "pro forma," and have not been troubled by PDAP about this. Additionally, provincial officials frequently mention that since 1976 the quality of trainers and field consultants has been a problem. In any event, since 1979 PDAP has ceased training activity, breaking another link to the provinces. Finally, in all of the provinces surveyed in 1980, the competence of the central PDAP staff was questioned. The accuracy of such claims were not explored, but the doubts themselves are indicative of PDAP-Central's current dismal reputation at the provincial level.

To all intents and purposes, PDAP has ceased its operations in the provinces and no longer exercises any real control over provincial government. The technical assistance programs that were mounted in this period were joint ventures: the effort to improve local budgeting systems in concert with the Ministry of Budget (which led to new regulations), and the development of a local government personnel classification system in conjunction with a special GOP/USAID team. But PDAP's association with such efforts was purely nominal.

III. PDAP and Provincial Change

As we have seen, during its twelve year lifetime PDAP filled a variety of roles and interacted with many agencies. Still, the focus of its activities remained at the provinces. Planning routines, analytical algorithms, centralized training and field extension services were each designed and directed primarily at the Provincial Development Staffs (PDS). While PDAP did build roads, bridges and structures, the only institution it continuously related to and worked with was the provincial PDS. And since the PDSs were usually key action institutions for PDAP's activities, the contact was repeated, sustained and, at times, intense.

Insofar as PDAP was designed to change more than the configuration of local heavy infrastructure, then, it was focused on the PDSs. For these reasons to judge the administrative impact of PDAP is largely to judge its impact on the PDSs and, through them, on provincial government.

Provincial Development Staffs and Governors; Planning: The PDS was originally conceived by PDAP to be a planning staff in support of the various programs funded through PDAP. And though planning and programming remain at the center of its responsibilities, the impact of the PDS on provincial government transcends these tasks.

On their face, the planning responsibilities of the PDS have been directed toward research and data gathering. Its first duty was to prepare a Socio-Economic Profile of its province which was to provide sufficient data to enable the definition and clarification of provincial development strategies. This entailed survey research and analysis, and the preparation of an outline of provincial problems. The Capital Investment Plan required a compilation of all capital investments, organized sectorally (health, education, roads, etc.), described briefly, and including the cost, timing, and priority of the projects. It has been since updated annually in an

Annual Investment Plan (AIP).

Planning has remained a central function for PDSs. Some might describe it as an overwhelming function. It is instructive to look closely at an example province. In 1979 the Bataan PDS engaged in the following planning activities:

Second generation RNDP

PDAP/Provincial Joint Work Plan and Annual Implementation Plan

Preparation of Performance Budget

Comprehensive Development Plan

Capital Improvement Plan (provincial and municipal)

Town Planning and Slum Improvement Rehabilitation Plan

Development of a Data Bank

Provincial Socio-Economic Profile

Project Planning - Bataan Development Council

One should also add a number of feasibility studies for RRP, IBRD, and BWP. And this list is not exhaustive. As of January 1, 1980, there were 36 people employed by the Bataan PDS—and this includes the watchman.

The character and quality of all these planning activities do vary among provinces, but it is clear from this case that the roster of planning requirements is quite heavy. If one takes RNDP (I), the entire staff of the Bataan PDS plus 10 casuals worked on it for one year. In trying to estimate as accurately as possible and with the help of the PDS staff the actual man-year cost of preparing the road plan, the most conservative figure was 25 man-years. The Provincial Coordinator thought it should be higher. A simple feasibility study cost four people, full-time, for two months, excluding clerical assistance. If one aggregated all of the planning tasks engaged in over the year, it is likely they would be beyond the capacity of a much larger, more sophisticated agency. A natural result would be for quality to suffer, data to be noisy, projection to frequently be doubtful guesses, and much of the work to lose all point. Planners would tend to become rule-followers who automatically comply with regulations legislated by PDAP. Time that could be spent on provincial problems would be absorbed by rituals.

In all twelve provinces studied, provincial personnel felt PDAP planning requirements were wasteful of time and resources, and often only marginally useful in provincial decision-making. All spoke of heavy manpower waste: their estimates ranged from 20-40%. They were critical of the requirements of Barangay Water (Level I especially) and of RRP. They felt they lost time in superfluous tasks, overly detailed requirements, demands for documentation, and the heavy paperwork generally required.

Evidence from the field did indeed indicate that the planning requirements imposed on the provinces approached, if not exceeded, provincial absorption capacity. The sheer number of mandated plans is sufficient by itself to prompt pause. But an equally important point is that all of these were closed in their design.

PDAP took engineering models and attempted to extend them far beyond their appropriate domain. That is, it is quite problematic as to whether any of them served as solutions to rural or institutional development problems—save for such hard technology areas as the engineering of a road or the construction of a soils test laboratory. What is clear, however, is the inflexibility they introduced and the "premature programming" and technological bias that they might thereby have engendered. PDAP's directorate rationalized "rigid compliance" and "procedural inflexibility" on the ground that it was necessary for adequate training. But its requirements were to be adhered to to a point that they would have predisposed and controlled the character of provincial planning so potentially to exclude any effort to develop local, decentralized, and unbounded planning systems. The opportunity cost here could have been rather high: the loss of the chance to develop planning strategies that could be adjusted to the wide range of variations found among the provinces. PDAP's ignorance of such strategies or, rather, of any attempt to develop them, is in large part a consequence of the inherent bias of the comprehensive planning systems which were employed by PDAP-central.

Fortunately, the type of planning, the documents and the role foreseen for them by PDAP was rarely met in the field, particularly after 1976. For the documents inspected and the personnel interviewed in 1980 suggest that these activities did not add up to a strategy nor to a comprehensive "rational plan." Neither the SEP nor the CIP were sufficiently detailed nor definitive, either in form or in operation, to be decisive instruments. Their limitations are easily seen on inspection. The SEP is too general to be useful for more than background data in the setting of a general inter-sectoral agenda. The CIP is basically a general listing of desirable investments, useful for purposes of reference and outline, and subject to continual revision as necessary. Neither are definitive "master-planning" documents. Ironically, they appear instead to have been important because of the unexpected ways they affected provincial decision making generally, and the position of the governor in particular.

What the PDAP planning and research tasks, as "revised" by field personnel appear to have done was facilitate a new process of decision making, stimulating greater discussion and cooperation among provincial officials, encouraging collective rather than individualized decision making, and, all the while, focusing the decision making process on the Governor as the single responsible, provincial action officer. In doing so, a decision making process which had hitherto been ad hoc, casual, and personalistic, began to be systematized, broadened, and institutionalized.

As one provincial development coordinator described it, "Preparing the Socio-Economic Profile was important because it made us sit down and think through the circumstances and problems of the province. It made us think through where we were, and where we might be going." The SEP, while not a comprehensive or strategic document, stimulated systematic discussion among provincial personnel, defined common concerns, and developed some cross-cutting

parameters which applied to all provincial activity. According to one PDC, it gave the "development of the province" a specific place in the decision-making process.

The Capital Investment Plan further encouraged this process and the influence of the PDC/PDS. The CIP was prepared interactively by sectoral (line) officers, the PDS, and the governor. Generally, the governor offered guidelines which were disseminated and explained by the PDS. The sectoral officials responded with specific proposals which were discussed in the "Task Forces" of the Provincial Development Council and, more importantly, in a governor's cabinet. In these instances, the PDC/PDS took a lead role in providing information, analysis, and criticism. Insofar as the Provincial Development Council was concerned, its task forces finalized plans which were presented by the PDS, approved by the governor, and the entire Provincial Development Council itself. A similar but less extensive process was followed for the revision of each year's Annual Investment Plan. As in the case of the SEP, the planning requirement became a mechanism whereby traditional processes of choice were displaced by more systematic, more open and more regularized decision practices. The implications of this for institutionalizing a genuine provincial government are not to be minimized.

As a more focused and systematic decision making system was generated by "modified" SEP and CIP requirements, so the role of the governor was strengthened. Both the SEP and the CIP exercises produced vast amounts of relevant information for the governors. General background data, discussion and analysis of intersectoral and area-wide problems and needs, the preferences of mayors, and of sectoral offices, were all central factors in the research/planning process. The PDS insured that vital information routinely flowed to the executive, with the benefit of its critique"and analysis, so that he could direct, bargain and persuade. Moreover, this expanded the number of legitimate participants in the decision process, which came to involve local,

public, private, and sectoral interests. The result was to diminish the
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 influence of any given sectoral officer over his "own" program. It was no longer simply "health" investment or "educational" investments that were to be decided along "professionalized" (and delimited) criteria. Rather these became, at least in part, "developmental" decisions with wide-ranging implications and which involved a large number of claimants for program resources. As the decision arena broadened and information monopolies of sector specialists were eroded, the resources of the governor loomed larger. The primary integrating agent here could be a politically astute and skilled governor.

In fact, many governors used their increased information resources and their powers of office to strengthen their influence vis a vis sectoral officers, and greatly to expand their authority over the entire range of provincial investment and program decisions. They used their power over both short- and long-term investment decisions to build exchange relationships with sectoral officers—gaining loyalty and support by the use of the resources they controlled. As one health officer put it, "If we don't have the governor's support, we don't have a program." Or an agricultural officer speaking, "Nothing goes on in this province without the support of the governor." Through processes of influence and exchange, a cohesive "government" began to be developed in the provinces we researched, and strong and effective horizontal linkages began to emerge. As one governor related

The most important impact of PDAP in the planning process was the increased staff capacity we developed at the provincial level. Before PDAP, we really could not question plans and programs dictated by Manila. Now, we have the technical ability to question, to criticize their plans. Now, we can plan, organize, make use of our own resources, and hold our own against national bureaucrats. We can go one on one and sometimes win.

Sectoral officers at times perceive this as a real advantage to them. One

Provincial Health Officer related:

National programs are just a starting point...we can make them do what the province needs with good planning and implementation.

In summary, PDAP planning requirements established the place of the PDS and gave it its initial credibility and the Governor a role in nearly all local-level administration. But their greatest impact had occurred after they were "scaled-down" in the field by the PDS, and were in their effects upon provincial decision-making and the provincial executive. A question, though must still be asked: might not a more appropriate "unbounded" planning system had beneficial effects in both strengthening the executive and encouraging creative, adaptable and useful planning procedures?

Infrastructure/Special Projects: The PDS has also, of course, been responsible for a number of supporting activities in the implementation of the Special Projects (Rural Roads, Barangay Water and Real Property Tax Administration). While the distribution of responsibilities between the PDS and the Provincial Engineer's Office and the Provincial Assessor's Office has varied among the provinces, the PDS generally performs key functions in preparing feasibility studies, selecting project sites, back-stopping projects (general management assistance), and, in the case of Barangay Water, developing local administrative structures to manage and support completed water projects. During the early years of PDAP, the PDS was also responsible for insuring that appropriate reports on Infrastructure projects were passed to PDAP-Manila.

These programming activities have also had deep affects on provincial government. First, the PDS early became essential for provincial governments to absorb the infrastructure projects. More significantly, the joint PDS-PEO and PDS-Assessor responsibilities helped build lateral linkages among key provincial officers, and contributed to the development of provincial staffs and "cabinets" joined together by a shared interest in the completion of

tangible programs. Moreover, the overlapping role of the PDS helped expedite the pooling and processing of information about a variety of programs which also strengthened the governor's managerial capacity.

The expanded responsibilities of the PDS (which have continued in spite of the decline of PDAP Central) in the Barangay Water Program are both indicative of existing staff capacity and promising of further growth. The PDS has been responsible for assisting in project selection, training equipment maintenance personnel, and assisting the organization of local associations to fund and support the system. Several PDSs have already begun implementing these responsibilities with visible success. Their role in this participatory-oriented program is a rather new function, which, perhaps, presages an entirely new phase of provincial institutional development. Interestingly enough, one PDS involved in Barangay Water is expanding to include four new professional, "Municipal Development Specialists," whose responsibility will be to strengthen "downward" linkages and mobilize greater municipal activity.

The infrastructure projects affected provincial government in two additional ways: the consequences attached to the control of assets and the "growth/learning by doing hypothesis." Each deserves some discussion; and while we have only subjective information to work with, it is fairly clear that the tangibility of the assets distributed by the special projects, and the role played by the PDS in these projects, have increased the credibility of the PDS substantially. These resources, along with the fact that USAID officials (and PDS members relate, IBRD and ADB personnel) seek out the PDS and take seriously its analysis of infrastructure needs, has enhanced PDS status and influence both with the governor and with other sectoral officers.

It should also be recalled that the data available indicate that FAR added 10% or more to provincial budgets. The impact of this on the administrative discretion of the provinces and the effect on the governor's position has

however, been substantially greater than this figure would indicate. Because such funds are generally unencumbered by national controls, they could be used for provincial needs by provincial officials. This fact may be the most important of all, because it is in terms of the availability of resources that governments build their authority and legitimacy. Thus one might wish to revise PDAP's "growth of capacity by doing" hypothesis to read a "growth of authority by doing."

Indeed, FAR is the most popular element of PDAP. Provincial officials admire it because It "supports professional standards in construction," provides a strong incentive to complete projects on time, helps to avoid loss of funds, and makes provinces feel that the projects really "belong" to them. The balance between local control (site selection, design, implementation, cash management) and external involvement (general guidelines., inspection, quality control) is seen in the field as sensible. Some serious issues, such as "up front" costs in poorer provinces, remain to be resolved. Similarly, the utility of a FAR system in service programs where recurrent funding is a problem, needs to be explored. Nonetheless, the principle and practice of FAR is accepted and respected. In fact, when provincial officials were asked what they would like PDAP to do in the future the answer that invariably came was to "provide more FAR."

Budgeting: In many, though not all provinces, we found the PDS playing an important role in the annual budget process. The stimulus for this is the ACTION budget system introduced as a PDAP requirement. This, we understand, has now been superseded by new national budgeting requirements. But in interviews we found substantial appreciation of the contribution made by the Action Budget.

The impact of the budgeting systems, like the planning exercises, was

primarily "political" in its redistribution of access and influence in the budgeting process- Several informants reported that before this budget system was established, and before PDS and other provincial personnel received training in budgeting, the governor lacked a knowledge of budgeting procedures, and a staff to assist in analyzing budget proposals and documents- Accordingly, governors were in no position to influence the budget process, nor to critically evaluate the claims of the Treasurer regarding such facts as, e.g., the availability of funds during a budget year. At that time, the ability of a governor to use the budget as a tool to manage local affairs or to counter national sectoral offices was minimal to non-existent. PDAP's efforts in budgeting may be seen as an important element in eliminating this weakness. The training it provided, apart from its budget system requirements, provided a critical knowledge of fiscal management at the provincial level.

The current role of the PDS in the budget process varies a great deal. In some provinces we found the Provincial Development Coordinator a key participant in budget committee deliberations, often acting as phairman in the governor's absence. On the other extreme, we have found one PDS that is quite removed from the process, except in so far as its capital planning decisions affect the budget. The recent addition of a provincial budget officer by the Ministry of Budget will certainly affect the role of the PDS. But it is an important commentary on the momentum developed through PDAP, and perhaps an insight into the future of provincial government, that in several provinces the new budget officer appears to have been coopted by existing provincial staff, and has been unable to "carve out" an exclusive turf. In most provinces, the Provincial Development Coordinator remains a key member of the budget committee, and through his staff plays a decisive role in assisting the governor to analyze and respond to budget proposals, and defend the budget before the

local assembly (The Sanggunian). For all such activities, the PDS acts as the governor's staff, reporting to him and carrying out his instructions.

In summary, the governor's increased information and initiative in budgeting appears to have been a crucial element in strengthening his control over programs at the provincial level. In several interviews, governors and sectoral officers indicated that they worked very closely in defining and designing service and development programs to make optimal use of provincial fiscal resources and to respond to provincial needs. The preparation of the budget is the major tool toward this end. PDAP set the basis for this process and the PDS has extended it.

New Program Development: In several provinces visited, PDSs have begun to assume a role in program development quite beyond original PDAP requirements. In one, for example, the PDC indicated that only a small percentage of PDS time is now spent on PDAP related activities, that 70% of its time goes toward developing completely new programs and projects. This may be an exaggeration. But the range of activities found across the provinces included the following:

- technical assistance to provincial level officers of national ministries (health, agriculture) in preparing specific proposals in response to new nationally based programs;
- technical and research assistance to national ministries directly;
- developing specific provincial programs;
- developing multi-sectoral, integrated, national/provincial programs.

One consequence of these activities is to augment the governor's ability to bargain effectively with national and regional institutions. These activities not only provide the governor with general information and knowledge of specific alternatives, they enable him to act as an ally of

sectoral officers. In nearly all provinces, sectoral officers indicated they too had trouble dealing with their national offices. Horizontal coordination tends to displace a monopolistic vertical control when a governor is able (as he has been reported) to get programs, funds and personnel from Manila that sectoral personnel have not been able to secure, or when he has provincial resources which he can offer in lieu of national resources.

Monitoring and Information Gathering: This general function has quite naturally devolved to the PDS, and its principal task here is to find the information the governor needs for both routine and extra-ordinary decision situations. The extent to which the PDS becomes the governor's primary source of information varies with the confidence the governor has in the PDS, but such a role seems to be emerging as a mode.

In performing this task, the PDS does not so much assume additional duties; rather, it takes on a broader and deeper analytical role regarding the data and information gathered. In this respect, the PDC acts as the chief of staff to the governor -weighing, interpreting, analyzing and reporting those issues and facts which he deems important to the exercise of executive management and control. PDCs and their staffs also prepare written reports, and provide oral briefings for the governor. "Troubleshooting" was repeatedly emphasized as an additional aspect of this task.

In several instances, we should add, we found the PDS adopting a self-conscious monitoring function regarding the entire range of activities in the province. This appears to be particularly supportive of attempts by the governor to integrate provincial implementation. Not surprisingly, some frustration has been expressed regarding the national ministries and the difficulty that provinces have in getting complete and timely information from them.

Responding to National Ministries: Without exception, the PDSs regard themselves as the governor's staff. Nonetheless, they face demands from PDAP which they have been required to meet, as well as requests for data, feasibility studies and plans from other national agencies. The majority of PDCs indicated that once such tasks as the RNDP or PCP were completed, PDAP reporting requirements were generally tiresome, but rarely burdensome. On the other hand, they did not find that the data or reports they submit to PDAP were used in a program-matically relevant fashion. Specifically, they received little or no feedback from PDAP, and they viewed these requirements as little more than compliance procedures which had no value to them. In recent years, however, there has been little interference from PDAP-Central, and they have been relatively unhampered by it.

The demands by national ministries and bureaus do cause demonstrable irritation. Excessive demands in circumscribed time frames are most frequently pointed to and the actual extent of this problem is worth detailed assessment.

PDAP and the PDS: Training and Technical Assistance

It is difficult to assess the contribution that training and technical assistance made to the PDSs and their capacity to operate as executive staffs. The "evidence" is meager because records of course syllabi, lecture content, enrollment figures, objectives and goals, etc., are, at best, in fragmentary form. Similarly, student evaluations (particularly longitudinal for repeat students/courses) were either never performed or cannot be found. Nor have there been any attempts to measure the impact of PDAP training and assistance by "controlled" studies; in fact, such studies are simply not feasible because spillovers have occurred as a result of personnel exchange, non-PDAP training resources, dissemination of PDAP manuals beyond PDAP provinces, etc. These

spillovers do suggest, however, that PDAP techniques have been widely sought, extending well beyond the 28 provinces that were PDAP participants.

What one is left with, therefore, are a set of subjective reactions based on interviews with training recipients. From these, some relatively consistent response patterns emerge.

First, most interviewees who experienced early PDAP training were favorably disposed. Several gave specific examples of tasks (budgeting, planning) which they could not do before, that their training helped them perform. Furthermore, these respondents, often spontaneously, drew specific linkages between the upgrading of their skills and the growth of provincial government capacity.

Second, most interviewees were also positive about early technical assistance. They felt that the original field teams were quite competent and quite useful in helping them learn master planning, socio-economic analyses, feasibility studies, and budgeting.

Third, most interviewees felt there had been a noticeable decline in the quality of training in recent years, marking 1976 as the turning point. Most indicated that this was unfortunate; they felt that their staffs could benefit from additional training. Part of the decline was attributed to the fact that PDAP-Central never really studied the problems of the provinces in the provinces that it decided in Manila what was needed. Nor was PDAP-Central seriously open to field or provincial suggestion.

Fourth, informants felt there had been a serious decline in the quality and relevance of technical/field assistance in recent years. While some simply referred to a decline in competence, others were quite specific in indicating that existing technical assistance was not relevant to their needs: that it was either unrealistic (PCP came under criticism here) or simplistic. The latter criticism seemed to reflect a desire to move beyond simple "1..2..3.." step models, to the development of more flexible problem solving/

management tools and approaches. PDAP has not been of a help here.

The evidence provides strong indication that pre-1976 PDAP training and technical assistance added an important dimension to technical staff development; that in recent years, PDAP-Central has declined markedly in its capacity to train effectively, and has failed to keep abreast of the changing needs of the provinces. The causes for this are many, but include, at least, the decline of PDAP's national position, staffing policies that have stimulated internal conflict, the tension between line and experimental functions, and a basic misunderstanding of the concept of a "pilot project" or an experimental role.

A provincial development coordinator's reply when asked, "How did PDAP affect PDS?" may best summarize the varied and complex role PDAP has played:

PDAP, first, helped us establish our identity, particularly when it was located in the Office of the President, and particularly when people from such agencies as USAID came to see us. Then, PDAP and USAID told other offices what it was we (PDS) were to do. This established our credibility. Thirdly, they gave us resources to expend that had to go through the PDS: this established our visability. Finally, they gave us training, which established our capacity.

The same PDC, when asked what was the most important effect of the PDS, said: "We are the governor's eyes and ears. We provide him with specific alternatives, from which he can choose his priorities and implement his policies." The PDS became the governor's executive staff. It has been used to gather information, to discuss provincial development, to plan, to program new projects, to "trouble-shoot" for both the executive, line officials, and more. Whether or not PDAP really intended this to happen is rather unclear, but it is the most important outcome of the project. It is this, and the promise it holds for the continued development of provincial government as an effective agent of social and economic development in The Philippines, that is the paramount accomplishment of PDAP.

PDAP: Experimentation, Role Conflict and Technologies: As the preceding section suggests, PDAP's more technocratic features had mixed results in the field, with some of the most important of them occurring as PDSs adapted technological-managerial innovations with apolitical goals ("rational" procedures of decision making, elimination of nepotism, pork-barreling, etc.) into politically relevant resources for the governors. This can clearly be seen in the planning function, its evolution in use by PDSs, and the use made of it by the governors.

PDAP was perhaps singularly unsuccessful in its self-ascribed role as "experimental" agency. Almost without question, it adopted the managerial doctrines then in vogue in the United States. In part, no doubt, this is because PDAP came into existence in the late 1960s in association with USAID. At that time, public administration in the United States was thoroughly absorbed by PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting System). Introduced in the Defense Department in 1961, it was ordered into general effect in 1965 on the national level. States and cities began to employ it thereafter, and it was applied internationally as well. In principle, it was adopted by PDAP: the CIP, the Action Budget, the Annual Implementation Program were established as steps to achieve a planning-programming budget. Fortunately, the Ministry of Finance's requirement for itemized budget presentations and the generally weak administrative condition of the provinces precluded any attempt to institute PPB on a grand scale.

Management/planning methodologies constrain choice, just as PPB is basically a control system. The product of this is a system which centralizes managerial, planning, and policy-making authority. It was first instituted in the United States in the Defense Department precisely because of this feature, and it succeeded in centralizing authority in the office of the Secretary of Defense. In fact, the centralizing character of PPB is its most

notable property. It is a curiosity, therefore, that PDAP, intent on creating decentralized provincial systems of organization and management, would employ systems that predispose in the opposite direction. One of the ironies of PDAP is that the tools it was first charged to "experiment" with themselves stifled experimentation. A second irony is that PDAP managed to succeed in decentralizing to the Provinces, largely in spite of the technology it selected.

Part of this thrust toward rules, regulations and compliance, no doubt, grew out of PDAP's own contradictory role: it was to be both an experimental and operational agency. Indeed, dualities of this kind have been notorious for the internal conflict they breed; for the doubt, uncertainty, and confusion that they engender. In such organizations, the experimental mode clashes with the requirements of line administration and both suffer. It is usually the case, however, (and PDAP is no exception) that the routines of administration prevail and displace experimental efforts. Line operations become so pronounced that they soon mark the character of the organization. Primary tasks become those of insuring compliance procedures, establishing control systems, instituting routines, and maintaining clearance and accountability mechanisms. Strict adherence to regulations, close supervision, and formal channels loom large in line organizations.

Experimental agencies, to the contrary, must be loose, open, free-wheeling **all** in the interest of discovering solutions to problems; nor can they be doctrinaire. They are bound to resort to the methodology of trial and error: and they are bound to admit error and to try to correct it. Such behavior is not easy to come by in line agencies: in fact, it is often argued, however persuasively, that such behaviors are disruptive of line agencies.

Be that as it may, PDAP originated as an experimental organization.

It, itself, was an experiment. Its task was to develop methodologies, procedures, and instruments that would strengthen local government. But the "controls" it imposed on its members, initially justified on experimental grounds, soon became synonymous with the responsibilities of a line agency. Its struggle to gain "replication" authority in additional provinces is indicative of this point, as is the fact that its initial procedures became its permanent operating procedures. Within a few short years, it had ceased its developmental-experimental efforts and had become, to all intents and purposes, an operating agency. After 1976, this fact brought It into conflict with other line agencies (such as a strained attempt to make RPTA a joint MOF-PDAP project) and prompted its anomalous status. PDAP-Central may have built a broader constituency and been a much stronger organization today had It pursued an experimental course—turning over successful developments either to the provinces or to the ministries, as the cases warranted. As an experimental agency, PDAP was clearly a failure. Indeed, nearly all "change" growing from PDAP resulted from provincial political dynamics (discussed above) and very little from technological experimentation along the lines of its charter. The irony is that PDAP had many opportunities for creative experimentation. At its maturity, its domain consisted of 28 provinces. These differed in many respects, but they also exhibited many similarities. PDAP might have varied managerial and planning systems, equipment pool construction and maintenance procedures, methods of fiscal administration, evaluation programs, and more, to learn which strategy produced what and at what cost. Provinces could have been paired, and competing programs established all with the idea of learning what takes hold easily, what kinds of obstacles have to be overcome, the relative costs of alternatives, and the like. PDAP's history, however, does not reveal such efforts. Apart from its disposition to act like a line agency, it operated as if its procedures and techniques

had been established as sound—that they were in fact proven solutions to problems. On this foundation, PDAP's heavy emphasis on rote training and on rigid procedural compliance is understandable. The potential of PDAP to experiment and stimulate change was soon displaced by its interest in controlling its established, line responsibilities.

IV. PDAP: An Overview of Goals and Accomplishments

PDAP in 1980: As of 1980, PDAP Central was virtually at a standstill. Its staff generally appeared much under-employed, preoccupied with finding a new function for PDAP or seeking employment' elsewhere. PDAP's only major activity in 1980 was the operationalization of the proposed IBRD Rural Roads Improvement Project which included packaging of the loan and orienting new provincial governments to the program. (This occupied about ten people.) The assignment of this task to PDAP-Central, when it could easily be handled by RRP, was seen by PDAP's acting director as an attempt, by the Deputy Minister, to restore a sense of worth and purpose to PDAP-Central's staff. The remaining agenda items included a revision, by the Equipment Pool Program Chief, of one of its evaluation measures (from a deadline to a utilization rate) in coordination with the USAID project office for RRP; and the involvement of two people from the fiscal management division in the Ministry of Budget's training program on local budgeting systems. Apart from this, PDAP was then preparing for its inclusion in the 1981 budget of the MLGCD as a regular agency with special concern for fifteen depressed provinces and seeking bilateral donor funding for such an activity. The rest of its activities tended to be administrative in nature—the collation of information from provinces for incorporation into the 1979 annual report; the receipt and recording of a plan or document required by one or another SP (increasingly, with the status of a "copy furnished" rather than as the major recipient), and the processing or payments for FAR. **Since** 1978 there had been no training, no conceptualization of new programs, no pilot testing, and no monitoring and evaluation.

PDAP and Innovation: The key concern in this paper is the success of PDAP in achieving administrative decentralization in the Philippines. What activities and strategies did PDAP pursue which were successful and unsuccessful in strengthening provincial government?

In general, and as we shall see below, the various actors in the provincial administration-development assistance community supported or hindered PDAP according to their control over the program and their expectation that it might expand or contract their own influence, prestige and status, PDAP's ultimate administrative success, it seems clear, grew from the political interests and decisions of others at least as much as it did from its technical program.

For example, during PDAP's earliest phase (1968-72), its strongest backers were indeed USAID, PDAP-Manila and the NEC. They had substantial control over project design: USAID and PDAP at least would have their resource base expanded by PDAP, and all three had little or no reason to expect the program would cost them any resources. The National Ministries, one might expect, saw little threat from this small, pilot effort to improve provincial management. If field personnel perceived some potential future cost or disruption implicit in PDAP procedures and requirements, they had no resources with which to resist it. The governors were largely still unaffected by early project activity in the few start-up provinces, and therefore not likely to become highly involved, pro or con. The Provincial Development Staffs were forming at this time, only beginning to develop their technical abilities, and swamped by prodigious research and planning tasks. Thus they were both unlikely to be independent actors nor particularly likely to threaten other provincial actors. PDS personnel and sectoralists both recall that great skepticism greeted early PDAP/PDS efforts: "airy, irrelevant, theorizing," was apparently a frequent attitude.

This attitude as well as mixed feelings by the governors may well have been

justified by early PDAP emphases. As we have noted, questions need to be raised in PDAP regarding the managerial, planning and budgetary systems which were originally required. In conjunction with PDAP program requirements, for example, these encouraged a centralized system in the name of decentralization. The constraints imposed by PDAP threatened to transform member provinces into mere subordinate agents. Where the original idea was to transform provinces into intermediate governmental units capable of both managing and initiating developmental projects, PDAP-Central was building a tightly controlled hierarchical system. The sheer number of PDAP requirements threatened to overload already impoverished provincial governments. The PDAP program was born of the fact that, as late as the 1960's, provincial administration was primitive, ineffectual, personalistic, and patrimonial. Provinces possessed little technical competence, severely limited revenue resources, and they were dominated by national ministries which all too often mandated provincial tasks without regard for local need, local desire, or local capacity—a practice which continues to date. PDAP-Central, despite its proclaimed goals, was well on the way toward becoming another such control agency. There was some ambiguity during this time as to whose staff the PDS was: PDAP's or the Governor's?

It was during the second "generation" (1972-76) of PDAP that its value to key actors and therefore its potential to change rural administration became evident. As the PDS staffs began to develop some organizational and managerial expertise, the infrastructure programs were established, and PDAP-Central gained control of substantial resources through the "Fixed Amount Reimbursement" mechanism (FAR). Such standardized PDAP requirements as the Provincial Coordinator, the Provincial Development Staff, the Action Budget and the Capital Improvement Program, were intended to introduce and sustain a modern "rational" management facility at the provincial level, and have strengthened the provincial governor. Over the life of

the program, such elements, in combination, encouraged the "institutionalization" of a provincial executive and of provincially-oriented administration. In all of the provinces visited, and especially in PDAP provinces, the modality of an executive office is today clearly visible. It is clear that many governors saw PDAP as a resource they could use to strengthen their authority. For early PDAP training, even rigid and doctrinaire, nevertheless contributed to developing professional and systematic decision making institutions at the provincial level. The substance and quality of instruction, important in its own right, were not the critical factors. Nor is it especially significant that the concept of feasibility studies was assigned a paramount status, or that such priority ranking techniques as Benefit-Cost Analysis and Internal Rate of Return were taught. In relatively short order, provincial staffs developed enough sophistication to engineer required internal rates of return and benefit/cost ratios for the projects that they deemed crucial. What is more important is the fact that a dynamic and increasingly institutionalized system of interaction among provincial staff, including the governor and provincial officials, was generated on the foundation of formal-"rational" systems of decisions-making that were coupled with the training. The rational techniques in and of themselves are problematical, their instrumental value is variable: some helpful, others not; but sustained training along these lines did not simply instruct as to the calculation of an IRR, just as it served to do more than merely promote the use of technical criteria in the consideration of alternatives. Again, variations of this theme can be observed, but in all of the PDAP provinces that were visited there was readily apparent a sense of professionalism and cohesion among top administrative personnel. In several of the provinces, local university instructors of accounting, planning, fiscal administration and engineering subjects felt quite at home as provincial officials. An association of provincial executives in one province, known as "APEX", included

sectoral officers in the province, initiated its own training program (funded by the province), and looked upon itself as a professional society. It was one measure of the change which has occurred.

Additionally, the sheer fact of participation in training programs produced informal and extra-official communication networks that further reinforced this professionalism and cohesion among the personnel concerned. The key point is that such networks and associations helped to develop provincial administration beyond what were probably naive assumptions about the amenability of provincial administration to planned, rational management algorithms: in taking some management "training," in being forced to work together to develop provincial plans, and in working with the Governor's development staff, they developed a provincial perspective and a provincial solidarity, and added considerably to the authority of the Governor. When provincial staff and sectoral officials became both advisors and allies, they consequently enabled the governor to act effectively in a wider domain. His ability to direct a Development Council, to cope with the Sanggunian, to exercise influence in Regional Councils, to deal with national ministries, was considerably enhanced by the presence of a cadre of professionally oriented personnel, tied to the executive office both formally and informally. These are the foundations upon which the equivalent of a gubernatorial cabinet could emerge, and coherent, coordinated provincial government could develop.

Interview data as to the value of PDSs are confirmed by the rapid expansion of PDAP from 15-28 provinces during this era. Additional provinces requested PDAP, but were rejected for failure to meet several PDAP requirements.

The SPs, most particularly the Rural Roads Program, provided the tangible and publicly visible resources that nourished the value of PDAP to the governors and strengthened provincial growth. Without such resources, possibly very little of what has been described would have come to pass. In the case of the Provincial

Coordinator and Development Staff, their critical role in the allocation of resources (by virtue of PDAP's original requirements as well as those of the Special Projects) forced sectoral representatives in the provinces to accept them as vital actors. This, reinforced by PDC/PDS responsibility for the preparation of Joint Work Plans and Annual Implementation Plans, RNDP, and the provincial budget, transformed the character and status of the development staffs, Where they might have been seen as a body of abstract planners and theorists (which is how sectoral officials received them at first), they became practical and forceful instruments which enabled the Governor to influence, often to the point of control, the sectoral representatives.

Beyond this, the SPs, and the use of FAR, extended both the jurisdiction and discretion of the Governor. One reasonable test of PDAP's effort to create strong provincial organization and management is the extent to which learned technologies were transferred to other areas of provincial action. "Other areas" were so limited, though, both by national restriction and inadequate sources of local revenue, that there was not much to transfer technology to. And it is quite clear that in the entire time-span of the project, no devolution of authority occurred despite the fact that this was the primary assumption of the PDAP program.

The existence of the SPs, however, widened the area of provincial action. Against national perspectives and provincial potential, this may appear to be a marginal increment. But it has, nevertheless, provided the executive with real
of
policy alternatives, choice/problems, and thus, a relatively vital provincial agenda. Governors have asserted that they owed victory in the last election largely to PDAP/USAID Special Projects. In the instance of one province, an audio--visual campaign presentation pointed to the achievements of the provincial government--the vast bulk of which were PDAP/Special Projects, The generally, we should say universally, positive response of provincial executives to PDAP (they do not

distinguish between PDAP-Central and the Special Projects) is due to the vitalization properties of PDAP/USAID programs. And because the Special Projects permit the existence of choice alternatives, governors have been able to employ incentives in dealing with Mayors, with the Sanggunians, and to bargain with the variety of interests to be found in the province—whether governmental or private. Special project resources, thus, have enabled governors to reduce factionalism and to resolve conflict. Not the least of the accomplishments of the provincial development assistance program is the fact that provincial executives exercise a conflict-resolving function. They now stand as pivotal actors in this process and they have become much more capable of administering and mobilizing their provinces.

As PDAP entered the infrastructure and special project stage, USAID had a large incentive to maintain its support. It continued to retain an effective role in the design stage, was able to expand the resources it controlled by expanding its Mission portfolio, and had more resources to distribute among Filipino institutions and thereby strengthen lateral relationships. It was also unthreatened by project values, goals, etc. PDAP also appeared to receive strong backing from the President's office, another actor which retained control, expanded resources, and was little threatened by PDAP goals.

The position of national Ministries might be expected to be ambiguous, on the other hand. While early PDAP did not directly challenge them (except by comparison, had its aspirations to efficiency, etc., been successful), the PDAP of 1972--76 posed several potential serious threats. The committee arrangement which gave many of them a voice in its operations (NEC) was disbanded, and a reputedly effective military officer close to the President was placed in charge. Functions normally performed by established national ministries (location, design, construction, financing of infrastructure; the emerging special projects in tax administration, local water works, and municipal development) were being aggressively pursued

by an outsider. PDAP was consuming donor resources which might have gone to them. And, MLGCD's portfolio of provincial and local government responsibilities could not help but be threatened.

Ministerial field personnel, on the other hand, represent an even more ambiguous situation. On the one hand, PDS planning, data gathering, budgeting, etc., could disrupt their control over local programs. Alternatively, governors could and apparently did act as counterweights for line field personnel vis-a-vis Manila.

In any case, by 1976, PDAP had been removed from the President's Office, placed in limbo in MLGCD with an impermanent status, removed from infrastructure projects (excepting completing RRI), and had Special Projects taken from its direct control. What is fascinating here, though, is that while PDAP-Central was systematically and effectively emasculated, the Provincial Development Staffs, Provincial Budgeting and the various planning routines were retained by the Governors, and they were extended nationally by the President. Indeed, these events may have strengthened the appeal of the PDSs to the Governors. To 1976, their status was ambiguous, responding both to the Governor and to PDAP-Central. Since then, and coincident with the decline of PDAP-Central, the tension has dissipated and it has become the central actor in the executive office. Its range of activities now extends far beyond PDAP's original perspectives. Planning, data-gathering, feasibility studies and priority ranking systems, e.g., are only a part of its agenda. As noted above, it monitors and coordinates, trouble-shoots, provides technical assistance within the province, and participates in executive decision councils. It acts as an internally sanctioned critic, directs and maintains communication channels, and serves as a trusted advisor. There are variations on this theme, but it remains clear, that the PDC/PDS constitutes a vital segment of provincial government. When this development is coupled to such instruments as

a performance or action budget, the ability of the Governor to enlarge his grasp, to administer his province, and to exercise his prerogatives is significantly enhanced. The institutional basis for the emergence of a "strong executive" at the provincial level has been laid.

PDAP-Central changed dramatically during this period. Whatever pretensions it may have had in experimentation and research were displaced by its intensive operational responsibilities. In this respect, the original PDAP concept and those who favored it, also lost influence during this period.

PDAP in decline (1976-1980) is informative to see what happens to an organization which is neither much of a threat nor an asset to any relevant actors. For USAID, the institutional bias toward new programming and against infrastructure (the latter growing from the "New Directions" Mandate), and "Human Rights" pressures regarding the Philippines reduced the desirability of continued support for PDAP. Indeed, the evidence we saw of Ministerial desires to remove the Special Projects from "PDAP" was complimented by USAID's desire to make its rural efforts more obvious.

For the Governors and the PDSs, PDAP had served its purpose. The PDS particularly as PDAP Central weakened, became increasingly the Governors' Staffs, and the Governors did not necessarily see continued PDAP-Central health as necessary when the Special Projects were managed elsewhere. Indeed, nearly all Provincial Development Coordinators felt PDAP-Central had outlived its usefulness and was, if anything, merely an annoyance. For the Ministries, PDAP appears to have been neutralized (though several interviews confirmed intense sensitivity even in 1980 to PDAP encroachment on Ministerial turf). For MLGCD, PDAP was tamed, and effectively under its control. Indeed MLGCD's only problem was its inability to decide what to do with PDAP: eliminate it outright, find it a new role, or obfuscate? In 1980, the last seemed its choice.

PDAP-Central, as noted above, stood in limbo at this time. Functions and resources had been gradually stripped away from it, morale was dismal, inattendance at work frequent, etc. Essentially, by 1980 PDAP had no apparent strong enemies nor friends, and was therefore left to atrophy. However, one must not forget one indispensable fact: PDAP-Central lost its key provincial allies not because it had failed, but because it had succeeded. The PDSs were in place, functioning and strengthening the governor's hands. The governors in turn protected their PDSs, and expanded their influence laterally and, occasionally, vertically with Manila through these new resources. In an important way, the Ministries closed the barn door after the barn was no longer needed.

V. Conclusions

How does one explain PDAP's successes? PDAP initially introduced change, much of it unintended, by creating new resources rather than attempting to transfer resources from active institutions. Furthermore, PDAP provided a resource for a set of persons (governors), not institutions, who might therefore be expected to be more flexible and expeditious in utilizing the new resource the "change." Furthermore, the evidence is that individuals "learn" more rapidly than institutions, so even a few successful governors could diffuse the new behavior rather rapidly. Additionally, rather substantial donor resources were targeted to this level, again mitigating perceptions of resource distribution from other institutions.

By the time the initially fragmented national ministries began to focus on and erode PDAP's influence, its provincial innovations had built its own constituency with its own, independent resources: the governors. These resources were used, in at least some provinces, to increase the size, latitude and independence of the field officers of sectoral ministries: thus another ally was added to PDAP's provincial changes. PDAP had its failures, problems and mistakes. It may well have been based on fundamentally fallacious technological premises which, until excised or ignored would impede its stated purpose. But it was slow and incremental; initially, it little threatened key institutions or those with resources or authority; it offered new resources to important individual actors; and it established two new institutions with valuable resources to dispense, and whose charter was to alter provincial decision making. Therein lay the keys to its successes. It threatened little, but promised key actors, the governors, much at little risk. It mobilized slack political resources into the political-economy before other participants realized its potential to alter the political game. By the time they saw what its activities could accomplish, the changes had already been consummated, and the game continued. The key to PDAP's change was politics, not technology.