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**POLITICS FIRST, ANIMALS AND RESIDENTS SECOND:  
"COMMUNITY-BASED" WILDLIFE POLICIES AND THE  
POLITICS OF STRUCTURAL CHOICE IN ZAMBIA, 1983-1991**

by

Clark C. Gibson  
Department of Political Science  
Duke University  
Durham, North Carolina 27708

and

Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis  
Indiana University

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**Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis**  
Indiana University, 513 North Park, Bloomington, Indiana 47408-3895 U.S.A.  
Tel. 812-855-0441 • FAX 812-855-3150 • Internet: [workshop@indiana.edu](mailto:workshop@indiana.edu)

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In a previous paper, I demonstrated that political institutions provided incentives for Zambian politicians and civil servants to maintain a wildlife policy that advanced individuals' political and economic goals, but failed to conserve animals.<sup>1</sup> The political logic of an economically crippled one-party state thwarted those who wanted to augment wildlife policy in Zambia — President Kaunda, the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), international donors and local conservationists.

These actors employed new strategies after 1982 to circumvent the impediments presented by members of the party and government. NPWS officers created the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMAGE), a new program of "community-based" wildlife management primarily financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). European conservationists, backed by President Kaunda, established the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDPA), a new public agency supported by the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD). Both LIRDPA and ADMAGE sought to conserve wild animals by incorporating rural residents in decisions over and benefits from wildlife resources.<sup>2</sup>

But the political institutions of the one-party state induced LIRDPA and ADMAGE's designers to construct programs far different than those necessary to implement their goal of

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<sup>1</sup>Clark C. Gibson, "Defying a Dictator: The **Political** Logic of Poaching in Zambia, 1972-1982," Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis working paper no. W94-16, 1994.

<sup>2</sup>In most documents **LIRDPA** is referred to as a project, and ADMAGE as a policy. However, both LIRDPA and ADMAGE promoted policies and incorporated new institutional structures with which to carry out these policies.

community-based conservation.<sup>3</sup> The programs' designers worried about possible intervention by Zambian politicians seeking patronage resources. They recognized their rivalry over control of Zambia's wildlife estate. They prepared for bureaucratic turf battles with other Zambian public agencies. And, most importantly, they understood the advantages and disadvantages posed by an alliance with President Kaunda: his influence could provide decisive support to a program's struggles to survive; his disfavor could prove politically fatal. In response to these factors, LIRDP and ADMADE's designers made choices over political sponsors, financing mechanisms and decision-making structures that favored procuring resources and insulating their programs from political intervention at the expense of goals such as local participation and conservation.

In this paper, I examine Zambia's wildlife policy from 1983-1991 by focusing on the construction of ADMADE and LIRDP. I argue that the institutions of both programs can be explained by exploring the strategic choices of the program's designers, who confronted a set of political constraints and opportunities generated by the one-party state. Such an approach challenges those who view bureaucracies as apolitical institutions designed to produce collective goods. Rather than regard public agencies as solutions to collective action problems, I conceptualize bureaucracies as means by which political winners can impose their favored distributive outcomes on the rest of society. The design of public agencies cannot be separated out from politics; on the contrary, structural choices are central to explanations of government policy.

Section one reviews the concepts provided by research on the politics of structural choice, focusing on how particular systems of government offer specific constraints and opportunities to the designers of public agencies. I model the choices that would confront the designers of public agencies confronting the political institutions of the African one-party state in section two. Section three applies the model to the creation of new conservation programs that occurred in Zambia after 1983. It demonstrates how bureaucrats' knowledge

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<sup>3</sup>In contrast, R. Michael Wright writes "No goal of ADMADE is more important than community development." See his "Alleviating Poverty and Conserving Wildlife in Africa: an 'Inefficient' Model from Africa," *The Nature Conservancy*, n.d., p. 20.

of the Zambian political landscape greatly influenced their choices over the structure of their public agencies. A discussion of the implications of the politics of structural choice in the African context takes place in the concluding section.

### 1. The politics of structural choice

Citizens, scholars and bureaucrats have long decried the inefficiency of public agencies. Supposedly designed to create and implement policy, the labyrinthine institutions and burdensome procedures of public agencies often cripple their effective action. Early work concerning bureaucracy by new institutionalists focused on legislative control of public agencies.<sup>4</sup> Subsequent research broadened the scope of investigation by dropping claims of "congressional dominance," but kept its spotlight on legislators and their mechanisms to influence bureaucracy.<sup>5</sup> More recently, scholars have discarded the assumption that the creators of public agencies design institutions primarily to provide technically efficient public

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<sup>4</sup>Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984): pp. 165-179; Barry R. Weingast, "The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective," Public Choice, 44 (1984): pp. 147-192; Weingast and Mark Moran, "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, 91 (1983): pp. 765-800.

<sup>5</sup>See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 3, 1987, pp. 243-247; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies," Virginia Law Review, 75, 1989, pp. 431-482; Jonathan R. Macey, "Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 8,1, 1992, pp. 93-110; Kenneth Shepsle, "Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 8,1, 1992, pp. 111-118; Murray J. Horn, "The Political Economy of Public Administration," (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1988); Horn and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Commentary on 'Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies': Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs," Virginia Law Review, 75 (1989): pp. 499-508.

services. Instead, this new line of inquiry assumes that well-informed politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats attempt to structure public agencies to achieve their particular goals.<sup>6</sup>

Terry Moe argues that two core characteristics of politics fundamentally affect the strategies of political actors competing over the design of public agencies.<sup>7</sup> First, politics is about the exercise of public authority. Public authority allows political winners to impose their preferred government structures and policy on the entire polity, often at the expense of political losers. Rather than view the supply of a public agency as a contract between interested groups seeking to remedy a collective action problem, the politics of structural choice conceptualizes these groups as seeking to construct bureaucracy to control public authority for their own benefit.<sup>8</sup>

Second, democratic politics means the exercise of public authority is temporary. This uncertainty drives the creators of public agencies to choose institutional designs they would never select if pursuing technical efficiency alone. Since political victory allows only

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<sup>6</sup>My argument follows Moe more closely than other scholars of structural choice, who generally address legislators' desire to create and control bureaucracies, often employing a principal-agent framework (see footnote 4). This chapter approaches the problem from the standpoint of bureaucrats and interest groups constructing institutions to evade such control, and thus resonates with the works such as William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971) and Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, "Agency Growth, Salaries, and the Protected Bureaucrat," Economic Inquiry, 27, 1989, pp. 53-67.

<sup>7</sup>Terry M. Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 (1990 special issue): 213-266. See also Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., Can the Government Govern? (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989); and Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Oliver Williamson, ed., Organizational Theory from Chester Bernard to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

<sup>8</sup>This type of exchange is different than those characterized in much of the literature on the new economics of organization, which assumes exchange between individuals is voluntary and mutually beneficial. See for example Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985); A critique of the contractarian nature of the literature can be found in Robert H. Bates, "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism," Politics and Society 16, no. 2-3 (1988): 387-401.

temporary control over public authority, incumbents will attempt to protect their agency from their political opponents, who could gut or dismantle the agency tomorrow. Further, this fear may drive incumbents to seek to insulate their agency from intervention even though such action may hobble their own exercise of public authority or generate technically inefficient institutions.

The strategies chosen by today's political winners to protect their agencies tomorrow depends on the configuration of political institutions in a country. For example, the separation-of-powers system found in the United States encourages actors to bury agencies in layers of legislation. Because passing laws is difficult in this system, it makes sense for those wanting to protect their agency to formalize its mandate and activities by passing a web of detailed laws. Even if opponents happened to secure a legislative majority in the future, the U.S. system makes changing legislation laborious, given a powerful and independent president and the lack of party discipline. The separation-of-powers system also promotes political compromise, allowing political opponents the chance to hamstring public agencies they dislike from the outset. The result is a highly constrained, complex and formalized American bureaucracy.

The political institutions of a parliamentary system, on the other hand, offer a different set of incentives to those wishing to control public authority and shield it from political uncertainty. Parliamentary politics makes it easier to pass laws, since a party or coalition usually dominates both executive and legislative institutions. Consequently, writing legislation to hide a public agency from its future enemies is less effective. Parties and groups would seek other strategies, like using independent commissions or government corporations, to make credible commitments without relying on legal provisions.<sup>9</sup> In both the separation-of-powers and parliamentary systems, bureaucratic institutions can be

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<sup>9</sup>Moe, "Political Institutions," pp. 239-245.

explained by referring to the strategies political actors take in response to the incentives generated by the particular distribution of public authority the system of government.<sup>10</sup>

## 2. The politics of structural choice in a one-party state

Moe's insights about the politics of structural choice in industrialized democracies can be extended to other political settings. This section attempts to model how individuals seek to construct their government agency under a one-party state with a strong executive, the system of government so common in post-independence Africa.<sup>11</sup>

At the apex of the one-party system stands the head of state and party, whose concentrated political power makes for a potent ally and formidable enemy. One-party presidents generally dominate government and party institutions.<sup>12</sup> They appoint important

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<sup>10</sup>Moe, "Political Institutions," p. 238. See also James Q. Wilson's description of American bureaucracy in Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

<sup>11</sup> individuals and groups seek to control the exercise of public authority in all countries, not just industrialized democracies. And democratic elections are not the only source of political uncertainty — it springs from phenomena common to all politic systems: insiders becoming outsiders, alliances shift, and exogenous forces change the distribution of political power.

<sup>12</sup>The ruler of a one-party state is hereafter referred to as a president.

government and party personnel.<sup>13</sup> They control most decision-making processes. And they wield unparalleled influence over choices regarding state revenue and expenditure.<sup>14</sup>

Groups interested in capturing public authority in this political system must ensure that the interests of the one-party president are not threatened. Moreover, if the group wants to secure strong political or budgetary priority, they will need to attract the president's active

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<sup>13</sup>One-party presidents use their control over job appointments to coopt elites into the one-party state. Employment within the government links individuals with state sources of goods and services. Given the dominant economic position of the state under a one-party system and the generally underdeveloped private sector, government jobs are extremely valuable. For examples from Zambia, see West, "The Politics of Hope," p. 96; James A. Scarritt, "The Analysis of Social Class, Political Participation and Public Policy in Zambia" Africa Today 3 (1983): pp. 16-17; for an example from Zaire, see D.J. Gould, "The Administration of Underdevelopment," in Guy Gran, ed., Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp.87-107.

President Kaunda used his control over the state's resources to keep rival politicians or groups off-balance and incapable of establishing independent bases of economic wealth or political power. Kaunda often employed the "prodigal son" routine, dismissing promising political elites only to welcome them back later with high positions within the government or party. This strategy helped to sanction the more independent activities of individuals while keeping them tied to the patronage system. See West above and Marcia Burdette, Zambia: Between Two Worlds (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 108.

<sup>14</sup>The following section draws from more detailed analyses of the behavior of and constraints on single-party leaders. See especially Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 14-80 and passim.; Patrick Chabal, ed., Political Domination in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Rene Lemarchand, "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 149-170; Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 83-110; Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., African One-Party States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); and James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu, eds., The Failure of the Centralized State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

The political strength of the military, labor unions, regional organizations, ethnic groups or civil servants association may prevent their complete co-optation or annihilation, but one-party president generally possess the ability to alter significantly their membership and activities. In the case of Zambia, see Cherry Gertzel, "Dissent and authority in the Zambian one-party state," in Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, eds., The Dynamics of the One-Party State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 100-101.



support. But with the benefits of the president's patronage also come potentially considerable costs: his monopoly over public authority allows him to intervene capriciously in government affairs.<sup>15</sup> Thus, a group that secures the president's backing must also worry about his future use of power, which could alter or destroy their agency.<sup>16</sup> The potential costs of presidential intervention may make some groups shun his succor, if they can survive without it. Those groups needing the president's support would still seek ways to prevent his active participation in their agency's affairs.

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<sup>15</sup>This analysis resonates with work regarding the problem of eliciting credible commitments from sovereigns. See for example Hilton L. Root, "Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy During the Old Regime," Rationality and Society, 1, 2, 1989 (October), pp. 240-258; Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W.W.Norton, 1971); North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 54-60; North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Credible Commitments: The Evolution of Institutions of Public Choice in 17th Century England," Journal of Economic History, 49, 1989, pp. 803-32; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); and Barry R. Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Institutions," unpublished paper, September 1992.

^Parliamentarians, bureaucrats and interest groups complain about one-party presidents' proclivity to announce new projects or goals without consulting either the affected public agencies or interested groups. In almost every interview I conducted for this study, public and private officials complained about President Kaunda's penchant for declaring policy independent of consultation. Similar trends occur in other one-party states. See for example William Tordoff, "Residual Legislatures in African One-Party States," Journal of Comparative and Commonwealth Studies, 1977: p. 241.

Without countervailing political institutions, policy direction under a one-party system is vulnerable to frequent policy shifts for two reasons. First, one-party presidents use policy change as a strategy to neutralize the political or economic power of individuals and groups. See Eugenia West, "The Politics of Hope" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1989), p. 51; Robert H. Bates and Paul Collier, "The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia," in Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger eds. Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). Second, such unrivaled public authority allows one-party presidents to implement their own possibly shifting ideas (and those of their trusted advisors), contributing to apparently erratic policy trajectories. For example, it is well-known that many of the tenets of President Kaunda's philosophies are contradictory. See Carolyn Baylies, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University Of Madison-Wisconsin, 1978), pp. 873-874.

Unlike other systems of government, a one-party state with a strong executive makes a strategy of alliance with domestic political actors relatively ineffective. While parliamentarians, ministers and other party and government officials could assist an agency gain access to additional services and funds, the president's dominant position allows him to dismantle most of these relationships.

If domestic protection is limited, however, a group could seek the protection of international sponsors for their agency. A foreign patron could alleviate political uncertainty caused by the one-party president by tying his hands through agreements about the agency's structure. Aid contracts could be written to specify the agency's mandate, hiring procedures, funding mechanisms and decision-making processes. Monitoring mechanisms — such as review missions, required reports, financial audits and annual meetings between the government and donor — could be included in the agreement to keep the agency protected from domestic politicians aspiring to use it for their own goals.

By gaining international support, a group also succeeds in linking the president's reputation to their agency. The president's acceptance of an agreement with a donor confers some international significance to the agency. Failure to perform the actions agreed upon may damage his credibility and thus threaten his country's access to other forms of international aid.

Groups attempting to capture a share of public authority under a one-party system with a strong executive encounter a highly uncertain political environment. Groups seek to augment and insulate their public agencies under any system of government; a one-party state forces them to consider mechanisms to limit the capricious inclinations of the president as well.

### **3. Conservationists and the search for new wildlife programs in the Second Republic**

Groups interested in conserving Zambian wildlife had little success in changing policy or programs from 1973-1982. President Kaunda, the National Parks and Wildlife Service, international and local conservationists could not overcome the incentives generated by the Zambia's political and economic institutions for party and government members to oppose conservation measures. The institutional environment changed, however, with an influx of ideas and financing from international sources. While Zambia had a long history of

involvement with ideas and funding from the international arena, the degree of international interest reached new heights in the 1980s.<sup>17</sup> Using these new resources, pro-conservation groups within Zambia attempted to establish new wildlife programs.

Despite agreement that a wildlife crisis existed, however, Zambia's conservationists disagreed over the most appropriate way to manage the country's wildlife resources. Two groups emerged: one composed of donors and European conservationists, the other represented the Zambian National Parks and Wildlife Service. Each group attempted to create programs they most preferred. To do so however, they had to secure and protect the public authority required to carry out their policies. Both groups demonstrated a keen knowledge of the distribution of public authority in the Zambian one-party system as they sought ways to gain power over Zambia's wildlife estate, to insulate their programs from political intervention and to limit the President Kaunda's possible interference.

a. The Watershed: The **1983 Lupande Development Workshop**

Dale Lewis, an American researcher, discovered that human activity — farming, bush burning, legal and illegal hunting ~ had significantly altered the movements and foraging

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<sup>17</sup>The public outcry at the slaughter of African wildlife in the 1970s led to the creation of a number of new international conservation organizations and increased revenues for those already established. Additionally, bilateral foreign aid began to target conservation projects. Consequently, both public and private conservationists in the 1980s could tap into more money from more sources than in the previous two decades. NORAD, US AID and the WWF would provide decisive revenue to the cause of Zambian conservationists. See John McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989); John C. Pierce, Mary Ann E. Steger, Brent S. Steel, and Nicholas P. Lovrich, Citizens, Political Communication, and Interest Groups (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992); and David Adamson, Defending the World (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1990).

habits of elephants in the Lupande Game Management Area of the Luangwa Valley.<sup>18</sup> Lewis's studies brought him into daily contact with villagers and traditional authorities.

It became clear to Lewis that rural residents paid the costs of conservation policies without receiving much benefit. The abundance and variety of wildlife in national parks and game management areas favored tourists and licensed hunters; wild animals did little to augment legally the daily living standards of the villagers. In Lewis's research zone, less than 1% of family income resulted from legitimate forms of wildlife utilization.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>The South Lupande Game Management Area is part of the Luangwa catchment region, containing the most varied and dense populations of wildlife in Zambia. It lies to the east of the Luangwa river and is sparsely populated. Besides the few local residents employed by safari hunters and the NPWS, most residents engage in subsistence farming, hunting and fishing.

Most of Zambia's wildlife tourism business occurs in the Luangwa Valley, and specifically in the vicinity of the Lupande Game Management Area. It is also considered one of the best areas for safari hunting. This region is also the best protected wildlife sanctuary, due to its distance from city centers, the efforts of NPWS and the prevalence of tourists and safari hunters.

<sup>19</sup>S.L. Atkins, "The Socio-Economic Aspects of the Lupande Game Management Area" in D.B. Dalai-Clayton, ed., Proceedings of the Lupande Development Workshop (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1984), p. 52. Others in the international conservation community had come to similar conclusions. Many wildlife managers found that preservationism, the style of conservation that excluded the use of any of the natural resources within a protected area, was not an effective policy. Locals who did not perceive gains from conservation programs flouted laws by gathering firewood, fishing or hunting in protected areas. Additionally, wildlife departments in developing countries, like Zambia, found the management costs for preservation strategies unmanageably burdensome. To mitigate local residents' illegal activities and to augment the finances of wildlife departments, wildlife managers had begun to espouse theories of wildlife management grounded on local participation. This concept held that locals should be included in the decision-making over and benefits from wildlife resources. By providing some degree of property rights over wildlife to local residents, conservationists thought that they could induce individuals to stop unsustainable resource use and help wildlife departments to monitor illegal activities. Interview with Richard Bell, Chipata, Zambia, 15 June 1991. See also R. Norman Owen-Smith, ed., Management of Large Mammals in African Conservation Areas (Pretoria: Haum Educational Publishers, 1983); the various chapters found in David Anderson and Richard Grove, eds., Conservation in Africa: People Policies and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Stuart A. Marks, The Imperial Lion: The Human Dimensions of Wildlife Management in Central Africa (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984); and David Western, "Amboseli

Motivated by these observations, and his conflicts with local chief Dennis Malama, Lewis, with the help of NPWS and the non-governmental organization Save the Rhino Trust, arranged for a conference of wildlife managers, conservationists, government officials and donors to discuss the problems regarding resource use in the Lupande Game Management Area. The Lupande Development Workshop convened on 18 September 1983 to develop strategies to combat the increasing depletion of natural resources in both the Lupande area and Zambia's other protected zones. Participants of the Lupande Development Workshop represented precisely those groups whose conservation interests had been stymied by members of the Party and government in the preceding decade.<sup>20</sup>

The Lupande Development Workshop's proceedings, resolutions and aftermath would change the face of Zambian conservation policy for the next decade. Workshop participants agreed that Zambia needed a new program of wildlife conservation. They agreed that a project should be established to develop the Luangwa catchment area as a model for the efficient management and utilization of wildlife.<sup>21</sup> They agreed that both domestic and international funds were necessary to support the proposed research and anti-poaching

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National Park: Human Values and the Conservation of a Savanna Ecosystem," in J.A. McNeely and K.R. Miller, eds., National Parks, Conservation and Development: the Role of Protected Areas in Sustaining Society: Proceedings of the World Congress on National Parks (Bali, Indonesia) (Smithsonian Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1984).

<sup>20</sup>Of the 38 individuals on the official participants list, 9 were officers of the NPWS and another 20 belonged to government departments most concerned with conservation and whose budgets had also deteriorated tremendously after the 1973 copper shock, e.g. the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Forestry. Seven members of various private conservation groups attended the workshop. Despite the intended goal of including the voice of local villagers in the proceedings, Chief Malama was the only local Zambian at the proceedings. Fifteen participants were European. See Proceedings, pp. vii-viii.

<sup>21</sup>The Luangwa catchment covers almost 20% of Zambia's land surface and includes 5 national parks and 7 game management areas.

efforts. And they agreed the project should also include "people of the Luangwa Valley GMAs" in the "development and management of the catchment's natural resources."<sup>22</sup>

However, the participants strongly disagreed over the proposed project's mandate, structures and control. Two different factions within this pro-conservation lobby surfaced. One group, led by Europeans from international development agencies and the Zambian conservation community, favored a large-scale project that incorporated the management of all natural resources. They argued that the contingent nature of villagers' resource use required an integrated resource development project (IRDP). Importantly, the European bloc also expressed a desire for the new institution to be independent from the normal course of Zambian politics, which had stymied their attempts to change wildlife policy in the past. With complete control over all natural resources in a particular geographic area, these conservationists believed the IRDP could eliminate inter-departmental meddling and corruption. Many in this group also privately expressed their long-standing desire to create a structure free from the influence of NPWS, an agency they considered lacking in integrity and capacity.

Another group, led by Lewis and NPWS officers, expressed apprehension about such an institutional design. They voiced concern about how the IRDP might replace their legislative authority over wildlife. They believed NPWS could provide the expertise needed by any wildlife conservation scheme. And they wondered how such a large program could effectively include the needs of the local resource-user, supposedly one of its fundamental assumptions. Other government officials sided with NPWS's concerns. While all departments generally favored development schemes, especially those that might bring in large amounts of donor funds, they remained wary about the roles that their respective agencies might play in such a structure.

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<sup>22</sup>"Resolutions Passed at the Lupande Development Workshop," in Proceedings, p. 99. Participants also agreed to the formation of an Interim Planning Group to prepare programs and budgets to support the project, and the need for an independent review to explore the feasibility of a policy that featured an integrated resource approach, and to insure that no single department or ministry dominated the design-making stage.

b. The National Parks and Wildlife Service: re-establishing authority through  
ADMADE

NPWS's initial actions: a pilot project

Lewis and NPWS officers understood the threat posed by the European bloc and their proposed IRDP.<sup>23</sup> Without an effective counterstroke, NPWS stood to be replaced as the manager of wildlife resources in the Luangwa Valley. Worse, given President Kaunda's early support for the IRDP concept and his deep distrust of NPWS, the department feared they could be removed as Zambia's principal wildlife manager throughout the country if LIRDP proved successful.<sup>24</sup> Lewis and the NPWS chose to create a new NPWS program quickly, to insulate it from domestic politics by keeping it within the legislative mandate and institutions already enjoyed by the NPWS and to seek the political and financial support of foreign donors.

As a first response to the land-use management needs of the Lupande area and the disconcerting support that many of the workshop's participants gave to a large scale project, Lewis and NPWS speeded up plans to establish their own pilot wildlife management project in the Luangwa Valley.<sup>25</sup> NPWS asserted that the project aspired to solve the land use conflicts between humans and wildlife, to develop greater responsibility for the local

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<sup>23</sup>Lewis chose to work closely with the National Parks and Wildlife Service from the start of his research efforts in Zambia. He befriended many of the junior officers. He collaborated with Zambians to publish academic papers. He worked actively to secure grants for research activities that included NPWS. He brought the latest concepts of the international wildlife management community to the attention of NPWS. And he publicly supported NPWS's constitutional mandate as the protector and manager of wildlife resources in Zambia.

It is difficult to distinguish between the ideas of Lewis and others of the NPWS directorate. NPWS officers and Lewis purposefully give each other credit to enhance the perception that the NPWS is a unified, Zambian agency. While Lewis clearly did not dictate decisions, most NPWS officers interviewed agree that he initiated many of NPWS's policy changes, especially ADMADE. I often single his name out in the text to refer to this significant role.

<sup>24</sup>President Kaunda said he "doubted some of the cheaters at NPWS." Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 18 August 1992.

<sup>25</sup>The pilot project was named the Lupande Development Project.

management of natural resources and to demonstrate the sustainable use of natural resources.<sup>26</sup>

In designing the new project, Lewis and NPWS knew that they could not count on President Kaunda for support. Kaunda had expressed great frustration with NPWS over the last ten years, and was unlikely to be sympathetic to any new initiative emanating from that department. Lewis's own experience other government and party members had shown him that while their personal support was useful at times, their commitment was mercurial and their intervention often destructive.<sup>27</sup> Other NPWS officers resented Kaunda's attempts to insert his favored candidate as the department's director.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, Lewis and NPWS sought neither the patronage of Kaunda nor other senior politicians for support.

Significantly, NPWS did not need Kaunda's active patronage. They already possessed the legislative mandate to administer Zambia's wildlife laws throughout the country. They also had government staff and revenue that, while limited, at least allowed them to function at a low level. Rather than pursue a potentially harmful alliance with Kaunda, Lewis and NPWS constructed a program that attempted to insulate NPWS from politics while expanding the department's authority through extant legislation and institutions. They selected three courses of action. First, they wanted to increase their revenue and shield it from governmental control. Second, they wanted to increase their staff, without depending on other departments if possible. And third, they wanted to create popular support for the project.

The existence of the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund (hereafter the Fund) helped NPWS to insulate their project from political interference. In order to retain the monies it earned and distribute them with little constraint, NPWS needed a mechanism that

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<sup>26</sup>See Lupande News and Views No. 1 (September 1985).

<sup>27</sup>Interview with Dale Lewis, ADMADE Technical Advisor, Nyamaluma Camp, Zambia, 28 June 1991.

<sup>28</sup>I believe this is either Siwana or Kaweche



did not allow oversight by other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance.<sup>29</sup> Not only could the normal procedures of Zambia's financial institutions be cumbersome, but if other agencies noticed any significant NPWS revenues, the possibility that others would seek a share of the department's funds increased. Fortunately, in the 1980s the government promoted the creation of revolving funds for those agencies that could support themselves from their own revenues.<sup>30</sup> In January 1983 the Ministry of Finance approved such a fund for NPWS.<sup>31</sup> The NPWS started using the Fund more intensely, however, after the establishment of their pilot project.

NPWS needed additional revenue to establish their program. Lewis and NPWS successfully persuaded the Ministry of Tourism to allow their project to administer the lower Lupande game management area as a safari hunting concession. The Ministry also implemented a new tax on safari companies. Before, safari companies paid two fees to engage in the hunting business: a fee (in dollars) for the hunting rights to a particular area and a game management area permit (in kwacha), both amounts accruing to the central government.<sup>32</sup> Despite these taxes, many NPWS officers maintained that safari companies paid relatively little when compared with the amount of profits that could be earned during the hunting season. Lewis, in particular, thought that the companies would be willing to pay

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<sup>29</sup>Under Cap. 600, government agencies capable of supporting themselves had been able to apply for their own "working funds" since 1969. The government wanted such funds to allow agencies, especially those related to the mining industry, to procure quickly needed inputs from their own revenues without having to go through the Ministry of Finance. Interview with B. Nair, Director of Internal Accounts, Ministry of Finance, Lusaka, 1 April 1991.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid. Also see Wright, "Alleviating Poverty," p. 14; A.N. Mwenya, D.M. Lewis and G.B. Kaweche, ADMADE: Policy, Background and Future (Republic of Zambia, [1990]), p. 4.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid. The government seeded the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund with a grant of 418,618 kwacha in 1984. See also Nair interview. LIRD used the WCRF to deposit its earnings until it gained its own revolving fund in 1987.

<sup>32</sup>Safari hunting clients themselves paid five types of fees: fees for the various animals hunted, a basic safari license fee, a standard fee for exporting trophies and a tax on each trophy exported.

more for the hunting rights to an area as popular as Lupande. He also knew that it would be difficult to appropriate any share of the extant fees on safari hunting that the central government currently received. To provide the project with financing while staying clear of political fights, Lewis suggested an entirely new safari concession fee. This fee would be paid by safari companies directly into the Fund. The NPWS soon established the new fee at a rate of \$2000 for each 14 day safari.<sup>33</sup>

NPWS also needed to expand their personnel in the field. Hiring local residents as village scouts enabled NPWS to staff their pilot project at low expense. In 1983, NPWS successfully convinced their minister to designate Classified Employees as wildlife officers.<sup>34</sup> This allowed any rural resident to be employed as village scouts. The measure also gave NPWS more flexibility in hiring and firing staff, since classified employees received neither the wages nor protection mandated by the Zambian civil service code. And since classified employees could be terminated for non-performance — unlike regular NPWS civil servants — village scouts provided the project with motivated and loyal personnel.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, NPWS knew that powerful politicians would be less inclined to cancel a project that was locally popular.<sup>36</sup> Delivering tangible benefits to locals was also one of the major policy changes advocated by NPWS and others at the Lupande Workshop. Consequently, Lewis and NPWS worked hard at gaining grassroots support for their program.<sup>37</sup> NPWS established a cropping station to provide employment and meat for local residents and revenue, and gave the local community 50% of the profits the station earned

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<sup>33</sup>Neither the transfer of the concession area nor the new tax required NPWS to fight other government agencies. Their parent Ministry, Tourism, had the authority to declare these actions unilaterally.

<sup>34</sup>Wright, "Alleviating Poverty," p. 14.

<sup>35</sup>Interview with Lewis, 28 June 1991.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Interview with Lewis.

from the sale of meat, skin and tusks.<sup>38</sup> NPWS also gave the community 40% of the revenues it collected from the new safari concession fee.<sup>39</sup> NPWS expedited the grading of the major road in the area, hiring local villagers as day laborers to complete the task. To win the support of the local elite, NPWS consulted with Chief Malama about which individuals should be selected as village scouts.

The NPWS hailed its pilot project as a great success, claiming that in addition to the revenue and jobs it produced<sup>40</sup>, poaching rates had declined 90% in the project's area over three years<sup>41</sup>, local residents could buy game meat legally from the cropping station and the motivation of village scouts exceeded that of regular NPWS staff. Additionally, a NPWS survey of villagers' attitudes toward wildlife found with "convincing certainty" that

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<sup>38</sup>Although the local Kunda ethnic group do not prefer to eat hippo meat, it was still cropped because its products could be sold elsewhere, and the number of hippo in the area could well withstand a significant amount of offtake.

<sup>39</sup>In 1986 NPWS collected 134,444.41 Zambian kwacha (ZK) in safari concession fees, of which the community's share was ZK 53,777.76. Using a nominal exchange rate of 7.5 kwacha to the US dollar, the amounts represent approximately \$18,000 and \$7200 respectively. See A.N. Mwenya, G.B.Kaweche and D.M. Lewis, Administrative Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) (Chilanga, Zambia: National Parks and Wildlife Service, [January 1988]), p. 6. The exchange rate used here is the average of the nominal figures presented for the four quarters of 1986. See Doris Jansen, Trade, Exchange rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Zambia, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1988), Table 6, p. 21. Because these are nominal figures, and the value of the kwacha was overvalued by the Zambian government, the amounts above overestimate the value of the ADMADE revenues.

<sup>40</sup>NPWS claims the pilot project produced over \$35,000 in gross revenues and provided 21 full-time and 37 part-time jobs. See National Parks and Wildlife Service/Lupande Development Project "Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," (Nyamaluma Camp, number 1, May 1988); Mwenya et. al., "Administrative Management," pp. 5-6.

<sup>41</sup>Many individuals disputed the validity of the pilot project's claims. Lewis based the rate of poaching decline on the decline in the number of fresh carcasses of rhino and elephant found in the project area. Critics indict this methodology on several grounds. The incentives and skills of the village scout/NPWS patrols' counting may produce low counts. Poachers could have hid carcasses. And the use of the fresh carcass technique does not take into account baseline populations or possible animal migration.

individuals within the pilot project area had a more protective sense of wildlife than those outside of it.<sup>42</sup>

#### Establishing a nation-wide program

NPWS, increasingly worried about the progress of their rivals' IRDP implementation, quickly adopted the pilot project's basic structures as departmental policy in 1987, calling it the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE). For ADMADE, Lewis and NPWS stuck to their strategy of trying to create a program that enhanced the department's authority and was insulated from domestic political intervention. Such insulation would come from an institutional design that kept NPWS in sole command over the program's most important decision-making structures and sources of revenue.

##### i. ADMADE and decision-making

Lewis and NPWS officers crafted ADMADE's structures to keep the program under the department's control. Overall responsibility for ADMADE's design and implementation was in the hands of the ADMADE Directorate, which included only senior officers from NPWS. Beneath this body, ADMADE drew boundaries for wildlife management units. NPWS officers originally selected units on the criterion that their safari concession fees would cover the costs of ADMADE programs.<sup>43</sup> Thus, some units' boundaries coincided with areas already marked as hunting blocks. However, most units followed established GMA borders, apparently to reduce possible administrative confusion.<sup>44</sup> The ADMADE Directorate appointed one of their own NPWS staff as a "unit leader" to direct the implementation of ADMADE policy in each unit.

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<sup>42</sup>Mwenya et. al. ADMADE, p. 4. Other ADMADE documents are less certain about the significance of the project on local attitudes. "Overwhelming evidence supported the conclusion that the more positive attitudes toward wildlife conservation found among residents in the Lupande Project area was (sic) at least partially due to the significant economic benefits from wildlife available to the local community." (Emphasis added.) From NPWS/LDP "Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," (Nyamaluma Camp, number 1, May 1988): p. 2.

<sup>43</sup>NPWS/LDP "Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," p. 3.

<sup>44</sup>Neither the ability of areas to support safari hunting nor their potential for effective wildlife management correlate with GMA boundaries.

For each unit capable of supporting the costs of its own wildlife management, ADMADE established a Wildlife Management Authority. The district governor chaired the Authority, and the district executive secretary served as vice-chairman. Members included the area's wildlife warden, member of Parliament, unit leader, chiefs and ward chairman. The Authority also allowed the managing directors of safari companies to become members if their business operations had a commercial interest in the unit's area.<sup>45</sup> Every Authority, in turn, contained a Wildlife Management Sub-authority for each chiefdom in the unit. The local chief chaired this body, whose members included village headmen, the unit leader, ward chairman, teachers and a district council representative.

The ADMADE Directorate had a two-fold strategy for membership on the Authority and Sub-authority. First, they wanted to use these bodies to garner support for ADMADE at the local level. Villagers had traditionally been the most antagonistic towards wildlife conservation policy. Lewis and NPWS officers believed if ADMADE could secure the favor of chiefs, headmen, ward chairmen and teachers, their program could be implemented with less hostility from the local community. In the best case, local demand for ADMADE would be high enough to thwart any political threats made toward the program.<sup>46</sup> Second, the Directorate included certain regional political actors within ADMADE's structure to enhance the department's access to government goods and services, while trying to limit the politicians' possible use of the program for their own ends.<sup>47</sup>

The choice to include politicians within the ADMADE structure did not come easily for the NPWS officers or Lewis: they greatly feared political intervention. Originally, the Directorate planned to place its own wildlife wardens as chairmen of the Authority. But the Ministry of Tourism's permanent secretary advised Lewis and NPWS officers to place district governors as chair both to protect the program from local politicians seeking to hijack

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<sup>45</sup>Mwenya et. al. ADMADE, p. 6.

<sup>46</sup>Interview with Lewis, 28 June 1991.

<sup>47</sup>Mwenya et. al., ADMADE, p. 6.

it, and to exploit the governors' influence over central government services.<sup>48</sup> The Directorate eventually agreed to this tactic.

Despite surrendering some influence to the district governor, the Directorate purposefully limited the influence it gave to other local politicians and ordinary villagers: the terms of reference for the Authority and Sub-authority clearly indicate that the department would tolerate little loss of decision-making authority over wildlife. The Authority could only advise on decisions already taken by NPWS staff regarding access to wildlife resources, i.e. hunting quotas and hunting licenses. Additionally, ADMADE policy required the Authority and the Sub-authority to help NPWS fulfill its mandate of protecting Zambia's wildlife estate. The Authority should "monitor both illegal and illegal off-takes of wildlife, "prepare a workplan for the unit's wildlife management program" and "enforce the National Parks and Wildlife Act., Cap. 316, and other relevant Acts through the office of that unit's leader." Among other things, the Sub-authority should "monitor and solve wildlife management problems on the level of the chiefdom" and "facilitate the implementation of any programs, plans projects, etc. approved by the authority."<sup>49</sup> The terms of reference made

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<sup>48</sup>Lewis interview; see also NPWS/LDP "Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," no. 1 (May 1988): p. 4.

<sup>49</sup>Mwenya et. al., ADMADE, pp. 6-7. The full terms of reference for the WMA were:

- monitor both illegal and illegal off-takes of wildlife resources;
- initiate projects for improved wildlife management
- approve allocation of sustained-yield quotas of wildlife as recommended by NPWS for various forms of use: safari hunting, export and restocking, culling, resident hunting, etc.;
- liaise with the Director, NPWS, on the issuance of hunting licenses;
- ensure that 40 percent of the revenue generated from the exploitation of wildlife resources is committed to the management costs of wildlife resources within the unit;
- ensure that 35 percent of the revenue earned is used by local village communities from whose area such revenues were generated'
- prepare a workplan for the unit's wildlife management program and local community improvement on an annual basis;
- enforce the National Parks and Wildlife Act, Cap.316, and other relevant Acts through the office of that unit's unit leader;
- furnish the Director of NPWS records of its meetings;
- encourage applied management research and solicit outside expertise where needed;

clear that NPWS remained in firm control over the substance and implementation of the ADMADE policy.

The Directorate also created a formula to distribute ADMADE revenues that kept their department's interests paramount. In the original allocation, NPWS gave itself 40% of ADMADE revenues to meet its management costs in each unit. NPWS also awarded itself 15% of ADMADE revenues to run Zambia's national parks, even though ADMADE funds came predominantly from hunting in game management areas. The local community received 35% for development projects. NPWS gave the remaining 10% to the Zambia National Tourist Board for the promotion of tourism.<sup>50</sup> The ADMADE Directorate changed the beneficiaries over time, increasing NPWS's allotment. In 1990, they applied 15% to the NPWS to defray its overall costs of administering ADMADE.<sup>51</sup> By 1991, they retained the 10% portion as well, to support the costs they incurred for managing national parks.<sup>52</sup>

#### ii. ADMADE and revenue

Regardless of the precise allocation formula, it was clear to Lewis and NPWS officers that they needed more revenue to establish ADMADE effectively throughout the country. Partial funding from the World Wildlife Fund allowed ADMADE to be instituted in only six (out of 32) game management areas in 1988.<sup>53</sup> The new safari hunting concession fee they had established was lucrative, but fell short of the funds the Directorate believed necessary to beat back the threat posed by the European conservationists and their proposed IRDP, who

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-act as a planning body for formulating new wildlife policies and appropriate management activities;

-implement policy concerning wildlife management for its unit, and;

-manage self-help schemes by appointed communities.

<sup>50</sup>Mwenya et. al. "Administrative Management," p. 13.

<sup>51</sup>NPWS/LDP "Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," no. 6 (August 1990): p. 2.

<sup>52</sup>NPWS/LDP "Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," no. 9 (September 1991): p. 1.

<sup>53</sup>WWF gave ADMADE \$124,000 for the purchase of two vehicles and the construction of unit headquarters for in two GMAs. Additional funding was also provided by US AID and a US citizen who had befriended Dale Lewis. See NPWS/LDP "Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," (Nyamaluma Camp, number 1, May 1988): p. 4.

had already received the enthusiastic backing of President Kaunda and were currently discussing funding with the Norwegian Agency for International Development NORAD.<sup>54</sup>

The Directorate also knew they could not count on the Zambian government to fund ADMADE. The government had severely cut NPWS budgets over the last decade. Even Kaunda, although a conservationist, did not champion the department. Given the general lack of political support bureaucratic battles over budgets would not likely end up in NPWS's favor.

NPWS senior officers, and especially Lewis — who had significant experience with donor funding due to his field research — realized that they needed the financial resources of international donors. The ADMADE Directorate also believed that external patrons would allow NPWS to reduce its political exposure while simultaneously augmenting their operations.<sup>55</sup> Working through connections that Lewis had cultivated with United States embassy personnel, the Directorate achieved some of the security it had sought: a three million dollar grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The money firmly established ADMADE as a major program in Zambia.

iii. Using donors **for** protection

The U.S. support was more than just a financial boon for ADMADE; NPWS officers and Lewis used the international agreement to protect the independence of ADMADE's decision-making, personnel and financial institutions from domestic political intervention. First, the project grant agreement between Zambia and the U.S. acceded to ADMADE's established decision-making structures. The document's description of the membership and powers of the Authority and Sub-authority mirror ADMADE's prior policy documents.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid. In 1988, revenue from the 14 ADMADE units was US \$391,250. Safari hunting concession fees accounted for well over 90% of the total.

<sup>55</sup>Interview with Lewis, 28 June 1991.

<sup>56</sup>Republic of Zambia, "Project Grant Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the United States of America for Natural Resources Management," 1990. (Mimeographed.) Annex I, p 3.



The ADMADE directorate, whose name changed to the ADMADE Coordinating Committee, remained composed of only NPWS officers.<sup>57</sup>

Second, the Zambian government agreed to augment "substantially" the number of NPWS staff to reduce poaching.<sup>58</sup> In addition, the government committed to providing ADMADE a land use planning officer, a senior natural resource economist, a senior wildlife ranching ecologist, an accountant, a senior wildlife warden and "any other professional or technical personnel as may be required under the Project." To support the "continuation and growth" of ADMADE, the Zambian government also agreed to absorb these positions into their permanent civil service.<sup>59</sup>

Third, the agreement produced and protected ADMADE's revenues. USAID's money allowed ADMADE to expand to nine GMAs, considerably enlarging the area over which NPWS could exert effective authority.<sup>60</sup> The Zambian government consented to contribute "all other resources required to carry out the Project effectively and in a timely manner."<sup>61</sup> In addition, Zambia agreed to transfer 50% of the revenues the central government earned from hunting licenses and trophy fees to the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund to help cover some of ADMADE's management costs; to tax tourist operations and give the levies to the Fund; and to allow ADMADE to retain the portion of income it had previously given to the Zambian National Tourist Board. In a critical measure pushed by the ADMADE Directorate, the US AID agreement obliged the Zambian government to maintain at least the

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<sup>57</sup>Although the grant allowed for a project officer from the WWF to supervise ADMADE, NPWS had a say in the individual selected.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>60</sup>USAID gave \$1.1 million to ADMADE through WWF and \$1.8 million to ADMADE for capital expenditure. USAID kept \$100,000 for future evaluation expenses and discretionary funds. The final agreement was not signed until 16 January 1990. Interview with Jim Harmon, USAID Zambia, Lusaka, 15 February 91.

<sup>61</sup>"Project Grant Agreement," p. 2.

current level of recreational safari hunting in the country, the primary source of ADMADE revenues.<sup>62</sup>

To ensure the future integrity of ADMADE, the agreement established an evaluation program for the program. Such evaluations would focus on the project's success in attaining its objectives, identification of problem areas or project constraints and assessment of the overall development impact of ADMADE, helping to reduce the possibility of ongoing intervention by domestic political actors.<sup>63</sup>

USAID money breathed new life into NPWS. But the ADMADE Directorate used USAID's sponsorship to protect their program from political interference as well. The USAID agreement tied the Zambian government to the institutions designed by the ADMADE directorate, which had been constructed to insulate ADMADE from domestic intervention. It backed these institutions with the threat of reducing all of USAID's financial commitments to Zambia. As a result of ADMADE's alliance with USAID, NPWS gained significant clout to use in its battles with the European-led conservationists seeking to undermine the department's authority.

### **c. Conservationists, Kaunda and the birth of LIRDP**

#### Crafting institutions and seeking political patronage

##### **i. LIRDP's original design**

Following the 1983 Lupande Workshop, the European-led group pushed hard to follow up on its desire to create an IRDP. While facing the same political institutions as NPWS, this group, however, confronted a different task in setting up their program. They had no legal mandate. They were not government officials. They did not administer an extant Zambian public agency. They had no staff. And they controlled no funds. These factors forced the groups to choose different tactics in their efforts to manage Zambian wildlife. Most importantly, it pushed them into an alliance with President Kaunda.

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<sup>62</sup>In fact, the Zambian government agreed to make these changes before the disbursement of any USAID funds. See "Project Grant Agreement," p. 3.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

Following the Lupande Workshop's proposals, the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) submitted a funding request to the NORAD on 17 July 1984 for a feasibility study regarding an integrated resource development project in the Luangwa Valley.<sup>64</sup> NORAD and NCDP selected two consultants for the study: Thor Larsen (NORAD) and Fidelis Lungu (NPWS).

Larsen, a Norwegian wildlife biologist, did not possess primary expertise in either Africa or development projects; his most well-known work dealt with polar bears. To overcome his lack of knowledge, Larsen relied a great deal on the knowledge and opinions of the European conservationist community in Zambia.<sup>65</sup> Lungu, although employed as a NPWS biologist, had always felt excluded from the department's inner circle of decision-makers.<sup>66</sup> Lungu was ambitious, knew the Zambian political environment well and had experience working with international conservation organizations.

Larsen and Lungu's recommendations for their new pilot conservation program — the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRD) ~ followed closely the three major preferences of the European-led conservationist bloc of the Lupande Workshop.<sup>67</sup> First, Larsen and Lungu supported the multi-sectoral IRDP approach.<sup>68</sup> Like the European

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<sup>64</sup>The National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) is the Zambian agency responsible for overseeing all inter-ministerial development projects in the country.

<sup>65</sup>Interview with Mike Faddy, Save the Rhino Trust and Chinzombo Safari Lodge, Lusaka, 21 March 1991. Interview with Monica Ngoma, former senior economist, Land and Natural Resource Unit, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, 10 October 1991.

<sup>66</sup>Interview with Fidelis Lungu, former co-director LIRD, Chipata, Zambia, 28 May 1991.

<sup>67</sup>Another NORAD consultant, Trond Vedeld, helped Larsen and Lungu from 13 June to 10 July 1985. ADMAD's Dale Lewis claims that Larsen rewrote the terms of reference to further his own vision of the Lupande area project. Interview with Lewis, 28 June 1991.

<sup>68</sup>While LIRD sought to manage the full range of natural resources, wildlife clearly remained the means and the ends of most of LIRD's proposed activities. Wildlife tourism and hunting would generate the majority of LIRD's funds, and policies to strengthen wildlife management dominated LIRD's planned activities. Thor Larsen, Fidelis B. Lungu

conservationists, they believed such an all-encompassing institution could best manage the contingent nature of resource use, despite the general trend in the development community to move away from large-scale projects, and despite their own lack of experience with development projects of this size.<sup>69</sup> Second, both Larsen and Lungu distrusted NPWS. Their proposed LIRDP virtually eliminated the NPWS's authority over the most important wildlife areas in the country. Larsen and Lungu suggested that LIRDP gain control of the South Luangwa National Park, the "jewel of the NPWS crown," and the Lupande Game Management Area, home to some of the better hunting blocs in Zambia.<sup>70</sup> NPWS stood to lose not only the revenues from the sale of these areas to safari operators, but the transfer of authority would also seriously damage the department's prestige as the *de jure* protector of Zambia's wildlife.<sup>71</sup> Third, despite rhetoric to the contrary, Larsen and Lungu mirrored some of the European conservationists' misgivings about devolving any real authority over wildlife resources to local Africans. The consultants' report devoted less than two of their report's over ninety pages discussing the role of local Zambians within LIRDP. Larsen and Lungu avoided making any concrete recommendations about the role of locals, leaving for

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and Trond Vedeld, "Preparation Report on the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP), Chipata, September 1985. (Mimeographed.)

Some NCDP and NORAD officials believed LIRDP's focus on wildlife reflected the professional background of the Larsen and Lungu, and cynically remarked that some of the project's activities, such as the women's program, "were merely window-dressing designed to get the sponsorship of foreign donors for a big wildlife project."

<sup>69</sup>Interview with Arne Lonning, NORAD, Lusaka, 10 September 1991. This was Larsen's first experience with a development project. Further, had Larsen and Lungu reviewed current development literature — which normally appears in NORAD project proposals — they would have revealed that experts were beginning to reject IRDPs in favor of supporting key institutions at the local level and locally-sustainable projects.

<sup>70</sup>Interview with Richard Bell, co-director LIRDP, Chipata, Zambia, 28 May 1991.

<sup>71</sup>Revealingly, most of Larsen and Lungu's discussion of NPWS in their "Preparation Report" occurs only in the context of which staff and resources the department should bequeath to the new LIRDP program.

the future LIRDP administrators to "determine how these ideas and principles can best be put into life under the LIRDP."<sup>72</sup>

In addition to the influence of the European-led conservation bloc, Larsen and Lungu espoused structures that would help to constrain the kinds of political intervention found in Zambia. To enhance LIRDP's financial efficiency and self-sufficiency, the consultants advocated that the project be given its own revolving fund mechanism. All revenues from project activities would be put into this fund, including game license fees, safari license fees, national parks entrance fees and revenues generated from the sale of confiscated trophies (such as ivory and rhino horn). The LIRDP administrators, in complete control of this fund, could authorize necessary expenditures without having to run the gauntlet of central government agencies for permission.<sup>73</sup>

Larsen and Lungu also suggested that LIRDP assume authority over all land-use and resource management projects in the proposed area, including control over all aspects of wildlife management that the NPWS currently exercised, such as determining hunting quotas, controlling harvesting, distributing meat and patrolling for poachers. The consultants thought that LIRDP administrators should be included in the decision-making processes of all government ministry programs in the project area. Finally, the consultants recommended that LIRDP administration gain supervisory powers over all ministry staff seconded to the project.

In an effort to further insulating LIRDP, Larsen and Lungu's plan conferred strong powers to LIRDP's two directors. The co-directors would be responsible only to a Steering

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<sup>72</sup>Larsen and Lungu advocated an approach similar to Zimbabwe's experiments with community participation in wildlife management, but acknowledged that the Zimbabwean approach "can probably not be transferred directly to Zambia, for various reasons including the differences in legislation." See their "Preparation Report" p. 85.

<sup>73</sup>Despite LIRDP's goal of self-sufficiency, and its desire to expropriate all wildlife-related revenues in the project area, the consultants estimated that the project would still require \$25 million in external funds over the first five years before it became self-sufficient. See Larsen and Lungu, "Preparation Report" p. 67. In comparison, the Ministry of Health's expenditures for the entire country was about \$ 23 million in 1986.

Committee.<sup>74</sup> Although they could be advised by members of the NPWS, the University of Zambia, the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia, six chiefs, four chairman of the local UNIP wards and "other relevant agencies," the co-directors retained the power to choose which activities to fund and which individuals would staff them.<sup>75</sup>

Larsen and Lungu's recommendations reflected both the preferences of the European conservationists bloc and the political institutions of Zambia's one-party state. Decisions would emanate from the top of a hierarchically-organized, independent government agency that was unaffiliated with NPWS. LIRD administration would have authority over the projects and staff of other government agencies in its area, and control their own revolving fund. And while rural residents would benefit from the program, they were still removed from any meaningful decision-making power over wildlife resources, and remained subject to the exclusionary impact of Cap. 316, whose provisions LIRD planned to enforce more diligently.

#### **ii. LIRD's need for Kaunda**

Lungu, Larsen and the European conservationists knew their proposal for a vast new bureaucracy would not fare well if left to the normal political processes of Zambia's one-party state. Conservation was unpopular. The government was near bankruptcy. And extant government agencies would resent LIRD's likely attempts to usurp their share of public authority. Only one Zambian politician could provide the political backing necessary to carve out the niche that LIRD sought. Consequently, the consultants solicited the support of President Kaunda. Larsen and Lungu used the influence of the Eastern Province Member of UNIP's Central Committee and the leverage of Larsen's affiliation with NORAD

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<sup>74</sup>At this time, Larsen and Lungu suggested that the committee's membership be "open to all organizations (Government Ministries, District Councils, Chiefs, etc.) which might be affected by the Project or have a legitimate interest in it." See their "Preparation Report," p. 61. Besides chiefs, rural residents were not mentioned.

<sup>75</sup>Larsen and Lungu proposed seven organizational sub-units under the co-directors's authority (extension/development, operation and logistics, anti-poaching, information/education, women's program, research/management and cooperatives) but thought it best to allow the future co-directors to design the activities and structures of these sub-units in more detail. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

to press for a private audience with the President. During their discussions, the consultants also suggested that the President assume the chairmanship of LIRDPA's Steering Committee. The President enthusiastically accepted.<sup>76</sup>

Kaunda had several reasons to support LIRDPA. LIRDPA offered him a new way to pursue conservation in his country. It also allowed him a concrete response to growing international criticism of Zambia's conservation measures. But LIRDPA served other, more political, ends as well. LIRDPA would channel funds, development projects and employment to a portion of the Eastern Province, long known as a UNIP stronghold. Further, LIRDPA could deliver these benefits without generating the criticism that Kaunda was playing regional favorites: after all, the Luangwa Valley area was chosen because of its spectacular wildlife, and the monies would come from international donors, not government coffers. The program's core area, the Mambwe sub-district, happened to be the home of his wife's family; his son Wezi would win the area's parliamentary seat in 1988. Supporting the LIRDPA allowed Kaunda to meet both conservation and political goals with little cost.

LIRDPA began to benefit immediately from the patronage of the most powerful politician in Zambia. Unlike most development projects under the NDCP, Larsen and Lungu's used Kaunda's backing to avoid presenting their proposals for NDCP scrutiny, and

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<sup>76</sup>Richard Bell and Fidelis Lungu tell a less political tale about Larsen and Lungu's meeting with Kaunda. They assert that during the president's annual visit to the presidential lodge in the Luangwa Valley, Kaunda had heard of the report being prepared by Larsen and Lungu, and had "demanded" that they journey to his lodge to present their findings. Their ensuing discussion supposedly moved Kaunda deeply; he declared LIRDPA to be the "answer to my prayers" and insisted on being the chair of the Steering Committee. Interviews with Bell and Lungu, 28 May 1991.

Kaunda had good reasons to be enthusiastic about Bell and Lungu's proposals. Through LIRDPA, Kaunda could direct a great deal of resources into an area that had long been a UNIP stronghold, and which was the home of his wife's family. Mambwe would eventually receive full district status as a result of LIRDPA, which increased its political importance and government services. Finally, LIRDPA offered Kaunda a way to respond to the international press, which had been highly critical of Zambia's conservation efforts.

LIRDPA's Phase I began without any official review.<sup>77</sup> Kaunda intervened directly to hire LIRDPA's co-directors, writing to Malawian President Hastings Banda to release Dr. Richard Bell from service as a consultant to the Malawian wildlife department. Kaunda also wrote a letter to the Ministry of Finance on 7 May 1986, formally initiating LIRDPA and appointing Bell and Lungu as its co-directors.<sup>78</sup> And Kaunda began personal appeals to the Prime Minister of Norway for funding.<sup>79</sup>

Bell and Lungu used Kaunda's backing to insulate LIRDPA from other government agencies. Following LIRDPA's official start under the supervision of the NCDP's permanent secretary, the co-directors concentrated on developing the organizational structure, work programs and funding proposals of LIRDPA from late 1985 to early 1986. The permanent secretaries of a LIRDPA advisory committee, worried about LIRDPA's future powers, encouraged the co-directors to discuss their ideas with salient government departments, NGOs and local communities.<sup>80</sup>

Bell and Lungu realized that government agencies would fear their program; after all, the co-directors had obtained Kaunda's backing, and sought a share of public authority that

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<sup>77</sup>Interview with Gilson Kaweche, former NPWS Chief Research Officer, Chilanga, Zambia, 10 October 1991. Kaweche avers that NCDP questioned the procedures that LIRDPA followed.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid. NCDP Permanent Secretary Almakuni told Chief Wildlife Research Officer Gilson Kaweche that the positions should have been advertised.

<sup>79</sup>On 7 May 1986, President Kaunda formally initiated LIRDPA in his letter to the Ministry of Finance which outlined the principal features of the program, including LIRDPA's control of the South Luangwa National Park and Lupande Game Management Areas, responsibility for all programs concerning natural resource study and use in the project area, right to a revolving fund mechanism and management by two co-directors. See R.H.V. Bell and F.B. Lungu, "The Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, Progress of Phase I and Proposals for Phase II," 11 August 1986, pp. VIII-IX. (Mimeographed.)

<sup>80</sup>The ministries were Finance, National Commission for Development Planning, Lands and Natural Resources, Tourism, Agriculture and Water Management, Decentralization, Cabinet Office and Personnel Division and Cooperatives.



must come from the portfolios of extant ministries and departments.<sup>81</sup> In their first progress report, Bell and Lungu attempted to mollify some officials' initial worry about their spheres of influence. Explicitly stating that LIRDP "should not be regraded as a 'special project' with special privileges," the report asserts that while LIRDP may be a "novel" organization, it will develop to be a "mainstream component of the Zambian Government."<sup>82</sup> The proposed structure of LIRDP at this time appeared to place the project squarely under the authority of existing government and party officials. The Steering Committee, whose mandate was to give general policy guidance to LIRDP, included members of both the UNIP Central Committee and ministries in whose sectors or provinces LIRDP intended to operate; President Kaunda remained the chairman. Permanent secretaries formed an Executive Committee (formerly the Advisory Council), responsible for the implementation of policy. The Director-General of the NCDP chaired the Executive Committee.<sup>83</sup>

Despite these rhetorical and structural assurances, Bell and Lungu still advanced an institutional design that emphasized LIRDP's insulation from political and financial intervention. They recommended that all district-level government officers in their program area be seconded to LIRDP. They reiterated the need for a revolving fund under the day-to-day control of the co-directors.<sup>84</sup> And they asked the government to draft legislation to give LIRDP the legal status of an independent, self-managing organization.

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<sup>81</sup>Interviews with Bell and Lungu, 28 May 1991.

<sup>82</sup>Bell and Lungu, "LIRDP, Progress of Phase I and Proposals for Phase II." p. 11. See also "The Luangwa Integrated resource Development Project, The Phase Two Programme," LIRDP Project document No. 4, November, 1987, p. 14. (Mimeographed.)

<sup>83</sup>President Kaunda also chaired the NCDP.

<sup>84</sup>Bell realized that decentralized programs often failed for lack of independent sources of revenue, and cited the poor success of Zambia's decentralization plans in the early 1980s for proof (Decentralisation Act of 1980, Act No. 15 of 1980). He claims the decentralization effort floundered because while responsible for implementing policies and delivering services to the district level, district councils were not given any powers to raise revenues. See "The Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, A Presentation to the National Assembly," December 1990, p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

Permanent secretaries immediately objected to Bell and Lungu's proposal for the secondment of their district-level officers to LIRDPA. Bell and Lungu retreated, and tried to construct another way to maintain access to the government personnel which they needed to run their program.<sup>85</sup> Eventually, Bell and Lungu suggested the formation of technical subcommittees to the Executive Committee. These technical subcommittees, composed of both departmental and LIRDPA staff, would develop and supervise the work programs of the sectoral department staffs in the project area, with funding coming through LIRDPA.<sup>86</sup> Departmental staff would "remain responsible to their parent departments, which transmit to them the decisions of the technical sub-committees."<sup>87</sup>

The co-directors presented the progress of Phase I, which included their institutional design, to a meeting of government officials and donors at Chichele Lodge in the Luangwa Valley in June 1987. While not attending personally, Kaunda's long shadow was still apparent: by the end of the meeting the permanent secretaries agreed to Bell and Lungu's revised LIRDPA structure. Many of these same permanent secretaries would recommend the dismantling of LIRDPA's institutions after Kaunda's electoral loss in 1991.

Despite the presence of officials from the aid agencies of the United States, Sweden and Norway at the meeting, major donor funding had not been secured by its end. To demonstrate his strong support for LIRDPA, President Kaunda summoned all of the meeting's participants to his residence at Kasaba Bay on Lake Tanganyika for discussions — with the government picking up the tab for all transportation, meals and accommodation. Government officials present for the Kasaba Bay meetings believed Kaunda intended to demonstrate to donors that LIRDPA was worth funding since it had his personal backing.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup>LIRDPA, "The Phase 2 Programme," p. 56.

<sup>86</sup>Bell and Lungu's final proposal slated subcommittees for agriculture, women's program, forestry, fisheries, works and supply, water development and wildlife management. The chairman of each technical subcommittee would be the highest ranking departmental officer of the province.

<sup>87</sup>LIRDPA, "The Phase 2 Programme," p. 16.

<sup>88</sup>Interview with M. Ngoma, 10 October 1991.

Donors did make stronger commitments to fund LIRDP as a result of Kaunda's intervention: in October 1988, NORAD agreed to grant LIRDP \$12.3 million over its first five years.

### iii. Seeking insulation through NORAD

LIRDP used NORAD's support for more than just revenue. The co-directors structured the agreement with their international sponsor to grant the program insulation from domestic political intervention. The agreement stipulates LIRDP's institutional design as the outcome of the Chichele lodge meeting, and confirms the responsibilities and membership of the Steering Committee, the Advisory Committee and the Technical Subcommittees.<sup>89</sup> The document requires an annual meeting between NCDP, NORAD and LIRDP and sets forth a minimum agenda, including discussions about on-going activities, and guidelines for the coming year's activities, work plans and budgets. Norway expected Zambia to "ensure that revenue from the Project are transferred to the LIRDP revolving Fund for investments and daily running of the Project," to "bear all expenses that may be required over and above the Grant for successful implementation of the Project," and to "promptly inform Norway of any condition which interferes with or threatens to interfere with the successful implementation of the Project."<sup>90</sup>

The co-directors knew that Kaunda's backing could prove to be a Faustian bargain: although currently supportive, the President could easily squash the dreams of Bell, Lungu and the European conservationists for an entirely independent conservation agency operating in the Luangwa Valley. But they hoped the institutions agreed to by the Zambian government with Norway would help mitigate Kaunda's possible intervention.<sup>91</sup> They had placed Kaunda in a largely ceremonial position within the LIRDP hierarchy. They had secured a revenue base distinct from the Zambian government and Kaunda's direct control.

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<sup>89</sup>See the Republic of Zambia, "Agreement between The Government of the Kingdom and the Government of the Republic of Zambia Regarding the integrated resource development of the Luangwa Valley in Zambia," October 1988. (Mimeograph.) This "Agreement" refers to the LIRDP "The Phase 2 Programme" as the referent document.

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid*<sup>90</sup> *Ibid* p.4.

<sup>91</sup>Interview with Lungu, 28 May 1991.

They had agreed to annual meetings with NORAD which would prevent Kaunda from completely hijacking the program's activities. And, most importantly, they had successfully linked President Kaunda's personal reputation with the survival of institutions designed by Bell and Lungu.

#### 4. Conclusion

During the 1970s and early 1980s, international concern over poaching in Africa reached an all-time high. President Kaunda was as sensitive to international criticism of Zambia's record of protecting wildlife as he was sympathetic to its conservation. He knew how little money his government, still in a downward economic spiral, could afford to give to wildlife management. He also knew that few Zambians shared his preference for conservation. Of all sectors, international support for domestic public agencies dealing with wildlife conservation would be the most welcomed by Kaunda.

Conservationists in Zambia capitalized on these circumstances to seek insulation from the uncertainty generated by the political institutions of the one-party state. Zambia's political structures vested most of the country's political power in the person of President Kaunda, who posed a credible threat to intervene in the activities of his government's agencies. In response to the menace of centralized authority, the designers of ADMADE and LIRDP sought to put their resources out of reach of that authority. One tactic the programs shared was to gain the backing of an international donor. Agreements with Norway and the United States helped LIRDP and ADMADE to secure funding and decision-making structures without which the programs would remain highly vulnerable to President Kaunda and other Zambian politicians.

But given their different shares of public authority, ADMADE and LIRDP made opposite choices about Kaunda's personal support. NPWS already enjoyed a legislative mandate as protector and administrator of Zambia's wildlife. By keeping ADMADE within their department, NPWS did not need political heavyweights to establish their program. LIRDP, however, posed a danger to established ministries, and had no legal right to exist. To carve out a bureaucratic space for themselves, LIRDP supporters needed Kaunda's clout, despite the risks posed by the president's involvement. In fact, affiliation with Kaunda

would inflict a mortal blow to LIRDPA in the future, when Kaunda lost the 1991 multiparty elections.

This paper focused directly on how supporters of public agencies make choices that reflect the distribution of power in political systems. Most studies of bureaucracy, while acknowledging how the political arena might undermine public agencies, normally fail to include politics as a fundamental explanation for the structure of bureaucracies. Scholars and practitioners generally criticize the corrupting influence of politics on bureaucratic activity, and, while implicitly hoping for the elimination of politics, forward bureaucratic solutions (more communication, better planning, better training, etc.) to cure bureaucracy's ills.<sup>92</sup> This paper has shown that politics is more than one of many constraints on effective bureaucratic activity. Politics is about the very structure of bureaucracy — even before it has had the chance to design or implement its programmatic goals. Choices about structure cannot be separated from policy mandates. Much of the scholarship of the new institutionalism and public policy ignore the fact that institutions can produce political as well as economic goods and services. This paper aligns itself with those scholars who conceptualize bureaucratic design as reflecting the interests, strategies and power of those who exercise political power, not as an institution to produce public goods effectively.

This paper also established that the politics of structural choice is as important to explanations of political institutions in a developing country with a one-party government as it is in industrial democracies. Political uncertainty stems from a variety of sources, not just democratic elections. By examining the origins of political uncertainty in a one-party state, this paper was able to anticipate the strategies that interest groups use to protect their public agencies from political intervention.

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<sup>92</sup>For example, see William Ascher and Robert Healy Natural Resource Policymaking in Developing Countries (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 11, 159-190; Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour Politics, Position, and Power: From the Positive to the Regulatory State 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1986); and Frederick C. Mosher Democracy and the Public Service 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1982). Terry Moe points out that the latter three authors, understanding the influence of politics on bureaucratic structure, still hope for public agencies to serve some "national interest." See Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," pp. 267-68.

Finally, this paper demonstrated that commonly-held assumptions emanating from the new institutional economics must be reconsidered. New institutionalists frequently locate the origin of institutions in their consequences, i.e. institutions emerge to solve social dilemmas that economic markets themselves cannot overcome. In this institution-as-remedy view, ADMADE and LIRDP could be considered solutions to the social dilemma of illegal hunting in Zambia. But what exact features would a dilemma-solving institution incorporate? And when will it emerge? Essentially functionalist, new institutionalist cannot predict the structure of a dilemma-resolving institution, as an infinite number of solutions are possible.<sup>93</sup> And since new institutionalists focus on the collective goods institutions provide, these scholars generally fail to explain why or how actors overcome the collective action problem embedded in the construction of any institution.<sup>94</sup> This paper, on the other hand, demonstrated that the particular institutional arrangements pursued by individuals and groups can be explained by examining the nature of public authority and political uncertainty under a particular system of government. Focusing on the goals and actions of individuals and groups in their quest for public authority also moves the study of institutions back to the level of the individual, putting questions about collective action and distributional gain at the center of institutional analysis.

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<sup>93</sup>See Robert H. Bates, "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism," Politics and Society 16 2 (1988):387-401; and Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43 (1991): 336-366.

<sup>94</sup>See chapter one.