

Rethinking Governance, Social Conflict and Livelihood Choices: Stories from Prieto Diaz, Philippines

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Abstract

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This paper explores the role of social networks, including relationships between traditional power holders and fisherfolk using banned fishing gears, in perpetuating social strife and unsustainable resource use in the Philippines. It argues that traditional governance institutions are building on “negative social capital” (Sol, 2003) to mitigate and reverse the many gains achieved during almost a decade of organized CBCRM efforts. The authors suggest emphasizing good governance based on understanding existing social networks and institutionalizing relationships that foster sustainable resource management and greater social equity.

Prieto Diaz is a fishing municipality in the province of Sorsogon, Bicol, Philippines. In 1995, a local NGO working in collaboration with local government authorities initiated a CBCRM program in the municipality. This program achieved many gains in resource conservation and in 1999 the municipal government received a national award for municipal coastal resource management planning.

The gains in resource management did not occur without accompanying social costs and political upheaval. This paper analyses the link between the decisions and actions of the municipal authorities in Prieto Diaz and the eradication and then resurgence of certain types of illegal fishing gears, including baling (a fine mesh drag net) over an 8 year period (1996-2003). It argues that poor governance, through the misuse of power through vote buying and the manipulation of local conflicts for political purposes, has perpetuated illegal and unsustainable fishing methods and halted or reversed many of the gains achieved through a highly effective CBCRM program.

Good governance that outlasts changes in administration requires good linkages within a municipality, meta-legal strategies, advocacy and most importantly strong grassroots organizations able to mobilize social capital for environmental and social gains. This approach must recognize the impact that governance can have on livelihoods and start with an understanding of current livelihood sectors and their relationships and pre-existing conflicts with each other.

Introduction

Grassroots participation in governance is essential for people to take control of their overall social and cultural development and manage the resources on which their livelihoods depend (Mayo-Anda, 2004). Governments that support and enable local aspirations result from the combination of strong peoples' organizations capable of articulating their desired policy alternatives and institutions designed to be responsive to local demands. Good governance allows local people to set the policy agenda, be a watchdog for abuses, and ensure implementation and enforcement of regulations.

The combination of a favorable policy environment and strong popular movement should ensure good governance. In the Philippines, community-based coastal resources management thrives as a result of those very conditions. But is this enough to achieve long term change in people's lives?

What if a CBCRM initiative leads to more social strife? What if while building strong civil organizations that can harness social capital for social good, the process also gives rise to another type of social network; one of marginalized, displaced and angry fishers who can be manipulated by the political elite in order to reverse controversial resource management decisions in the name of people power?

This paper discusses examples from Prieto Diaz, the Philippines, where after almost 10 years of successful and nationally acclaimed community-based coastal resource management efforts, the PO and their NGO partner find themselves almost back where they started in terms of local government support for resource management. In light of this situation, the partners are exploring the links between resource management and livelihoods in their community, and why local social capital can be harnessed for political expediency as well as for social gains.

This paper argues that good governance requires understanding the impacts of resource management decisions on livelihoods and how this can exacerbate social conflicts within a

community, which will in turn reverse any resource management gains made through CBCRM. It discusses strategies to help grassroots organizations use their social capital to achieve longer lasting, more equitable and socially acceptable changes. This paper suggests emphasizing good governance based on understanding existing social networks, and institutionalizing relationships that foster sustainable resource management and greater social equity.

Governance in CBCRM

Almost everywhere in the world, fisheries managers are faced with the twin pressures of globalization and competing uses. At the community level, these forces lead to loss of access and control over a resource that is in any case, dwindling. The basic governance challenge in fisheries management is establishing and maintaining institutions that enable communities to address this complex and fragile situation (Nielsen *et al*, 2003). Governance requires norms and rules guiding decisions, including the institutions, laws and frameworks in which decisions are made (Mayo-Anda, 2004).

The Philippines is well known for an active civil society that engages with government at many levels. Since 1991, the Philippines have pioneered a unique experience in decentralized governance. The policy environment in the Philippines favors the formation of partnerships between civil society groups and government (Rivera-Guieb, 2000). The 1987 Constitution developed shortly after the ouster of President Marcos creates a legitimate space for civil society organizations to play a direct role in government. The 1991 Local Government Code is a decentralization law that devolves considerable decision making power to the Municipal level. Furthermore, the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 recognizes Municipal jurisdiction over coastal waters and requires that each municipality establish resource management bodies composed of fisherfolk and local government representatives to develop resource management plans for their municipality.

The proliferation of partnerships between civil society groups and government in the Philippines can be attributed to a supportive policy environment and an active people's movement (Rivera-Guieb, 2000). This rich combination has also enabled the Philippines to become globally

recognized over the last decade for its experimentation with Community Based Coastal Resource Management (CBCRM). In CBCRM, governance deals with the exercise of power over coastal resources (Mayo-Anda, 2004). CBCRM is a process of governance which proposes actions involving decision-making at the local level (Rivera, 1997).

Livelihoods and CBCRM

Livelihoods are attracting increasing attention in the context of CBCRM. Everyone understands the term livelihoods differently, but there is a general acceptance that livelihood encompasses all the strategies and assets that individuals and households use to earn a living (DFID, 2001; CBCRM Resource Center 2003; Graham and Tanyang, 2001; Arciaga *et al*, 2002; Ashby, 2003). This definition is extremely broad, and its implications and local understanding of the term can only be understood through context specific participatory research and dialogue. There are three specific areas where livelihoods connect directly with CBCRM initiatives and all have relevance to the case study discussed in this paper.

First of all, from a livelihoods perspective, natural resource use by an individual or a group of people is part of their livelihood strategy. “A reversal of environmental degradation require new livelihood options that change people’s incentives, in particular the benefits and costs of resource use” (Ashby, 2003; p2). Many livelihoods in coastal communities are based on the sea, therefore resource management activities, such as those commonly carried out through CBCRM initiatives, are livelihoods activities that reduce local vulnerability and enhance natural capital (Graham and Tanyang, 2001; Arciaga *et al*, 2002). Consequently, establishing and protecting marine protected areas, developing coastal resource management plans, and mangrove reforestation are a livelihood component activity within a CBCRM project.

However, despite the growing agreement that coastal resource management efforts are part and parcel of increasing livelihood security, most CBCRM initiatives also contain a more traditional livelihood component in the form of livelihood projects. The local resource management cooperatives organized by Tambuyog Development Center as part of its Sustainable Coastal Area Development Program (SCAD) have two main purposes, firstly to develop sustainable

community enterprises to support its programs and activities and secondly to provide leadership in advocacy towards community-based coastal resource management (De la Cruz and Lopez, 1997).

Not all livelihood projects are as integrated into overall program direction as Tambuyog's SCAD program. Other CBCRM initiatives have livelihood projects ranging from land or sea-based income generating activities, to saving and loans schemes, to community enterprise development and marketing of local products (Vera, 2003). The rationale for the continued introduction of income generating projects is the perception that they are the "hook" that will stimulate local interest in resource management activities (Arciaga *et al*, 2002). As well as the desire to help reduce local vulnerability by providing supplementary sources of income to seasonably vulnerable households and to earn income to sustain community organizations (Vera, 2003).

Some form of livelihood assistance is often expected by fisherfolk involved with, or displaced by, CBCRM activities as a support or incentive. This might come in the form of loans or access to other fishing gear or income generating activities (Heinen, 2001). While providing new livelihoods is a common activity, it does perpetuate the problematic concept that that a livelihood is merely an income generating activity and that can be "handed over" or given to someone (Graham and Tanyang, 2001; Graham 1998; Arciaga *et al*, 2002).

There have been many discussions about the relationship of CBCRM and sustainable livelihoods frameworks and the role livelihood projects within CBCRM programs (CBCRM Resource Centre 2003; Graham and Tanyang, 2001). However, a third aspect of livelihoods in CBCRM is how the social capital built up by organized fisherfolk can be used to create a more favorable policy environment as a direct way of improving livelihood security. This might be expressed as using social capital for livelihood advocacy (Sol, 2002).

Social capital and social networks

"Social capital is a set of resources that resides within the relationships among people and allows them to share their knowledge and skills, or human capital" (Kilpatrick and Falk, 2003;

501). These relationships are expressed through social organizations such as networks and associations, as well as by the norms, values and social trust that reside within these organizations (Putman, 1995; and Shrader, 1999).

A core element of all CBCRM initiatives is organizing communities for resource management. This is a way of mobilizing and increasing the social capital within and between community members (Sol, 2002). The resulting organized group or people's organization is a negotiating body, a resource tenure holder, and overall community representative (Gollin & Kho, 2002). Local networks can speak for and represent a community and influence policy at a higher level (Kilpatrick and Falk 2003).

Krishna and Shrader (1999) summarize the elements of social capital that can be used to improve outcomes for individuals and communities: networks; appropriate norms that generate trust, shared visions, appropriate organizational structures, rules, procedures and human infrastructure. Social capital is built by comparing and sharing norms and values and developing trust (Kilpatrick and Falk, 2003).

There are both internal (micro) and external (macro) dimensions to social capital. Micro level social capital refers to the potential contribution that grassroots organizations can make to development. Krishna and Shrader (1999) identify two types of social capital within the micro context. Cognitive social capital is made up of the less tangible values, beliefs, and attitudes, such as trust and solidarity that are shared among the members of a group. Structural social capital includes the composition and practices of local level organizations, both formal and informal, which serve as instruments of community development. Structural social capital is built through horizontal networks that have collective and transparent decision making processes, accountable leaders, and practice collective action and mutual responsibility.

Kilpatrick and Falk (2003) use a similar classification of micro and macro level of social capital, but break down micro level social capital into knowledge and identity resources. The identity resources are the shared values and norms held by all group members, while knowledge

resources are what allow community members to combine their skills and knowledge with that of others to effect change.

Macro level social capital includes formal relationships and structures, such as the rules of law, legal frameworks, the political regime, and level of decentralization and participation in policy formulation (Krishna and Shrader, 1999 based on Bains and Hicks, 1998). Macro level forms of social capital at the organizational, community, or societal level mirror those at micro-level. Interactional infrastructure resources are those associated with networks, procedures, and rules. Values infrastructure has to do with the shared norms, attitudes, and visions that exist between organizations or that are shared by the organization and the community at large, including elected leaders and government institutions. Micro and macro levels of social capital are interdependent and constantly reinforce each other. The quality of the interactions between micro and macro levels determines the quality of the outcomes, including how others are disadvantaged (Kilpatrick and Falk, 2003).

Grassroots organizations with strong micro level social capital i.e. shared values and norms, and the organizational capacity to articulate and work towards shared goals and visions are constantly interacting within a larger arena. Their networks must extend beyond their immediate community to make linkages with other individuals and networks that may in time come to recognize shared values and goals (Krishna and Kilpatrick, 2003). A legislative and policy environment favorable to CBCRM is one in which micro and macro forms of social capital can interact for positive social outcomes. That is where POs can drive the policy agenda and push for specific pro-people actions like increased enforcement of illegal fishing regulation.

Community organizing in the Philippines already relies extensively on existing forms of social capital by building on the relationships found within all communities. It is far easier for local organizers to convince their kin, or members of their church to join an organization than it is to cross family, class, ethnic, or religious barriers to recruit members. The close connections between community organizations is an asset in building a cohesive organization but little attention has been paid to the implication of this process on the dynamics and power relations of the wider community (Rivera-Guieb *et al*, 2004).

Social networks are expressions of social capital. But not all social networks are used to bring about positive social change. What is social capital in one context can be unsocial capital in another (Krishna and Shrader, 1999). An organization working to further the interests of its members at the expense of others in the community are creating what Sol (2002) calls the negative social capital, and Putman 2003 refers to as “the dark side of social capital”. “Unless one knows the activities, purposes, and values that bind the members of any group, it is impossible to know in advance whether this group adds or detracts from the sum of social capital” (Krishna and Shrader, 1999; 3). The human interactions that take place within a social network can sometimes support cooperation and coordination and other times competition and conflict.

In their assessment of social capital, Krishna and Shrader (1999) conclude it is important to pay attention to the balance of bonding and bridging ties. Bonding ties are the relationships that link the members of a group to each other. Bridging ties are those that connect the members of a social network to resources outside their own community. Members of a close knit social network with no access to external resources or knowledge are not building the kinds of relationships that contribute to building overall macro level social capital. Networks with no bridging links and dense horizontal bonding can have a negative impact on a community’s overall social capacity (Falk and Kilpatrick, 2003).

Social Capital and Social Conflict: Stories from Prieto Diaz

Prieto Diaz is located in the municipality of Sorsogon, a province in the southern peninsula of the large island of Luzon. The municipality of Prieto Diaz lies at the northeastern tip of Sorsogon. It faces the Pacific Ocean in the east, the Albay Gulf in the north, the municipality of Bacon in the west and the municipality of Gubat in the south.

Nineteen of Prieto Diaz’s twenty three barangays (villages) are coastal. Fishing, farming and shell-craft making are the main livelihood activities in the area as other

Economic opportunities for fishing households are limited. Shellcraft making is often a primary source of income for fishing households during the typhoon season when small scale fishing activity is diminished. Some households earn income from commercial fishpond operations, charcoal production, livestock raising, and carpentry, fish trading, store vending, driving tricycles or jeepneys and remittance from family members working in other parts of the country or internationally (De la Cruz and Lopez, 1997; Graham and Tanyang, 2001).

Tambuyog Development Center, a Manila based NGO with a regional office in Sorsogon City, has been active in Prieto Diaz since 1994. Tambuyog started working in Prieto Diaz at the invitation of a former parish Priest who had initiated a local fisher organization called *Samahan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda ng Muntopar* (SAMAMAMU). The organization's original purpose was to assist the members to access funds to purchase fishing gear. At the priest's invitation, Tambuyog decided to implement the Sustainable Coastal Area Development (SCAD) program in Prieto Diaz. That was in October 1994 (De la Cruz and Lopez, 1997).

The members of the original fisher organization were bound by multiple social and cultural ties. They were all small scale fishermen who owned their own boats and gears. SAMAMAMU members were came from the same barangay, were active in the Catholic church, and many were related to one another (Graham, 1998). Tambuyog strategically reinforced the group's shared history. One of their first activities was to ask the membership to collectively draw a "river of life" illustrating the organization's history as a series of successful and less successful experiences (De la Cruz and Lopez, 1997).

As part of the organizing process, Tambuyog conducted participatory research in the area. The research revealed a growing problem of resource degradation, habitat destruction and declining fish catches associated with the use of destructive fishing gears such as dynamite and cyanide and fine mesh nets. They held several follow-up trainings on environmental awareness and resource management in Prieto Diaz's four central barangays. The organizing process also included as activities such as documentary films on the environment, coastal community clean-ups and popular education trainings. These activities were designed to encourage collective action in the community (De la Cruz, 1997; Rivera-Guieb, 2000). The organizing activities

reinforced SAMAMAMU's social cohesion and built on their shared norms and values, as well as the group's capacity to function as democratic organization (Sol, 2002).

Tambuyog's involvement brought a new focus on environmental education and resource management to SAMAMAMU. Their organizing efforts attracted many new members, most of whom were also small scale fisherfolk from the barangays nearest to the town centre. The new members developed shared values around protecting and conserving marine resources, and a core group became quite active in resource management activities (Graham, 1998). In mid-1995, SAMAMAMU was officially transformed into a resource management cooperative to take the lead in responding to problems of unsustainable coastal resource used while at the same time functioning as a marketing and credit cooperative to improve member's livelihoods (De la Cruz and Lopez, 1997; Sol, 2002).

Tambuyog, in coordination with SAMAMAMU, completed a coastal resource management plan based on the participatory research previously done in the four barangays. The resource management plan included management measures to reverse the trend of coral reef degradation, as well as detailed plans for ongoing resource assessment, strict enforcement of anti-illegal fishing laws, and the implementation of community environmental education campaigns (De la Cruz and Lopez, 1997; Rivera-Guieb, 2000).

After developing the resource management plan, SAMAMAMU and Tambuyog began to work towards its passage as a municipal ordinance. Their advocacy campaign corresponded with local elections held in May 1995. SAMAMAMU openly supported a political candidate who promised to back their resource management efforts. Their candidate was victorious and this new Mayor and his political allies remained in power for two terms (Rivera-Guieb, 2000).

SAMAMAMU was able to parlay their influence into the passage of the resource management plan as a municipal ordinance. By September 1995, the advocacy committee of SAMAMAMU, together with Tambuyog, pushed for the formation of the Task Force Banyuhay, to take the lead resource management initiatives in the area and institutionalize the implementation of the resource management plan. Task Force Banyuhay had representatives from the PO sector, NGO,

elected officials and municipal employees as well a staff from line agencies such as the Coast Guard.

The Task Force represented a convergence of government, non-government and community institutions that was initiated by a fisherfolk organization, with assistance from an NGO (Rivera-Guieb, 2000). At the time the Task Force was established, its only legal basis came from the provisions of the Local Government Code. It was only several years later that Executive Order 240 mandating the establishment of Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management Councils (FARMCs) was enacted and then used to advocate for the eventual passage of the 1998 Fisheries Code (Rivera-Guieb, 2000). The establishment of the Task Force demonstrates that SAMAMAMU had the knowledge resources to effectively use their social capital to achieve social change.

During this period, SAMAMAMU enjoyed a great deal of political influence. Their membership understood and supported the resource management initiatives outlined in the resource management plan, especially efforts to establish a marine protected area and eradicate illegal fishing. These activities received widespread community support, as residents began to benefit from CBCRM. They cited an increase in previously rare species, and the outside interest in Prieto Diaz as some of the main gains from resource management (Graham, 1998).

Organizationally, SAMAMAMU was a strong social network that benefited from vertical linkages with local government and supportive institutions from outside the community. SAMAMAMU was able to access municipal support in terms of funds for patrolling, stipends, and the general expenses associated with running the sanctuary. Individual members also benefited from their broader social connections and influence with local politicians and authorities. The organization and its NGO partner contributed enormously to the development of social capital in Prieto Diaz by building shared values around resource management and stewardship within the fisher and non fisher households. Together, they had the interactional social capital to promote good governance by creating democratic structures and procedures for civil society to take the lead on resource management initiatives in the municipality.

In late 1998, Prieto Diaz was recognized by the National Government as one of the top ten coastal resource management sites in the Philippines. Encouraged by this recognition and the continued support of community members, the local government amended the ordinance in November 1998 to provide a yearly allocation for the Task Force's operational expenses (Rivera-Guieb, 2000). That same year, Tambuyog helped organize a women's organization called BUGKOS in Prieto Diaz. BUGKOS focuses on coastal resource management and advocacy for women's rights (Sol, 2002).

Unfortunately, the story of Prieto Diaz does not end there.

“But what was thought of to be a happy story, ended with the bitter rivalry between the PO and the political leaders at the municipal level. During a recent local election, the incumbent Mayor accused the PO of supporting his political rival. Since his election, the new Mayor is single-handedly turning around the gains of the previous partnership of the PO and the government.... The cases of illegal fishing, which decreased in the previous years, are slowly increasing again. Even organized members of the POs, not hopeful of any support from their Mayor, have returned to illegal fishing” (Rivera-Guieb et al, 2004).

What happened between 1998 and 2004 to lead to this dismal situation?

The breakdown of macro social capital in Prieto Diaz did not happen overnight. It happened in conjunction with the gradual implementation of new fisheries management measures. The Resource Management Plan was implemented in stages to phase out certain fishing activities and move towards more sustainable resource use. The first fishing methods that were stopped were those that were already illegal under existing, but un-enforced, national laws. There was not much public outcry or social disruption when rules banning the use of dynamite or cyanide began to be enforced. Those fishermen displaced from this activity relocated into other marginal fishing activities. Those who financed the illegal operations for example, the owners of compressors used for cyanide fishing, invested in other fishing enterprises (Graham, 1998; Graham and Tanyang, 2001).

The implementation of the municipal fisheries ordinance proceeded smoothly until efforts to stop the use of baling in 1998. Baling is fine mesh drag net that is used on the reef flats and slopes adjacent to the lagoon. The nets are weighed down with scare lines made of bamboo fronds and

weights, which are dragged on the bottom of the sea floor and through coral reefs and seagrass beds. The baling crew pounding coral with sticks to frighten fish into the nets. Baling nets catch large volumes of juvenile fish; the associated dragging and pounding causes damage to seagrass and coral habitat. The representatives of the provincial Department of Natural Resources sitting on the Task Force recommended that stopping the use of baling be a priority for municipal law enforcement personnel in the 1998/1999.

Banning baling was a thorny issue because it affected the livelihood of around 70 fishers in the area. There were only four baling operators but a much larger number of crew members would be affected by the ban. The baling crews are some of the poorest and most marginalized fisherfolk in Prieto Diaz. They are usually young men with little formal education and without access to, or knowledge of, other fishing methods. All baling crew live in Barangay Diamante, a coastal barangay whose residents have little access to social services or livelihood opportunities. Lacking other fishing gears, residents of Diamante are frequently engaged in charcoal burning, dynamite fishing or other destructive fishing methods. There are few SAMAMAMU members amongst the residents of barangay Diamante (Graham 1998, Graham and Tanyang, 2000). The residents of barangay Diamante, and the baling crew in particular, were a group perceived by SAMAMAMU members to have a negative social impact on the whole community because of their fishing practices.

The ban on baling was criticized by some sectors because no economic support was provided to displaced baling fishers. Nonetheless, the strict enforcement of laws and the active participation of SAMAMAMU members led to a dramatic decrease in the use of this gear (Rivera-Guieb, 2000). The radically different expectations and understanding about the baling ban stem from an inability of the community to come up with a shared knowledge and value base on which to make fisheries management decisions (Nielson *et al*, 2003). Baling fishermen did not agree with the Task Force's assessment that their gear was more destructive than any of the other local fishing gear. The baling sector did not participate in the research, analysis or drafting of the resource management plan, nor did they contribute to community dialogues about collective goals and aspirations.

Since they had not received any environmental education training, they did not share SAMAMAMU's understanding of the status of Prieto Diaz's coastal resources. The baling sector claimed that the 3-ply gillnet (a fine mesh net used by most SAMAMAMU members) caused far more cumulative damage to the marine resources than the seasonal baling operations (Graham, 1998, Graham and Tanyang, 2001). The displaced baling fishermen believed that SAMAMAMU and Tambuyog had unfairly manipulated the political process to protect their own interests at the expense of the already marginalized baling crew. This situation illustrates what Ashby (2003) sees as a common challenge for all community-based natural resource management efforts to engage stakeholders in the process of systematic enquiry to uncover and understand the impacts of different management regimes and their cross-scale effects. And then, to link this enquiry with knowledge sharing so that the information produced by the research is relevant to common goals, is socialized, and provides a common basis for action.

The displaced baling fishermen wanted to be provided with some kind of alternative livelihood. However, because they were unorganized, and could not articulate their demands in any particular forum, there was no real vehicle through which to channel livelihood assistance (Graham, 1998). Baling fishermen lacked the structural social capital to organize themselves into an organization that could influence municipal politics. Nor did they have the cognitive values to negotiate or appeal directly to SAMAMAMU members.

In any case, providing livelihoods for displaced baling fishers would have become a question of competing claims for scarce resources (Neilson *et al*, 2003). Since at that time period, (1998/1999) SAMAMAMU was struggling to set up livelihood projects to support the organization and provide livelihood support to its own membership. SAMAMAMU existed as a resource management cooperative and its dual mandate led to the existence of distinct interest groups within the larger organization. SAMAMAMU's core membership remained interested and committed to resource management activities, and very active in sea patrols, and on the Task Force. However, there were also members who joined SAMAMAMU primarily out of an interest in the income generating activities and whose interest in SAMAMAMU started to wane when these projects did not bring the expected benefits (Graham, 1998; Sol, 2002).

SAMAMAMU members bore most of the transaction costs associated with resource management in Prieto Diaz, especially the time commitment and risk of patrolling municipal waters to prevent illegal fishing. In return, they expected to receive livelihood assistance as compensation for their efforts should the municipality or any other organization make funds available (Graham, 1998). They could see no value in allocating scarce resources to displaced illegal fishermen when their own livelihoods were so precarious. Ultimately, SAMAMAMU had the social capital to access livelihood funds from local government as well as external funding institutions, while the baling fishers did not.

Residents of barangay Diamante did not have any political influence, or a formal organization, but they are not completely without social resources. Those who use baling consider themselves part of a social network with bonds forged by participating in a demanding and risky livelihood activity in which gains and losses are shared by the whole crew. Graham and Tanyang (2001) found that the well developed mechanisms for sharing catch and their ability to avail of emergency assistance from the owners of the vessels and from each other, contributed to a strong feeling of group cohesion and solidarity in the baling sector. The baling crew had a collective social identify, but they lacked the knowledge resources to apply their social capital to influence the implementation of the new baling regulations. They did not possess the tradition or skills for the kinds of collective action that could build structural social capital and gain legitimacy in the community.

Furthermore, while the poorest and most marginal fishermen are crew on baling boats, the actual owners are businessmen with power, and influence, who are closely allied with the Mayor's political opponents. These local power holders did not intend to sit by quietly while their businesses were shut down. The implementation of the new baling regulations led to several arrests and the confiscation of some baling nets. These events started to create a more explicit feeling of solidarity sparked by shared anger and resentment.

The baling owners and opposition politicians began to use this anger to fuel political mobilization against the mayor and his Administration. They manipulated the elections by promising the resident of Diamante that if elected they would reverse all previous legislation

against baling and other illegal gears. The strategy worked, the conservation minded mayor was defeated in 2001, and all previous resource management gains have been reversed.

“.. illegal fishers who belong to large families or clans (using “baling” or drag net) have been given political favour by the current administration officials, since they had helped them rise in power by supporting these officials during election...In essence, their vulnerability as being poor had been subjected to another form of abuse by corrupt government officials through vote buying and misuse of political power.” (Sol, 2002; 47).

Now, it is SAMAMAMU who has no influence on the political process and whose members feel discouraged and abandoned. In effect, in contrast with the situation in 1999, the organization's social capital has been eroded. Some of the disenchantment is a result of members' discouragement at the failure of most of their livelihood projects (Sol, 2002). A further source of fragmentation was some members' fear that once baling was stopped, 3-ply nets would be the next target as outlined in the long term goals of the resource management plan (Graham and Tanyang, 2001). But the final straw for even SAMAMAMU's most dedicated members was the lack of financial or moral support from the current administration, which has resulted in a resurgence of illegal fishing practices in Prieto Diaz, since the provisions of the resource management plan are no longer being enforced (Rivera-Guieb *et al*, 2004).

Sadly, the baling fishers are not really any further ahead in terms of advancing their own livelihood aspirations. Being once again able to fish means they may be substantively better off than they were between 1998 and 2001 when the municipal laws against baling were strictly enforced, but they are still poor and marginalized fisherfolk with no real possibility of improving their well being through this livelihood strategy. Neither the identity or knowledge elements of their micro-level social capital have been enhanced. They remain a loose network without the structural social capital to participate effectively in the formal aspects of governance. The opposition politicians who rallied them and manipulated them during the last municipal elections have once more turned their back on their constituents leaving them with the same living conditions they faced prior to the baling ban – a feudal dependence on the largess of the baling owners in return for marginal economic returns (Sol, 2002).

Conclusions

The experience in Prieto Diaz offers a lot of insights about livelihoods, social networks and governance in CBCRM. It also suggests a few immediate and longer term needs in terms of knowledge and skills gaps that would support organizations facing these situations. Lastly, though this story has, if not a happy ending, at least some points of hope for the residents of Prieto Diaz.

Livelihoods are at the heart of CBCRM. In this case, livelihoods means the general interest in economic projects that attracted many members to SAMAMAMU, as well as the resource management activities undertaken to improve the long term livelihood security of the entire community.

The significance of livelihoods is also expressed in residents' anger and despair at the threat of being displaced from their current livelihood activities because of resource management activities. This is a real fear. During group activities with members of SAMAMAMU and BUGKOS to understand local definitions of sustainable livelihoods, Graham and Tanyang (2001) noticed that members defined one characteristic of sustainable livelihoods as being that they will not be banned or forbidden. Illegal livelihoods are not sustainable livelihoods because they will eventually be halted. Those comments reflect a great deal of community uncertainty about the process and costs of implementing the municipal resource management plan.

In the case of baling, loss of livelihoods caused so much anger that it fueled a political backlash which undermined all that had been achieved. Livelihoods are more than the sum of the different household activities. It is the ability to mobilize assets, in this case a social and ultimately a political network (Sol, 2002).

Clearly, a rise and fall of power between competing groups each using their social networks to bring about political change is not good governance. There cannot be any long term gains on the interdependent areas of livelihoods and resource management without real institutionalization of the kinds of changes that will lead to greater livelihood security for all. Good governance requires making sure that community participation is not relegated to the level of rhetoric (Mayo-

Anda, 2004). People power has become synonymous with the expression of grassroots democracy in the Philippines. It should not be misused for short term political gains or political expediency.

Governance requires institutionalizing structures and processes that will outlast regime change. A resource management plan serves as a “script” for coastal resource management. The adoption of SAMAMAMU’s resource management plan through its passage as a municipal ordinance put the ideas and priorities of the local people in a legal framework. However, it is far more important that the provisions of any resource management plan be legitimized not only through laws but in the social acceptance of the community members (Rivera-Guieb, 2000). Governance is a question of widening the popular mandate for change, of expanding social networks to create a popular movement with common values and a commitment to resource management and social equity. Somehow, in Prieto Diaz, the network stopped expanding and the implementation of the resource management plan failed to become legitimized in the eyes of the wider community, leaving the entire plan vulnerable to political machinations of opposition politicians. What is actually needed to mobilize social capital for long term, equitable change?

Fisheries management requires developing an approach to managing conflict between users who have acquired rights through the resource management decision making process and those who have lost access (Nielsen *et al*, 2003). In Prieto Diaz, the administration failed to find a mechanism to minimize social conflict by balancing the gains and costs of resource management. They did not consider overall social equity, and in doing so set the stage for destructive social strife.

There can be no shared social values or aspiration without constructive engagement by all stakeholders in the policy making process. No group should end up further disenfranchised or marginalized through CBCRM initiatives. Continuing dialogue/interaction between organized fisherfolk and other stakeholders is integral to the governance process (Mayo-Anda, 2004). This is the only way to mobilize macro-level social capital necessary for CBCRM advocacy.

SAMAMAMU and the baling sector do not have a common understanding of resource management priorities for Prieto Diaz, nor can they yet articulate their livelihood aspirations with any shared framework or concepts. Neither group has the cognitive resources to talk about what they might have in common and where their priorities differ. In this, both groups have failed to create any bridging links that would enable to communicate or mobilize around a common small fisherfolk agenda. Both groups might benefit from participatory research into their livelihood strategies to develop a common understanding of socially acceptable tradeoffs from a livelihoods and resource management perspective (Ashby, 2002). Good governance that outlasts changes in administration requires good linkages within the community, metal legal strategies, a commitment to pro-poor advocacy, and most important strong grassroots people's organizations (Sol, 2002).

Ideally, CBCRM initiatives should take place in the context of a culture of learning about other resource uses, the resource base, and the potential impacts of resource management decisions. Nevertheless, learning alone is not enough. A network has to be built around both willingness and capacity (Kilpatrick and Falk, 2003). Trust is necessary before any group can access and use the skills and knowledge of other networks. A willingness to commit to long term action and social change is a function of social capital. Strong grassroots people's organizations are essential for creating the linkages within the community to chart a course for grassroots development and prevent the misuse of political power (Sol, 2002). Organized fisherfolk should not only be drafting a policy agenda that will protect their own livelihood interests, but must also act as watchdogs for the democratic process. If they are perceived as such, they will achieve the popular support to challenge unfair political processes.

“In CBCRM, we are linked by our relationships to one another. Our common currency is trust (Ferrer, 2001; xvi). The members of Prieto Diaz must start their efforts anew and focus on building bridges between the various social groups in the community. In 2003, SAMAMAMU and BUGKOS became the partner organizations in an IDRC supported Sustainable Livelihoods research project. Tambuyog is supporting the local organizations in integrating the research into the overall organizational revitalizations efforts. Local researchers are honing their capacity to understand and analyze the livelihood strategies in their community and the impact of potential

resource management activities. Most importantly, they are reaching out to other resource users, non SAMAMAMU members, and to residents of barangay Diamante to seek common values and a start a dialogue about resource management and governance in Prieto Diaz. It is too soon to tell what will be the outcome of the rebuilding process, but it is appropriate that the theme of livelihoods which led to so much social conflict in the community might well be the bridge that brings the community together. May the next municipal election in Prieto Diaz see a more cohesive and solid grassroots network mobilize itself around resource management, social equity, and sustainable livelihoods for all!

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