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Management of the Global Commons: Problems with Property Right Approach

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Type: Working Paper
Author: Ueda, Yoshifumi
Date: 1999
Agency:
Series:
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10535/6475
Sector: Global Commons
Theory
Region:
Subject(s): global commons
property rights
free riding
collective action
common pool resources
Olson, Mancur
public choice
game theory
incentives
Abstract: "According to the Olsonian logic of group actions, large groups consisting of selfish members are doomed to difficulty in achieving their common interests owing to free-riding incentive. The global commons is one of the common interests of the large group, actually of the largest groups. However, we can ubiquitously observe the appropriators of the global commons are negotiating on social contracts to preserve it. Any of the social contracts does not allow the signatories to freely access to the global commons. Of course, any player can not adapt to the requirements for the preservation of the global commons so suddenly. As a compromise, the target level of restoration of the commons' quality has been a focal point of the negotiation on the social contracts. The management of the global commons is at such a level of achievement now."

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