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Management of the Global Commons: Problems with Property Right Approach

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dc.contributor.author Ueda, Yoshifumi
dc.date.accessioned 2010-10-06T18:57:52Z
dc.date.available 2010-10-06T18:57:52Z
dc.date.issued 1999 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10535/6475
dc.description.abstract "According to the Olsonian logic of group actions, large groups consisting of selfish members are doomed to difficulty in achieving their common interests owing to free-riding incentive. The global commons is one of the common interests of the large group, actually of the largest groups. However, we can ubiquitously observe the appropriators of the global commons are negotiating on social contracts to preserve it. Any of the social contracts does not allow the signatories to freely access to the global commons. Of course, any player can not adapt to the requirements for the preservation of the global commons so suddenly. As a compromise, the target level of restoration of the commons' quality has been a focal point of the negotiation on the social contracts. The management of the global commons is at such a level of achievement now." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject global commons en_US
dc.subject property rights en_US
dc.subject free riding en_US
dc.subject collective action en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.subject Olson, Mancur en_US
dc.subject public choice en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject incentives en_US
dc.title Management of the Global Commons: Problems with Property Right Approach en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Other en_US
dc.subject.sector Global Commons en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US


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