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Judicial Deference and the Efficiency of the Common Law

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dc.contributor.author Kanazawa, Mark
dc.date.accessioned 2019-05-31T15:49:37Z
dc.date.available 2019-05-31T15:49:37Z
dc.date.issued 2019 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/10451
dc.description.abstract "Economists and legal scholars have long been interested in the efficiency of common law. A shortcoming of existing studies in this literature is that they ignore the role of judges in reviewing legislative enactments. Judicial review ties the efficiency of common law to the efficiency of the statutes reviewed. If judges defer to inefficient statutes, the common law will then reflect those inefficiencies. To investigate the efficiency of judicial review, the paper examines 647 judicial rulings of occupational licensing statutes in federal and state courts during the period 1885 to 1911. Evidence from this analysis suggests that judicial deference has evolved over time, from efficiency-supporting review during the Progressive Era to inefficient deference currently." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject law en_US
dc.title Judicial Deference and the Efficiency of the Common Law en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Workshop on the Ostrom Workshop 6 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates June 19-21, 2019 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Indiana University, Bloomington en_US

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