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Franck’s Right to Democratic Governance and the Role of Democratic Sanctions

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dc.contributor.author Bernatskyi, Bohdan
dc.date.accessioned 2019-08-09T16:31:50Z
dc.date.available 2019-08-09T16:31:50Z
dc.date.issued 2018 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/10590
dc.description.abstract In 1992, Tomas Franck conceptualized the democratic entitlement theory — a new approach regarding the international validation of governance, which was previously based solely on the “doctrine of effective control.” This led to the emergence of a new international norm under which only democracy can validate a government’s legitimacy. Twenty years later, the theory proposed by Franck has gained more currency. International organizations and states began and continue to address the legitimacy of a government by imposing democratic sanctions. This article proposes to corroborate the Franck democratic entitlement theory by incorporating democratic sanctions, while also consolidating cases where sanctions were applied, inter alia, construing legal status of such measures. en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject LAW en_US
dc.subject.classification Law en_US
dc.title Franck’s Right to Democratic Governance and the Role of Democratic Sanctions en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries National University of Kyiv-Mohyla academy en_US
dc.coverage.region Europe en_US
dc.coverage.country EU en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal en_US
dc.identifier.citationpages 137–157 en_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber 4 en_US


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9.pdf 372.4Kb PDF View/Open BERNATSKYI, Bohdan. Franck’s Right to Democratic Governance and the Role of Democratic Sanctions. Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, n. 4, p. 137–157, 2018

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