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Breaking Commons Cartels

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dc.contributor.author Daniels, Brigham en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T14:28:23Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T14:28:23Z
dc.date.issued 2008 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-10-24 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-10-24 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/180
dc.description.abstract "Scholars and others concerned with resource management typically celebrate pathways to stability and cooperation in the commons. Within in this celebratory literature, Elinor Ostrom's principles of long- enduring institutions have become recognized as a landmark achievement. This article reexamines stable commons institutions generally and Ostrom's principles specifically. While these principles undoubtedly have helped identify ways to build stable institutions, they have an unexplored downside. Specifically, when our values change, stable institutions can thwart new values from making headway in the commons. A number of scholars have used game theory to explain the power of institutions to resolve problems plaguing the commons. However, the game theory used thus far does not take into account that how we value the commons is subject to change. Using conventional game theory to describe the power of institutions to govern the commons, the article extends that theory and highlights a dark side of institutions." en_US
dc.subject institutions en_US
dc.subject resource management en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.title Breaking Commons Cartels en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.identifier.citationmonth July en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Governing Shared Resources: Connecting Local Experience to Global Challenges, the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Commons en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates July 14-18, 2008 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Cheltenham, England en_US
dc.submitter.email elsa_jin@yahoo.com en_US

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