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Abstract:
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"This study concerns many rural Communities, but it focuses on Missirah. The rural community of Missirah is located in Tambacounda, a forested region in the eastern Senegal. Missirah is the greatest zone of charcoal production of this region. Its communitarian forests are parted into three essential zones: a zone managed by PROGEDE said Managed (ZA-zone amenagee), a non managed zone (ZNA-zone non amenagee) and a zone which is between the hands of forestry agents, controlled production zone (ZPC). The first experimentation of the ZPC is currently happening in Missirah's forests. Patterns of democratic institutional pluralism will be explored through three decision-makings: the signature of the prime license, the 'protocole d'accords' and the 'protocole d'entente'. The prime license is the decision whose validity occurs after the PCR signature. Without it, charcoal production isn't theoretically allowed in the forests of a rural community. The 'protocole d'accords' is an agreement on charcoal production in a rural community which is signed between the president(s) of CIVDG and the forestry operators' president. It is approved by the Sub-Prefect and the Director of regional forestry agency. The 'protocole d'entente') is an agreement signed between the forestry operators' president, the PCR and the Director of the regional forestry agency.
"The material analysed in this article is based on interviews, participant observation and surveys we've conducted from the end of June 2004 to December 2005 in many rural communities, especially at Missirah. In addition to that, we have carried out a review of laws and literature on decentralization, PROGEDE's rapid rural appraisal (RRA) reports, and rural councils deliberative PVs. The surveys took place in twelve villages of the rural community of Missirah. Village chiefs, rural councillors, Sud-Prefects, forestry service agents, PROGEDE fellows, committees' members, 'forestry operators', regional council and regional agency of development (ARD) members, and villagers were interviewed in each village.
"'Actors-Powers-Accountability' model adopted by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) inspired this analysis. We have found in their model opportunities to determine the powers of each institution -actor- and to see how their nature and origins inform the accountability they hold. We hope to find in task the limits and the advantages of the pluralist management of the massif in the name of decentralization.
"The next section deals with decentralization laws review in order to determine the powers transferred, in theory, to each institution. This is followed by a section on the practices of institutional pluralism in the forest administration in Missirah's communitarian forest, particularly through charcoal production decision-making. The links between these two sections is the assessment of theories and practices of decentralization. The subsequent section examines the effects of the institutional pluralism on local democracy establishment and democratic decentralization effectiveness. The last section presents conclusions and their political, economical and social implications, and the recommendations we propose."
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