| dc.contributor.author |
Lipnowski, Irwin F. |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T14:42:30Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T14:42:30Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1991 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2008-06-03 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2008-06-03 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/2114 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This paper formulates the 'tragedy of the commons' in game-theoretic terms. The source of this problem is that of moral hazard, wherein the unobservable behaviour of agents who have an incentive to violate a trust induces their anti-social action. Since the outcome of the collective behaviour of all agents is observable, it is possible to devise a rule which penalizes each agent by a sum exceeding the gain which any agent would relize by his or her independent anti-social action. It is shown that an appropriate rule involving collective punishment will provide an incentive structure which induces each rational agent to behave in a socially responsible manner, so that in equilibrium, such penalties will not have to be exercised." |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
tragedy of the commons--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
collective action |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
moral hazard |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
IASC |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Solving the 'Tragedy of the Commons': An Alternative to Privatization |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Common Property Conference, the Second Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
September |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Winnipeg, Manitoba |
en_US |