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Solving the 'Tragedy of the Commons': An Alternative to Privatization

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dc.contributor.author Lipnowski, Irwin F. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T14:42:30Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T14:42:30Z
dc.date.issued 1991 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-06-03 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-06-03 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/2114
dc.description.abstract "This paper formulates the 'tragedy of the commons' in game-theoretic terms. The source of this problem is that of moral hazard, wherein the unobservable behaviour of agents who have an incentive to violate a trust induces their anti-social action. Since the outcome of the collective behaviour of all agents is observable, it is possible to devise a rule which penalizes each agent by a sum exceeding the gain which any agent would relize by his or her independent anti-social action. It is shown that an appropriate rule involving collective punishment will provide an incentive structure which induces each rational agent to behave in a socially responsible manner, so that in equilibrium, such penalties will not have to be exercised." en_US
dc.subject common pool resources--theory en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject tragedy of the commons--models en_US
dc.subject collective action en_US
dc.subject moral hazard en_US
dc.subject IASC en_US
dc.title Solving the 'Tragedy of the Commons': An Alternative to Privatization en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Common Property Conference, the Second Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates September en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Winnipeg, Manitoba en_US

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