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Communication in a Commons: Cooperation Without External Enforcement

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dc.contributor.author Ostrom, Elinor en_US
dc.contributor.author Walker, James M. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T14:28:44Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T14:28:44Z
dc.date.issued 1989 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2007-06-18 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2007-06-18 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/233
dc.description.abstract "The experiments reported in this paper provide strong evidence for the power of face-to-face communication in a repeated common-pool resource environment where decisions are made privately. When communication was provided as a 'costless' institution, players successfully used the opportunity to: (a) calculate coordinated rent improving strategies, (b) devise verbal agreements to implement these strategies, and (c) deal with non-conforming players. "In field settings, it is rare that the opportunity to communicate is costless. Someone has to invest time and effort to create and maintain arenas for face-to-face communication. The cost of providing an arena for communicating has not been overtly considered in previous experimental work. We report the results from a series of experiments designed to investigate the affect of costly provision of the communication mechanism on: a) the ability of players to provide the mechanism; and b) the impact of the second order dilemma in solving the first order dilemma posed by the common pool environment itself. In summary, the provision problem players faced in the costly communication experiments was not trivial and did in fact create a barrier. In all three experiments, the problem of providing the institution for communication diminished the success of either: (a) having the ability to develop a coordinated strategy and/or (b) dealing with players who cheated on a previous agreement. On the other hand, all groups succeeded to some degree in providing the communication mechanism and in significantly improving the efficiency of resource allocation decisions." en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.subject communication en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.subject cooperation en_US
dc.subject resource management en_US
dc.title Communication in a Commons: Cooperation Without External Enforcement en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference American Political Science Association Meetings, Panel on Freedom and Organization en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates August 31 - September 3, 1989 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Atlanta, Georgia en_US
dc.submitter.email efcastle@indiana.edu en_US


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