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Abstract:
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"Pressures for electoral reform have existed in Japan for many years and yet no substantive changes have ever been instituted. Although there has been mass urban migration the electoral apportionments have not kept pace. This has produced a rural bias in the electoral process.1 Voter inequality between the least rural districts and the most populated has risen as high as one to 5.26 in the Upper House and one to 4.99 in the Lower House (Hata, 1990:160). Along with favoring the rural districts the electoral process also favors larger parties. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) present data from Japanese elections to gauge its degree of proportionality (see Graph 1). As is shown from the graph, the electoral process consistently grants the LDP more seats than it has votes. Conversely, the smaller parties consistently win fewer seats than their percentage of votes. Electoral reforms to date have split populated districts in half, given seats to the most populated districts and in one occasion (1986) taken seats from the least populated districts. However, voter inequality remains high and elections favor the larger parties."
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