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Endogenous Group Formation

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dc.contributor.author Ahn, Toh-Kyeong
dc.contributor.author Isaac, R. Mark
dc.contributor.author Salmon, Timothy C.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-08-26T14:43:52Z
dc.date.available 2009-08-26T14:43:52Z
dc.date.issued 2004 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4684
dc.description.abstract "While the rules governing the formation of groups engaging in collective action may have significant impact on group size and behavior of members, most experiments on public goods have been conducted with the subjects in fixed groups or of fixed sizes. We study endogenous formation of groups in a public-goods provision game by allowing subjects to change groups under three sets of rules: free entry and exit, restricted entry and free exit, and free entry and restricted exit. We find that the rules governing entry and exit do have a significant impact on individual behavior and group-level outcomes." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject economic behavior en_US
dc.subject outcomes en_US
dc.subject collective action en_US
dc.subject public goods and bads en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject rules en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.subject human behavior en_US
dc.title Endogenous Group Formation en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US

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