| dc.contributor.author | Ahn, Toh-Kyeong | |
| dc.contributor.author | Janssen, Marco A. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Reiners, Derek | |
| dc.contributor.author | Stake, Jeffrey E. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-09-01T15:17:22Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-09-01T15:17:22Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4691 | |
| dc.description.abstract | "The effect of increased monitoring and rule-enforcement in National Hockey League(NHL) games is analyzed at two levels (player and team). The economic theory of crime predicts a reduction of rule breaking due to increased deterrence. No change is observed in behavior at the player level. At the team level, however, we find a change in composition in type of players. Private rule enforcers, the goons, become more costly and less necessary when official monitoring is increased. We observe a decrease in the salaries of the goons as our game theoretic model predicted. These findings suggest that the economic theory of crime needs to be tested at multiple temporal and organizational levels." | en_US |
| dc.language | English | en_US |
| dc.subject | cooperation | en_US |
| dc.subject | social behavior | en_US |
| dc.subject | game theory | en_US |
| dc.subject | crime--economics | en_US |
| dc.subject | Workshop | en_US |
| dc.title | Learning to Play Nice: Strategy Evolution in the National Hockey League | en_US |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
| dc.type.methodology | Case Study | en_US |
| dc.subject.sector | Social Organization | en_US |
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
| Learning to pla ... national hockey league.pdf | 211.1Kb |
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