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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo; Stranlund, John; Willis, Cleve |
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Date:
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1998 |
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Agency:
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Series:
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5128
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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experimental economics
common pool resources--economics
regulation--models
Workshop
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Abstract:
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"Agents are apt to over-exploit common-pool resources. Two devices for nudging individuals toward efficient use of a local common are government imposition and enforcement of rules and simple communication. Experiments were conducted in areas of rural Colombia to study the effects of these two devices on the behavior of individuals who are actually involved in a local commons. Communication among subjects improved efficiency. A more dramatic increase in efficiency obtained when a government regulation was introduced, but that efficiency degraded to no-communication levels after only a few rounds of experience."
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