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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Gardner, Roy; Herr, Andrew; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M. |
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Date:
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1998 |
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Agency:
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Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN |
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Series:
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Workshop Working Paper Series no. W98-31 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5210
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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common pool resources--theory
Workshop
game theory
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Abstract:
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"This paper examines the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks as an allocation rule for improving the performance of common pool resources (CPRs). Two field cases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, where there are high value types and low value types. This asymmetry induces a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linear-quadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency and distributional consequences of
proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived."
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