hidden
Image Database Export Citations

Menu:

Cooperation and Institutional Arrangements

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Shepsle, Kenneth A.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-02-03T21:45:34Z
dc.date.available 2010-02-03T21:45:34Z
dc.date.issued 1986 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5476
dc.description.abstract "The formal study of cooperation is something of a cottage industry these days in political science, primarily because it is central to so many vital issues. These issues, of course, are not new. Rousseau's famous 'stag hunt dilemma,' Hume's "worry over commons problems and public goods supply (as in neighbors draining a meadow), and Hobbes's generalized concern over how human societies might avoid the dire consequences of life in the state of nature, all suggest that voluntary cooperation in social settings is a commodity in considerable demand and, presumably, In short supply. Some, like Hobbes, have made this disparity between the demand for and the supply of voluntary cooperation the basis of an elaborate rationale for authoritative coercion In the form of the State." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject institutional design en_US
dc.subject cooperation en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.title Cooperation and Institutional Arrangements en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Harvard Conference on International Regimes and Cooperation en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates February 13-15, 1986 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Dedham, MA en_US


Files in this item

Files Size Format View
cooperation and institutional arrangements.pdf 174.3Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show simple item record