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The Evolution of Cooperation at Saigata Commons: A Game Theoretic Interpretation

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Type: Working Paper
Author: Bhattacharya, Sudeepto
Date: 2004
Agency: Collaborative Research Center (CRC) of IFRI SHODH: The Institute for Research and Development, Maharashtra, India
Series: Working Paper, no. 6-04
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5610
Sector: Forestry
Social Organization
Region: Middle East & South Asia
Subject(s): common pool resources
forest management
monitoring and sanctioning
village organization
game theory
Abstract: "The foregoing discussion interprets the community action to cooperate for conservation and management of CPR at Saigata, which they have now come to identify as 'my forest', as a Prisoner's Dilemma game, thereby reflecting individual choices in public goods interactions. It illustrates how cooperation among the members of the resource community can emerge in a population dominated by non-cooperators. Cooperation, however, fails to get a foothold if an individual or a scattered aggregate of cooperators attempts an interaction with the defectors. It can emerge and become established through interactions between a cluster of cooperating individuals using a nice strategy like the TFT and the unconditional defectors, provided these individuals have approximately 5% of their interactions with each other. Such an interaction results in an invasion of the entire environment by the cooperators, making cooperation to conserve CPR thrive at Saigata."

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