| dc.contributor.author |
Lise, Wietze |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-03-23T15:58:57Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-03-23T15:58:57Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1995 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5660 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Institutions have been proposed and initiated at the rural level in India on a voluntary basis to avoid the tragedy of the commons. These institutions have been modelled in this paper as a two-person repeated game, where two peasants have to decide in each period whether they want to pool labour or land or not. For reasons of simplicity, finite and infinite period trigger strategies are considered which
are subgame perfect. As a special feature of the game, the payoff structure is not fixed but it is taken as a function of the level of natural resources. With the help of comparative statics on the payoff functions, necessary conditions along with their robustness, expressed
as a minimum required discount factor, are derived under which participation is the individual optimal outcome." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Working Paper Series, no. 27 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources--models |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Preservation of the Commons by Pooling Resources, Modelled as a Repeated Game |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Dehli |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |