| dc.contributor.author |
Winer, Stanley L. |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Hettich, Walter |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-05-03T18:59:29Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-05-03T18:59:29Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1993 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5762 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"The paper formulates a normative theory of taxation that incorporates both economic structure and political institutions as essential elements. Such a theory has interesting parallels to optimal taxation,
including large information requirements. We discuss solutions to the information problem in a competitive political economy. The answer appears to lie in a decentralized information gathering and policy process rather than in the development of simplified guidelines for central planners. The paper proposes a framework to examine the effects of decentralized decision making, imperfect political competition and political institutions on tax policy outcomes." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Working Paper Series |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
taxation--theory |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Optimal Representative Taxation, Information and Political Institutions |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Qualitative |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
School of Public Administration, Ottawa, Canada |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |