| dc.contributor.author |
Gilligan, Thomas W. |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Krehbiel, Keith |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-06-11T14:22:09Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-06-11T14:22:09Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1987 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5838 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"The thesis of this paper is that restrictions on the ability of a parent body to amend committee proposals can enhance the informational role of committees. More precisely, restrictive procedures can encourage committees to gather information and can facilitate the adoption of informed policies that are jointly beneficial to the committee and parent body. Thus, acting in its self-interest, the parent body often restricts its ability to amend committee proposals." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Social Science Working Papers, no. 632 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
decision making |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
legislature |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.region |
North America |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.country |
United States |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |