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Elections with Limited Information: A Multi-Dimensional Model

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dc.contributor.author McKelvey, Richard D.
dc.contributor.author Ordeshook, Peter C.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-21T19:18:55Z
dc.date.available 2010-06-21T19:18:55Z
dc.date.issued 1984 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5870
dc.description.abstract "We develop a game theoretic model of 2 candidate competition over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of other participants . The players consist of the voters and the candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and candidates alike ) observe contemporaneous poll data broken down by various subgroups of the population. The main results of the paper give condition s on the number and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium ) extracts all information ." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Social Science Working Papers, no. 529 en_US
dc.subject competition en_US
dc.subject majority rule en_US
dc.subject stability en_US
dc.subject elections--models en_US
dc.subject voting--models en_US
dc.title Elections with Limited Information: A Multi-Dimensional Model en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Modeling en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US

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