| dc.contributor.author |
McKelvey, Richard D. |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Ordeshook, Peter C. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-06-21T19:18:55Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-06-21T19:18:55Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1984 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5870 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"We develop a game theoretic model of 2 candidate competition
over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have
incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of
other participants . The players consist of the voters and the
candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the
information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy
choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and
candidates alike ) observe contemporaneous poll data broken down by
various subgroups of the population. The main results of the paper give condition s on the number and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium ) extracts all information ." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Social Science Working Papers, no. 529 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
competition |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
majority rule |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
stability |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
elections--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
voting--models |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Elections with Limited Information: A Multi-Dimensional Model |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Modeling |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |