| dc.contributor.author |
Starr, Harvey |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
McGinnis, Michael D. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-06-29T15:42:28Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-06-29T15:42:28Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1992 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5883 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"We focus on the decision problem of a government (or regime) facing
external and domestic threats to it s security. For simplicity, we treat this governmental actor as a unitary rational actor. We also assume that this government (which we denote as actor i) faces threats from a set of other unitary actors, comprised of other governments j-1,2,...,J and domestic organizations or groups k-1,2,...K. Since government i must fin d some way to balance the threats posed by these various actors, and since dealing with tradeoffs between desired ends is the very essence of rationality, a rational choice approach seems particularly appropriate for modeling a government's efforts to manage two-level security problems. We assume that government i is fundamentally concerned with minimizing the probability that it will lose a war with any government j or that it will be overthrown after a revolution instigated by domestic groups k." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
conflict |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
behavior--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
| dc.title |
War, Revolution, and Two-level Games: A Simple Choice-Theoretic Model |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Colloquium at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
September 14 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana |
en_US |