| dc.contributor.author |
Greisinger, Alex |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-09-21T20:36:57Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-09-21T20:36:57Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2005 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6358 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This Article first introduces, very briefly, the rational choice model of norm formation. It then provides a short description of the need reinforcement principle and considers ways in which the principle adds to the current rational choice model of norms. In particular, it provides a basis for the claim that norms reflect the aggregate preference of members of a particular group, as well as a description of the psychological factors that lead individuals to identify and comply with group norms. The next section introduces the model of norm mismatch developed by Sanchirico and Mahoney and applies the sociology of norms to it, while also considering other issues relating to norm efficiency. Finally, this Article develops a set of criteria that must be considered before a presumption of norm efficiency can be established and considers the implications of sociology of norms for norm-based regulation." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
regulation |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
norms |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
pluralism |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private Regulation |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Journal Article |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
published |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationjournal |
Alabama Law Review |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationvolume |
57 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationpages |
1-30 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationnumber |
1 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationmonth |
Fall |
en_US |