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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

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dc.contributor.author Fehr, Ernst
dc.contributor.author Schmidt, Klaus M.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-09-23T19:56:43Z
dc.date.available 2010-09-23T19:56:43Z
dc.date.issued 1999 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6398
dc.description.abstract "There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper No. 4 en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject cooperation--theory en_US
dc.subject competition--models en_US
dc.subject fairness--models en_US
dc.title A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US

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