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Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games

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dc.contributor.author Barelli, Paulo
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-12T20:13:25Z
dc.date.available 2011-01-12T20:13:25Z
dc.date.issued 2010 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6756
dc.description.abstract "We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject hierarchy en_US
dc.subject epistemology en_US
dc.subject commons en_US
dc.subject equilibrium en_US
dc.title Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal Games en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume 1 en_US
dc.identifier.citationpages 415-421 en_US


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