Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6878
PDF
Type:	Journal Article
Author:	Kollmann, Andrea; Schneider, Friedrich
Journal:	Sustainability
Volume:	2
Page(s):	3710-3734
Date:	2010
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6878
Sector:	Social Organization
Region:
Subject(s):	public choice sustainability environmental policy governance and politics interest groups
Abstract:	"There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them."

Files in this item

Files	Size	Format	View
sustainability-02037.pdf	185.4Kb	PDF	View/Open