| dc.contributor.author |
Börner, Jan |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Wunder, Sven |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Shelia |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Hyman, Glenn |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Nascimento, Nathália |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2011-09-16T18:52:00Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2011-09-16T18:52:00Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2011 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7537 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Despite recent reductions, Brazil remains among the top deforesting countries in the world, and is thus one of the countries where ' ReducingEmissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation' (REDD) initiatives could potentially have the most tangible returns for climate-change mitigation. Economic incentives, such as payments for environmental services (PES) represent one option to induce forestland stewards under appropriate property right regimes to conserve more forests. Yet, for the large part of Amazon deforestation that occurs on non-designated public lands (terra devoluta) as well as on poorly delimited private land, PES will not be viable in the short and medium term. REDD will thus also require other tools, notably improved command-and-control disincentives that enforce existing forest laws more rigorously. While quite a number of studies have addressed the potential costs of using PES as a REDD vehicle, cost estimates of control-based REDD strategies are speculative at best. In this study, we develop a conceptual framework and a spatially explicit model to analyse regulatory enforcement in the context of the Brazilian Amazon. We validate the model's performance based on historical deforestation and enforcement mission data covering the years 2002-9. Based on an optimal enforcement scenario we analyse the costs of liability establishment and legal coercion for alternative REDD targets and evaluate local welfare impacts in terms of land users' opportunity costs or fine obligations depending on local compliance. On the basis of the results, we discuss implications for the introduction of a planned national PES Program and assess alternative REDD strategies with regard to costs and welfare implications. Our findings suggest that spatial patterns deforestation and inspection costs influence enforcement strategies and thus welfare effects of REDD interventions. Command-and-control is the most cost-effective of REDD instrument from a regulator's point of view, but could cost land users over R$ 2.5 billion annually in opportunity costs and fines if the national REDD target of an 80% reduction in deforestation rates was achieved. PES incentives could reduce the social costs, but increase budget outlays vis-à-vis a command-and-control dominated strategy and both legal and institutional challenges have to be overcome to make PES work at a larger scale. Decision-makers will thus have to innovatively combine on the ground implementation tools in order to make REDD both financially viable and socially compatible." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
CCAFS Working Paper, no. 8 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
enforcement |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
incentives |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
equity |
en_US |
| dc.title |
REDD Sticks and Carrots in the Brazilian Amazon: Assessing Costs and Livelihood Implications |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), Copenhagen, Denmark |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.region |
South America |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.country |
Brazil |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Forestry |
en_US |