Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7988
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Eyckmans, Johan; Tulkens, Henry
Conference:	Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources, the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics
Location:	Toulouse, France
Conf. Date:	May 3-4
Date:	2001
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7988
Sector:	Global Commons
Region:
Subject(s):	game theory climate change--models cooperation--international environmental economics simulations
Abstract:	"The CLIMNEG World Simulation (CWS) model is introduced here for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The CWS model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We first state the necessary conditions that determine Pareto efficient investment and emission abatement paths under alternative regimes of cooperation between the regions. We then show with a numerical version of the CWS model that the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) induces an allocation in the ('gamma') core of the world carbon emission abatement cooperative game."

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