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Analyzing Collective Action

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dc.contributor.author Ostrom, Elinor
dc.date.accessioned 2012-06-15T15:36:50Z
dc.date.available 2012-06-15T15:36:50Z
dc.date.issued 2009 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7992
dc.description.abstract "My line of attack on this immense topic will involve the following steps. First, I will discuss the growing and extensive theoretical literature positing a host of structural variables presumed to affect the likelihood of individuals achieving collective action to overcome social dilemmas. None of these structural variables, however, should really make any difference in the probability of successful collective action if we continue to treat the model of rationality that has proved successful in explaining behavior and outcomes in competitive market settings as a universal theory of human behavior. Thus, the second major section of the paper will examine how a theory of boundedly rational, norm-based human behavior is a better foundation for explaining collective action than a model of maximizing material payoffs to self. If one posits that individuals can use reciprocity and reputations to build trust in dilemma situations, then one can begin to explain both successful and unsuccessful efforts to overcome social dilemmas through collective action. The third section of the paper will then briefly examine the linkage between the structural measures discussed in the first section with the core individual relationships discussed in the second. In conclusion, I will reflect on the challenge that social scientists face in testing collective-action theory in light of the large number of variables posited to affect outcomes." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject collective action en_US
dc.subject social dilemmas en_US
dc.subject markets en_US
dc.subject reciprocity en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.subject rationality--models en_US
dc.subject human behavior--theory en_US
dc.title Analyzing Collective Action en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference 27th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates August 16-22 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Beijing, China en_US

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