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Abstract:
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"The common-pool-resource governance theory initiated and developed by Professor Vincent Ostrom and Professor Elinor Ostrom is a combination of empirical methodology, field studies and theoretical analysis. This theory effectively challenged the methodology, hypotheses and conclusions by traditional rational choice theorists on analyzing the management of public goods. As such, this theory proposed a new approach of governing the commons, i.e. self-governance of the commons, outside of the scope of the government as well as the market. The common-pool-resource governance theory is a mixture of both theoretical and empirical studies. Indeed, this theory has been substantiated by the experience and reality of more than a few countries and regions. Accordingly, this theory provides for many insights into institutional evolution and choice in the world. This article would first explore into the theoretical elements and basic preconditions of the common-pool-resource governance theory. Further, this article would describe current circumstances in China at issue. Based on such description, this article would evaluate the effectiveness of applying the common-pool-resource governance theory to relevant Chinese issues at constitutional, collective choice level and in attributes of community and individual personality levels, given existing political, economic and social order in China. Then, this article would articulate special significance of this comparison between the theory and the commons governance practice in China."
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