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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Muller, Andrew; Vickers, Michelle |
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Conference:
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Public Choice Society Meetings |
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Location:
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Houston, TX |
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Conf. Date:
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April 12-14 |
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Date:
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1996 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8052
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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common pool resources
game theory
cooperation--models
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Abstract:
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"We investigate whether communication can promote co-operation in a common pool resources environment. In a series of labvoratory experiments, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker have shown that aggregate appropriate in a no-commuication environment generally exceeds one-shot Nash equilibrium levels. Face-to-face communication reduced an environment in which the common pool resource could be destroyed with a probability proportional to aggregate appropriation. Destruction of the resource was rapid and efficiencies were low even when the probability of destruction was zero for group appropriations within a 'safe-zone'. They did not investigate the effect of communication in the environment. We extend the OGW results by investigating the effect of communication in a common pool resource subject to probabilistic destruction when group appropriation exceeds a safe zone. We replicate the OGW result that destruction of the resource is rapid and efficiencies are low when communication is not allowed. When face-to-face communication is introduced mean efficiencies are significantly increased. Three groups of five sustain a 'good' Nash equilibrium in the safe zone. The remaining two groups quickly destroy the resource. Achieving a 'good' equilibrium is highly dependent on the emergence of a leader in the group communication."
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