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Incentive Structure of a Common-Pool Resource Situation: A Dynamic Game-Theoretic Model of Irrigation System

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dc.contributor.author Lee, Myungsuk
dc.date.accessioned 2012-07-18T20:40:55Z
dc.date.available 2012-07-18T20:40:55Z
dc.date.issued 1992 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8184
dc.description.abstract "The incentive structure of common-pool resource (CPR) situations has often been modeled as the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in which the dominant strategy is of mutual defection. Even though the PD game can give us useful insights with which we can understand the basic social dilemma problems in CPR situations, this line of logic is misleading since it ignores several important facts. First, the incentive structures of CPR situations are not equal so that a single game model cannot explain all incentive structures of CPRs. Second, people using CPRs face two kinds of collective action problems--appropriation problem and provision problem. Without considering the interaction between the two, it is difficult to understand the incentive structure of CPR situations. Third, people will consider the effects of their decisions on future payoffs, as well as on present payoffs, at least to some extent." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.subject irrigation en_US
dc.subject prisoner's dilemma en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.title Incentive Structure of a Common-Pool Resource Situation: A Dynamic Game-Theoretic Model of Irrigation System en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN en_US
dc.subject.sector Water Resource & Irrigation en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Colloquium at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates November 30 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Bloomington, IN en_US


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