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The Failure of the La Zin Farmer's Association: How Aid Creates Perverse Institutions and Incentives

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dc.contributor.author Timms, Benjamin
dc.date.accessioned 2014-04-22T18:45:50Z
dc.date.available 2014-04-22T18:45:50Z
dc.date.issued 2002 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/9322
dc.description.abstract "Using the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, this paper will analyze how donor aid created perverse incentives that weakened institutions and created a common pool resource dilemma. The author worked with several farmers' organizations during service in the United States Peace Corps in Jamaica from 1999-2000. Using the example of one of the these groups, the La Zin Farmers' Organization, this paper exhibits that regardless of good intentions and money, the lack of appropriate institutions and resultant incentives can create sub-optimal outcomes than otherwise possible." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject incentives en_US
dc.subject institutional analysis--IAD framework en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.subject farmers' associations en_US
dc.subject agriculture en_US
dc.subject foreign aid en_US
dc.subject rules en_US
dc.title The Failure of the La Zin Farmer's Association: How Aid Creates Perverse Institutions and Incentives en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.coverage.region Central America & Caribbean en_US
dc.coverage.country Jamaica en_US
dc.subject.sector Agriculture en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates December en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Bloomington, Indiana en_US


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