dc.contributor.author |
Timms, Benjamin |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-04-22T18:45:50Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2014-04-22T18:45:50Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2002 |
en_US |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/9322 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
"Using the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, this paper will analyze how donor aid created perverse incentives that weakened institutions and created a common pool resource dilemma. The author worked with several farmers' organizations during service in the United States Peace Corps in Jamaica from 1999-2000. Using the example of one of the these groups, the La Zin Farmers' Organization, this paper exhibits that regardless of good intentions and money, the lack of appropriate institutions and resultant incentives can create sub-optimal outcomes than otherwise possible." |
en_US |
dc.language |
English |
en_US |
dc.subject |
incentives |
en_US |
dc.subject |
institutional analysis--IAD framework |
en_US |
dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
dc.subject |
farmers' associations |
en_US |
dc.subject |
agriculture |
en_US |
dc.subject |
foreign aid |
en_US |
dc.subject |
rules |
en_US |
dc.title |
The Failure of the La Zin Farmer's Association: How Aid Creates Perverse Institutions and Incentives |
en_US |
dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
dc.type.methodology |
Theory |
en_US |
dc.coverage.region |
Central America & Caribbean |
en_US |
dc.coverage.country |
Jamaica |
en_US |
dc.subject.sector |
Agriculture |
en_US |
dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
dc.identifier.citationconference |
Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting |
en_US |
dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
December |
en_US |
dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Bloomington, Indiana |
en_US |