Image Database Export Citations


Co-Evolution of Norms and Cooperation

Show full item record

Type: Conference Paper
Author: Jiménez Tovar, Fernando; Lara Rivero, Arturo A.
Conference: Workshop on the Ostrom Workshop 5
Location: Indiana University, Bloomington
Conf. Date: June 18-21, 2014
Date: 2014
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/9376
Sector: Social Organization
Subject(s): institutional analysis
agent-based computational economics
Abstract: "Cooperation is profitable from an evolutionary point of view as long as individuals have the right combination of cognitive and emotional faculties that enable them to extract the beliefs and values that are hidden on the behavior of other individuals. The ability of imitating intentions and not only actions has informational and regulatory reasons in social life that can generate cooperative equilibriums. Using simulation models it is possible to study how the process of institutional evolution affects the evolution of cooperation in a group of agents involved in a social dilemma situation. ADICO grammar proposed by Elinor Ostrom (2005) allows us to accurately classify and study the process of institutional evolution between different types of institutional statements. In this paper we use a cellular automata as an idealized version of a complex adaptive system and discuss how a shared strategy (AIC) can evolve to become a norm (ADIC) and what is the impact of this process on the evolution of cooperation in the system. It can be shown that this process of institutional evolution can promote a great diversity of norms from a single shared strategy. It is observed that the process of co-evolution of norms and cooperation produces better outcomes for populations of individuals who develop internal and external delta values compared to cases where no institutional evolution is achieved."

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
WG6_Jimenez, Lara-Rivero.pdf 1.092Mb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show full item record