| dc.contributor.author |
Laine, Charles |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.author |
Roumasset, James A. |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T14:43:21Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T14:43:21Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1991 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2008-02-21 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2008-02-21 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/2205 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"When players systematically underestimate public goods provision by others due to pessimism or risk-aversion, it is possible that efficient provision will emerge even in a non-cooperative setting. Once efficient provision is reached, it can be sustained in a repeated game setting as the focal point of strategic punishment to sustain the cooperative outcome." |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
public goods and bads--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
IASC |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
cooperation--models |
en_US |
| dc.title |
The Evolution of Cooperation from a Non-cooperative Game with Public Goods |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Common Property Conference, the Second Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
September 26-30, 1991 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Winnipeg, Manitoba |
en_US |
| dc.submitter.email |
efcastle@indiana.edu |
en_US |