| dc.contributor.author |
Atzenhoffer, Jean-Philippe |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T15:11:16Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T15:11:16Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2008 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2009-01-01 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2009-01-01 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3980 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"The 'Tragedy of the Commons' refers to the dissipation of a common- pool ressource when any appropriator has free access to it. Under the behavior of absolute payoff maximisation, the common-pool resource game leads to a Nash equilibrium in which the resource is over-exploited. However, some empirical studies show that the over-utilization is even larger than the Nash equilibrium predicts. We account for these results in an evolutionary framework. Under an imitation-experimentation dynamics, the long run stable behavior implies a larger exploitation of the resource than in the classical Nash equilibrium." |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Document de Travail, no. 21 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
evolution |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Evolutionary Stability in Common Pool Resources |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |