| dc.contributor.author |
Walker, James M. |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.author |
Gardner, Roy |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T14:29:46Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T14:29:46Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1991 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2007-06-20 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2007-06-20 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/405 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Using experimental methods to test a game theoretic model of destruction in a common pool resource environment, this paper investigates whether the possibility of destruction will significantly alter choice behavior in the resulting game. When there is a nonnegligible probability of destruction at the subgame perfect equilibrium, the common pool resource is in every case destroyed and, in most cases, rather quickly. Even when there is a second subgame perfect equilibrium which is completely safe and yields near optimal rents, subjects do not stabilize at this equilibrium. The consequence of this destruction is in every case a significant loss in rents." |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
user fees |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
modeling |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Rent Dissipation and Probabilistic Destruction of Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Common Property Conference, the Second Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
September 26-29 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Winnipeg, Manitoba |
en_US |
| dc.submitter.email |
aurasova@indiana.edu |
en_US |