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Non-Transferable Utility Values of Voting Games

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dc.contributor.author Gardner, Roy
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-02T20:24:35Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-02T20:24:35Z
dc.date.issued 1987 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4723
dc.description.abstract "A voting game is a non-transferable utility (NTU) game with a simple game structure. When the Shapley-Shubik index of a simple game is strictly positive, then the corresponding voting game has a strict NTU value. Moreover, the Shapley-Shubik index is the unique NTU value for a certain class of voting games. These results lead to a solution of the problem of a group choosing its leader." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries W87-19 en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject voting en_US
dc.subject social choice theory en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.title Non-Transferable Utility Values of Voting Games en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Game Theory en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US

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