Image Database Export Citations


Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Güth, Werner
dc.contributor.author Pull, Kerstin
dc.contributor.author Stadler, Manfred
dc.contributor.author Stribeck, Agnes
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-20T15:16:25Z
dc.date.available 2011-01-20T15:16:25Z
dc.date.issued 2010 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6824
dc.description.abstract "In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject equity en_US
dc.subject efficiency en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.title Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal Games en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume 1 en_US
dc.identifier.citationpages 89-102 en_US

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
Equity versus Efficiency.pdf 6.378Mb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show simple item record