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A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons

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dc.contributor.author Koczy, László Á.
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-28T20:09:21Z
dc.date.available 2011-01-28T20:09:21Z
dc.date.issued 2002 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6939
dc.description.abstract "In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Discussion Paper, no. 02.17 en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject tragedy of the commons--models en_US
dc.subject simulations en_US
dc.subject common pool resources--models en_US
dc.title A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Centre for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US

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