| dc.contributor.author |
Winburn, Jonathan |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2014-04-22T19:07:25Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2014-04-22T19:07:25Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2002 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/9324 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"The paper proceeds as follows. The first section lays out a theoretical argument that suggests smaller chambers, in general, and upper chambers, more specifically, offer more benefits to legislators. I discuss the issue institutionally from a bicameral perspective and then discuss how this institutional variation may structure member behavior of not only ambitious politicians looking to limb up the political power ladder but also for those career politicians who make their home in the state capitals. In the second section, I specifically examine the hypotheses derived from the previous discussion. I then lay out the analysis undertaken and the data used, and test several indicators of legislator preference between the chambers. A discussion of the results follows with a concluding section focused on the implications of my findings and potential extensions of this research." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
incentives |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
rules |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
legislature |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
institutional design |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
institutional analysis |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Institutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes: A Look at the Influence of Chamber Size in the State Legislatures |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.region |
North America |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.country |
United States |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
December |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Bloomington, Indiana |
en_US |